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Because mental functioning is essential to being human, the wide array of kinds and 
types of mental functioning displayed in narrative fiction enriches our store of 
conceivable models of human experientiality, suggests various views about its underlying 
features and regularities, and enlarges, through example rather than theory, our sense of 
what it may mean to be human.  




The link between how narratives are structured and the phenomenology of conscious 
awareness points to an indissoluble nexus between narrative and mind…Furthermore, 
this same link between storytelling and consciousness goes to the heart of the problem of 
other minds. 
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Nexus of Narrative and Mind 
In a society saturated with stories, narrative plays the critical role of enabling us 
to comprehend and navigate the human experience. As a tool for understanding, narrative 
is fundamental to human cognition and yet, what happens to the mind when reading 
narratives, particularly fiction and nonfiction, remains unclear. Despite this research gap, 
a wealth of theory and growing empirical evidence strongly indicate that reading 
activates a simulation with critical cognitive and emotional components. Importantly, 
these components have been linked to prosocial cognition, specifically the ability to take 
the perspective of another and empathize with the other1.  
Perspective taking, or Theory of Mind,2 and empathy are crucial prosocial skills 
in a world riddled with dangerous biases, rife with complex social relationships, and one 
that seems increasingly divisive. In such a world, stories possess untapped power. In a 
seminal work, David Herman (2009) identifies this power as the nexus of narrative and 
mind because in reading stories, readers gain access to experiences and the conscious 
minds behind those experiences, which would otherwise be unattainable.  Because of 
narrative’s aptitude to establish mental simulations in which readers can immerse 
themselves, “stories, and stories alone, afford an environment in which versions of what 
it was like to experience situations and events can be juxtaposed, comparatively 
                                                 
1 “The other” is meant in its relation to the concept alterity, understood as the state of being different. 
Otherness is mutually constituted between two subjects. 
2 Theory of Mind is used in its psychological definition throughout this thesis, as the ability to both 
recognize that others have different mental states—thoughts, beliefs, intentions and so forth—than oneself, 
and to attribute those mental states to others. Theory of Mind will be used interchangeably with perspective 
taking. The term, and its relationship to parallel concepts in narrative theory, will be further explicated in 
Chapter 3. 
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evaluated, and then factored into further accounts of the world (or a world)” (Herman, 
2009, p. 151).    
Thus, arises the claim that reading, and especially reading fiction, can improve a 
reader’s ability to understand and empathize with other human beings. Such a conception 
of the cognitive value of fiction is enticing on many levels and has been taken up by 
several narrative theory scholars to varying degrees (Fludernik, 1996, 2003; Zunshine, 
2006; Keen, 2007; Herman, 2009; Nunning, 2015). The fundamental concept of fiction as 
simulation can even be traced back to Aristotle in the Poetics writing about mimesis, 
which meant “world-making” or “modeling” (Djikic et al., 2013). Certainly, the 
culmination of these ideas has evolved into enticing theories for the potential of narrative 
to benefit a reader’s prosocial cognition, but these theories necessitate more convincing 
argumentation. 
The notion that the act of reading functions as a simulation, with potential 
cognitive benefits, is not unique to literary scholarship, however. In fact, what Herman 
terms the nexus of narrative and mind exists pervasively in cognitive science research as 
well.  Keith Oatley (2012), when arguing that reading fiction improves readers’ empathy 
and perspective taking in “The cognitive science of fiction,” states: 
The most important discovery in cognitive science is that the mind makes models 
of the world. These models are the mind, and planning depends on them. The 
cognitive science of fiction augments this idea … It is about how minds can enter 
these models, and thereby understand more about other people and themselves, 
perhaps enabling them to be more conscious, and more planful, in interactions 
with others. (p. 425) 
 
Oatley, a cognitive psychologist, along with psychologist Raymond A. Mar, conducted 
some of the initial empirical studies exploring the cognitive processes underlying reading 
stories, which has also led them to contend reading can benefit a reader’s prosocial 
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cognition because “[n]arratives are fundamentally social in nature in that almost all 
stories concern relationships between people: understanding stories thus entails an 
understanding of people and how their goals, beliefs and emotions interact with their 
behaviors” (Mar et al., 2006).  
Research across these disciplines converges on the concept that reading entails a 
simulated experience. However, exactly how this simulation works, and under what 
conditions reading stories leads to improved prosocial cognition, remains understudied 
despite the prevalence of claims. Thus, this thesis aims to fill gaps in the research by 
more closely parsing the underlying processes of narrative engagement by specifically 
investigating the role of genre expectations on measurements of prosocial cognition and 
transportation.3  
What Makes Fiction Special?  
With the guidance of narrative theory and empirical insights from cognitive 
psychology, an empirical study was conducted to explore how fiction and nonfiction 
genre expectations influenced the following constructs: transportation, empathy, and 
perspective taking. Research in cognitive psychology has shown genre expectation 
influences how readers allocate cognitive processing resources when reading a text. 
Narrative theory, premised on the assumption that narrative is an inherent human 
capacity that enables us to understand fundamental aspects of the human condition and 
                                                 
3 Transportation, understood as immersion in a storyworld, is a key construct stemming from psychology 
(Richard Gerrig, 1993) and is thought to be connected to narrative simulation. Transportation will be 
addressed in Chapter 3. Current empirical work assumes some combination of relationships between 
transportation, empathy and theory of mind, but those relationships have not been adequately determined. 
Rather, existing studies often make the assumption that transportation is either the equivalent of perspective 
taking, or a necessary precondition that enables perspective taking, which leads to empathy. An important 
distinction made in the study presented in this thesis is that it challenges that assumption.  
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our experiences, has long-standing theoretical claims positing that reading fiction 
increases empathy and boosts the likelihood of perspective taking among individuals.  
Recent research in the field that combines these empirical and theoretical 
disciplines, cognitive narratology, has also exposed a genre effect and provided some 
support that fiction is linked to improved empathy and theory of mind skills. However, 
existing empirical work is very new, exploratory, and at times conflicting. Thus, more 
research is needed to better understand the relationship between reading narratives – 
fiction and nonfiction – and their potential relationship to prosocial cognition, empathy 
and theory of mind. The experiments conducted as a component of this thesis aim to be a 
contribution to the field of cognitive narratology, an interdisciplinary endeavor with a 
foundation that integrates narrative theory, literary studies, and cognitive science. By 
taking an integrated approach to investigate the underlying processes of narrative 
engagement, the research in this thesis aims to clarify the following research questions: 
What is the potential of narrative simulations to increase prosocial cognition, and how 
does that potential differ between fiction and nonfiction? And what exactly accounts for 
those differences? Engaging with these questions not only contributes to identifying the 
potential benefits of reading narratives, but also launches a much more rigorous analysis 
of narrative conventions and how they interact with the reader aesthetically and 
cognitively. 
Untapped power: educational, cultural and social implications  
If theory of mind and empathy are products of reading fiction, or a function of 
reading narratives in the proper circumstances, the most immediate benefit is that 
educators and scholars can make the case to key constituents that reading literature can 
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enhance the ability of individuals to take the perspective of others and increase their 
likelihood of empathizing with others. Therefore, it would be very beneficial to know 
what kinds of narratives provide this benefit, and how they do so. 
 Beyond the more immediate benefit of increased ability to understand others’ 
perspectives and empathize, expanding this line of research “is a step toward showing 
that fiction is a valid, epistemologically sound, enterprise,” (Oatley, 2012, p. 428). 
Considering that the importance of reading literature and a healthy literary culture has 
been increasingly under attack, it is essential that the humanities bolster their defenses 
with empirical evidence. This is especially important because the devaluing of the 
humanities has real-world impact on policy decisions, educational settings and larger 
cultural trends. The Common Core State Standards for instance advocate for “less 
emphasis on fiction in secondary education” (Kidd & Castano, 2013, p. 380). 
  Furthermore, the untapped potential of fiction to change readers’ beliefs, 
including negative biases, warrants thorough investigation (Nunning, 2015).  The 
persuasive power of fiction to change readers’ beliefs and self-concepts needs to be taken 
seriously. “Contrary to prevalent beliefs, even ‘untrue,’ fictional stories, can change 
readers’ beliefs and their cultural encyclopedia,” (Nunning, 2015, p. 42). Some studies in 
this line of research have shown that the act of reading fiction changes self-reports of 
personality. Other studies have shown that participants learned about real-world items 
and information in a fictional setting, and then applied that knowledge in a real-world 
setting. First, this suggests the possibility that repeated interaction with fiction could have 
both short-term and long-term effects on an individual’s selfhood and general world 
knowledge. Secondly, and more importantly, there is untapped potential for researchers 
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and scholars to find ways to utilize literary narratives strategically to encourage desirable 
changes in an individual’s selfhood or knowledge.  
 The better we understand how processing narrative works, the closer we arrive at 
devising a toolkit of narrative strategies to improve educational outcomes that have 
broader social and cultural benefits. Expanding the knowledge of narrative simulation 
and the effect of genre expectations not only has educational implications, but presents 
opportunities for researchers in fields like conceptual change, to develop successful 
strategies that replace an individual’s misconceptions with the correct conception. Such 
efforts have never been more important as we witness the rise of fake news4, which often 
encourages biases toward ‘other’ groups, and misinformation about critical topics, such 










                                                 
4 Fake news refers to intentional and manufactured information that is falsely presented to the reader as 
true, stemming from websites falsely representing themselves as legitimate news outlets, from social 
media, or online peddlers of conspiracy. A prime example of fake news, how it originates and persists, as 
well as its dangerous consequences, is the story of Pizzagate (October - December 2016). Pizzagate even 
earned an entry on Wikipedia as the “Pizzagate conspiracy theory.” 
 7 
CHAPTER 1: WHEN THE NARRATIVE TURN AND COGNITIVE TURN 
COLLIDE 
 
 Although stories have long been the object of scholarship in literary studies, the 
concept of narratives as a fundamental tool for sense-making is relatively new as an 
object of serious study. As David Herman writes in the Introduction to Narrative Theory 
and the Cognitive Sciences (2003), “Theorists’ recognition of the vital role played by 
stories in our everyday lives is both a cause and a byproduct of the development (one 
might say explosion) of new approaches to narrative analysis,” fostered by the ‘narrative 
turn’ (p. 4). The functional result of the ‘narrative turn’ over the last few decades was that 
narrative “became a central concern in a wide range of disciplinary fields and research 
contexts” (Herman, 2003, p.4), especially in the cognitive sciences. In parallel, narrative 
scholars in the humanities became more open to integrating approaches from the 
cognitive sciences due to the ‘cognitive turn’ in narrative studies forms/emerges in the 
1990s.5  
                                                 
5 The integration of narrative studies and cognitive sciences during this period is evidenced by the 
emergence of early key works, journal issues dedicated to cognitive narratology, and has been followed by 
a steady stream of articles and conferences “exploring intersections among cognition, literature, and culture 
as well as approaches to the mind-narrative nexus in particular” (Herman, 2013, para. 4). An incomplete 
list of examples includes: 1) Key works –  Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence, and Narrative Theory 
(Marie-Laure Ryan, 1991), Reading Minds: The Study of English in the Age of Cognitive Science and The 
Literary Mind (Mark Turner, 1991 and 1996), Towards a ‘Natural’ Narratology (Monika Fludernik, 1996), 
Narrative Theory and the Cognitive Sciences (e.d., David Herman, 2003); 2) Journals – the very first 
volume of Image and Narrative in 2000 entitled “Cognitive Narratology” features an article by David 
Herman, “Narratology as a cognitive science”; a 2002 special issue of Poetics Today entitled “Literature 
and the Cognitive Revolution”; a search for the term “cognitive” in the major journal Narrative pulls up 
138 results ranging from 2002-2017; 3) Conferences – Science of Story and Imagination: Perspectives from 
Cognitive Science, Neuroscience, and the Humanities (March 2014), Why the Humanities: Answers from 
the Cognitive and Neurosciences (July 2015), Perspectives and Frontiers of Cognitive Narratology 
(October 2015); Narrative, Cognition & Science Lab (August 2016). At the 2017 International Conference 
on Narrative, there was a cognitive presence throughout the program, importantly marked by starting the 
conference with cognitive-oriented talks for the initial conference kick-off panel (Contemporary Narrative 
Theory I with speakers, Marco Carraciolo, Mark Currie and Karin Kukkonen), included the following 
panels: Empirical Research on Narrative, Cognitive Approaches to Narrative, Character, Cognition and 
Representation, and featured individual papers on other panels incorporating cognitive approaches in some 
capacity. 
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 A critical outcome that arises from the development of cognitive narratology is an 
interdisciplinary framework that understands “stories as both a major target of and an 
important basis for cognition” (Herman, 2003, p. 12). This approach incorporates two 
perspectives on the relationship between narrative and cognition—making sense of 
stories and stories as sense-making.  When using this approach, the study of narratives no 
longer solely aims to advance knowledge of their form and function and how those 
factors establish meaning for the reader, nor does it do so in the isolation of literary 
studies. Rather, the study of narratives in the framework of cognitive narratology seeks to 
discover both the cognitive processes underlying how we make sense of stories and how 
we use stories as “an instrument for sense-making, a semiotic and communicative 
resource that enables humans to make their way in a sometimes confusing, often difficult 
world” (Herman, 2003, p. 12).  
 Cognitive narratology entails an enticing and fruitful research approach to the 
study of narrative. But once we recognize stories function as a tool for sense-making, 
complex questions arise: How exactly do narratives accomplish such a feat and what 
happens cognitively when they do? Across disciplines, the answers to the question to this 
question converge on one key concept – simulation. 
Reading Minds, Insights from Literary Scholars  
Though she does not use the term ‘simulation’, Monika Fludernik (1996) 
introduces the term ‘experientiality,’ which she defines as “the quasi-mimetic evocation 
of real-life experience” (p. 12). In other words, experientiality is an outcome of reading 
(certain) narratives that contain representations of human experience such that they 
activate “‘natural’ cognitive parameters, particularly the embodiment of cognitive 
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faculties, the understanding of intentional action, the perception of temporality, and the 
emotional evaluation of experience” (Caracciolo, Experientiality, para. 1). To clarify her 
definition of experientiality as “the quasi-mimetic evocation of real-life experience,” 
Fludernik informs the reader that: 
…mimesis must not be identified as imitation but needs to be treated as the 
artificial and illusionary projection of a semiotic structure which the reader 
recuperates in terms of a fictional reality. This recuperation, since it is based on 
cognitive parameters gleaned from real-world experience, inevitability results in 
an implicit though incomplete homologization [sic] of the fictional and the real 
worlds. (1996, p. 35) 
 
Put simply, readers project a simulation of a storyworld and that storyworld’s characters 
and events in order to process the narrative cognitively using the same cognitive faculties 
they use on a daily basis in real life storytelling environments.  
Furthermore, Fludernik argues experientiality is the “crucial ingredient” that 
constitutes narrativity. In making this claim, Fludernik means that the quality that makes 
a narrative explicitly a narrative, as opposed to another form of discourse, does not reside 
in the text contents or features of the text, but is “rather an attribute imposed on the text 
by the reader who interprets the text as narrative, thus narrativizing the text” (Fludernik, 
2003, p. 244).  In this process, what matters most is “the protagonist’s emotional and 
physical reaction to [events as they impinge on her situations and activities]…since 
humans are conscious thinking beings, (narrative) experientiality always implies – and 
sometimes emphatically foregrounds – the protagonist’s consciousness” (1996, p. 30). 
In the context of this thesis, Fludernik makes two key contributions. First, she 
situates her claims about a reader’s experience with narrative in terms of a reader’s 
“natural” cognitive capacities, which dovetails into the second contribution. By 
establishing ‘experientiality’ as a cognitive process, Fludernik links a reader’s 
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consciousness to representations of consciousness in narratives. In doing so, she suggests 
that reading activates some type of simulated experience for the reader and that this 
simulation depends ultimately, on the reader rather than the text.  
 Fludernik’s ideas about experientiality remain pervasive and influential. Although 
she did not explicitly link experientiality to simulation, her theoretical contributions about 
the role of consciousness provided fertile ground for other scholars to extend her concept 
of experientiality closer to how it is understood in psychology, “as narrative’s capacity to 
give rise to experiential states and responses in recipients. Experientiality thus ties in with 
a larger movement within contemporary narratology—a movement that focuses on the 
psychological processes underlying recipients’ engagement with stories” (Caracciolo, 
para. 13). 
Herman contributes to this extension in the Basic Elements of Narrative (2009), in 
which he argues “narrative is a mode of representation tailor-made for gauging the felt 
quality of lived experiences” (p. 137-138). Building from Fludernik’s conception of 
experientiality, Herman draws on philosophy of mind’s notion of qualia6—a quality of 
human consciousness that specifically accounts for the feeling of “what it is like” to be 
someone or something (p. 143)—to argue that narrative and qualia are structurally 
isomorphic. A condition of narrative is the representation of characters’ consciousness, 
i.e., their qualia, and by representing minds, “stories emulate through their temporal and 
                                                 
6 The term qualia is a storied concept that stems from philosophy of mind. For the current purposes, it is 
best understood as a term referencing “the qualitative, experiential, or felt properties of mental states” 
(Levin, 1999, p. 688). In other words, it refers to subjective conscious experiences and is used accordingly 
in this thesis. It is beyond the scope of this thesis, however, to delve into philosophical conversations and 
debates about qualia in the specific context of philosophy of mind.  
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perspectival configuration the what-it’s-like dimension of conscious awareness itself” (p. 
157). Herman therefore makes the following statement: 
Stories […] do not merely convey semantic content but furthermore encode in 
their very structure a way of experiencing events. To put the same point in other 
terms, narrative, unlike other modes of representation such as deductive 
arguments, stress equations, or the periodic table of the elements, is uniquely 
suited to capturing what the world is like from the situated perspective of an 
experiencing mind. (p. 157)   
 
This is where Herman makes a distinctive and an important departure from Fludernik, 
and lays the groundwork for linking the reading of narrative to simulation. 
Beyond the claim that the structure of real-life qualia maps onto the structure of 
stories, and that stories represent qualia, Herman claims that narrative actually allows the 
reader to engage with the qualia, to in fact know the subjective conscious experiences, of 
characters in their respective storyworlds. Furthermore, this engagement enables readers 
to compare “versions of what it was like to experience particular situations and events,” 
which means that “narrative not only reflects but helps shape the sense of what it is like 
to live through worlds-in-flux” (p. 152). However, Herman stops short of stating that 
readers “experience” the qualia of characters in storyworlds during reading. 
In another step toward connecting the reading experience to simulation, Marco 
Caracciolo puts even more weight on the reader’s consciousness in the process of reading 
than Herman. “His central claim is that the consciousness the reader ‘finds’ in narrative 
texts is not represented or projected but enacted in the reader’s imagination” (Bernaerts et 
al., 2013, p. 15, emphasis mine). In line with Herman, Caracciolo also argues narratives 
present opportunities to understand the mental states of others. However, Caracciolo 
departs from Herman in two important ways.  
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First, Caracciolo elevates the role of imagination in the reader’s experiencing of 
fictional minds and second, he is more willing to argue that literary fiction specifically 
accomplishes this feat. From this position, Caracciolo suggests that “fiction can make 
empathic identification much stronger than it usually is in our engagement with other 
people, for the simple reason that we do not just ‘put ourselves into the shoes’ of another; 
we imaginatively reconstruct those shoes (and, for that matter, the other person) on the 
basis of textual cues” (2013, p. 48). For Caracciolo then, narratives do not just provide 
readers access to viewing fictional minds and their qualia, but narratives, and literary 
fiction especially, actually enable readers to share the experiences of those fictional 
minds and their qualia by enacting them. Furthermore, Caracciolo ties a reader’s 
simulation of fictional minds to empathy, a critical point that will be discussed in detail in 
upcoming chapters.  
In another key contribution to the concept of narrative simulation, Liza Zunshine 
(2006) integrates research from cognitive psychology on Theory of Mind, or mind-
reading. Mind-reading is the cognitive skill that allows us to ascribe mental states, such 
as thoughts, feelings, and beliefs, to others. This ability helps us understand how and why 
other people act the way they do. As Zunshine writes, “attributing states of minds is the 
default way by which we construct and navigate our social environment, incorrect though 
are attributions frequently are” (p. 6). In Why We Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the 
Novel, Zunshine showcases how closely integrated mind-reading is to literature, such that 
“literature pervasively capitalizes on and stimulates Theory of Mind mechanisms that had 
evolved to deal with real people, even as on some level readers to remain aware that 
fictive characters are not real people” (p. 10). With multiple detailed case studies, 
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Zunshine convincingly demonstrates this link by bringing to light the relationship 
between metarepresentation, ToM, and literature. Metarepresentation entails tracking the 
sources of representations; Zunshine refers to this as tagging. Where ToM enables us to 
identify, or hypothesize, about the mental states of others, metarepresentation aids us in 
tracking multiple, and sometimes contradictory information inputs about an individual. 
Therefore, Zunshine writes: 
Broadly speaking, whereas our Theory of Mind makes it possible for us to invest 
literary characters with a potential for a broad array of thoughts, desires, 
intentions, and feelings and then to look for textual cues that allow us to figure out 
their states of mind and thus predict their behavior, our metarepresentational 
ability allows us to discriminate among the streams of information coming at us 
via all this mind-reading. (p. 60) 
 
In the context of reading literature, a reader is presented with multiple 
metarepresentations—characters thoughts about other characters—and is tasked with 
arriving at the proper conclusion about the characters in the story. Though she does draw 
strong connections between these cognitive skills and literature, Zunshine’s project is 
focused on how these cognitive skills inform reading literature, not the other way around. 
She cautions that while, “Theory of Mind makes reading fiction possible, reading fiction 
does not make us into better mind-readers, at least not in the way that I can theorize 
confidently at this early stage of our knowledge about cognitive information processing” 
(p. 35). Yet, her project underscores the potential of literature to exercise our mind-
reading abilities. 
Narratives as Social World Simulations, Insights from Cognitive Psychology  
 While literary scholars have long theorized about the relationship between 
fictional minds and actual minds with a particular focus on issues pertaining to 
consciousness and (increasingly) text features, until very recently, they have edged 
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around, and often stopped short of, the claim that reading certain narratives can enact a 
simulated experience for the reader. Scholars from psychology and cognitive psychology, 
on the other hand, have not shied away from claims about the connection between 
narrative fiction and simulation. 
 A 2008 article in the Perspectives on Psychological Science, “The Function of 
Fiction is the Abstraction and Simulation of Social Experience” (Mar & Oatley), offers a 
prime example. Mar and Oatley (2008) write: 
Simulation is related to narrative fiction in two distinct ways. The first is that 
consumers of literary stories experience thoughts and emotions congruent with the 
events represented by these narratives. […] The second way in which literary 
narratives are related to simulation is that stories model and abstract the human 
social world. (p. 173)  
 
In a shift from the literary scholars discussed above, Mar and Oatley move away from 
theoretical discussions and posit a direct claim about the “function of fiction.” This 
perspective on narrative fiction has influenced cognitive psychology’s research about 
narrative comprehension quite extensively. For instance, the authors of a foundational 
study in cognitive narratology, “Reading other minds: Effects of literature on empathy” 
(2013), contend that:  
Fiction has the general subject matter of selves in the social world. It is in the 
narrative mode, and is about intentions and the vicissitudes they encounter. It is 
emotionally engaging and encourages identification or experience-taking. It is 
based on a simulation that the reader runs in his or her mind. The theory of fiction 
as simulation of selves and their interactions in the social world is supported by 
several lines of evidence (Djikic, Oatley, & Moldoveanu). (p. 34) 
 
The conviction behind these statements stems from a platform of pivotal 
theoretical contributions, especially Jerome Bruner’s (1986) Actual Minds, Possible 
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Worlds and Richard Gerrig’s (1983) Experiencing Narrative Worlds.7 After all, Bruner 
(1986) was the first to make the claim that narrative “deals with the vicissitudes of human 
intention” (p. 13); the use of “vicissitudes” is now commonplace in this literature rather 
than more accessible alternatives, like variations or fluctuations. Of greater importance, 
when Bruner (1986) argued that the main role of narrative is to mediate human 
experience, he made a critical contribution to how scholars think about narrative by 
conceiving of narrative as a mode of reasoning, sense-making, and as tool for creating 
one’s self identity (Mattingly, Lutkehaus & Thropp, 2008).  
Bruner (1986) posited that two modes of thought direct human cognition – the 
narrative mode of thought and the paradigmatic, or logico-scientific, mode of thought. He 
specifically links the narrative mode of thought to humans’ “primitive propensity to 
interpret behavior in terms of intention” (Mattingly, Lutkehaus & Thropp, 2008). 
Essentially, humans seek causality, which means we narrativize everything by trying to 
ascertain or ascribe intention to other humans or whatever subjects/objects exist in the 
world. In the narrative mode of thought, we use stories to understand and interpret the 
world, other humans, and our subjective experiences; it is how we extract meaning.  
In contrast, the logico-scientific mode of thought is linked to the testable 
empirical world, formal and logical categorization. In the logic-scientific mode of 
thought, our goal is not extract meaning, but to extract information. This distinction 
becomes particularly salient in distinguishing the reading goals of fiction and nonfiction. 
                                                 
7 Gerrig’s contribution, primarily the concept of narrative transportation, will be further discussed in the 
next chapter due to its direct influence on empirical studies on narrative comprehension.  
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Fiction communicates meaning, the meaning that others8 have constructed through their 
experiences, via an interpretable narrative. Nonfiction communicates information.  
According to Bruner (1986), these two modes of thought, or “cognitive 
functioning,” provide “distinctive ways of ordering experience, of constructing reality” 
and “each of the ways of knowing, moreover, has operating principles of its own and its 
own criteria of well-formedness” (p. 11). The distinction between the narrative and 
logico-scientific mode of thought was later applied to investigating the differences in how 
readers process fiction and nonfiction. Zwaan (1994) examined the effects of fiction and 
nonfiction genre expectations on text comprehension and found that the genre 
expectations influenced how readers processed texts resulting in the formulation of 
different mental representations. These findings suggest that readers comprehend texts 
according to which mode of thought is activated.9 On top of the major contribution about 
two modes of thought, Bruner (1986) also sets fiction aside as special. In addition to 
having content that parallels the social world, the presence of (character) consciousness, 
literature also presents potentials outside of everyday reality.10 “Stories, in other words, 
present the world not as it necessarily or always is, as settled facts, but as 
‘psychologically in process, and as such, contingent or subjunctive’” (Mattingly, 
Lutkehaus, & Thropp, 2008, quoting Bruner, p. 29). In doing so, stories act like case 
studies for humans to practice their narrative mode of thought and learn from. 
                                                 
8 Without delving into the complexities implied here, others can refer to fictional characters, narrators, and 
authors.   
9 Zwaan’s (1994) study will receive more attention in the following chapter, including how it influenced the 
experiments conducted in this thesis. 
10 The parallels between Bruner and literary theory scholars, especially David Herman, are striking here. 
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For scholars based in psychology and cognitive science, the link between reading 
narrative and simulation was also primed by a robust and extensive line of established 
research on text comprehension processes that strongly indicates readers develop mental 
representations of a text’s meaning during the reading process (Kintsch & van Dijk, 
1978; van den Broek et al., 1999) which includes automatic and “conscious intentional 
and strategic processes” (Mar & Oatley, 2008, p. 172; referencing Kintsch, 2005; van den 
Broek, Rapp, & Kendeou, 2005). Furthermore, text comprehension research has also 
revealed differences in the processes readers apply to narrative fiction texts versus 
expository nonfiction texts (Zwaan, 1994), a finding that is pivotal for the research 
conducted in this thesis, which specifically investigates the role of fiction and nonfiction 
genre expectations on narrative comprehension processes. 
Converging on Narrative Simulation 
It is telling that scholars across disciplines, all studying how narratives function 
but within the scope of their respective discipline’s research and theories, made 
contributions that converged on the fundamental idea that narrative entails some sort of 
simulated experience for the reader. The humanities focused on theoretical questions: 
What makes narrative distinctly narrative? What role does the reader’s consciousness 
play? What aesthetic qualities of the text, like point of view or the use of free indirect 
discourse, influence a reader’s experience of the text? In contrast, but certainly in 
complement, cognitive psychology centered its inquiry on mechanistic questions: How 
does narrative comprehension work? How does a reader establish a mental model or 
representation of a text (Bortolussi, Dixon, & Sommer, 2016)? 
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Insights from the humanities illuminated the role of qualia, and its relationship to 
the structure of narrative, while contributions from the cognitive sciences drew out the 
parallels between a reader’s cognitive capacities in daily storytelling environments and 
processing narrative texts. As the connection between fictional minds and actual minds 
becomes increasingly evident, new and more complex questions arise, however. 
Thankfully, the integration of these disciplines, i.e., cognitive narratology, opens 
up space for the research conducted in this thesis. Applying empirical approaches to the 
study of narrative is an opportunity, but one best served with adherence to and awareness 
of the contributions from literary theory scholars. As Bortolussi, Dixon, and Sommer, 
(2016) write in the Introduction to a special issue of DIEGESIS (5.1, 2016) entitled 
“Empirical Approaches to Narrative”, the exploration of “how interpreters make sense of 
stories and how specific narrative designs cue readers to respond to texts in predictable 
ways…is a truly interdisciplinary project that calls for close collaboration between 
narrative theory, especially the domain of literary [cognitive] narratology, and the 
methodologies of cognitive psychology and discourse processing” (p. 1). 
This interdisciplinary framework provides a better position for this thesis to ask 
the following questions: What factors influence the cognitive processing of stories? 
Specifically, does genre expectation matter and how so? What are the cognitive outcomes 










CHAPTER 2: STATE OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
 
The theoretical convergence on the idea of narrative simulation led to a surge of 
interest across disciplines in investigating how reading fiction functions, and this has 
resulted in a burgeoning line of empirical research. In this body of research, three key 
themes can be identified. First, the emergence of critical studies on the underlying 
cognitive processes and subsequent outcomes of reading narratives has typically assumed 
fundamental differences exist between fiction and nonfiction stories and those differences 
facilitate distinct processing. Second, the constructs—transportation and Theory of Mind, 
or perspective taking—that have been theorized as components of simulation have 
received the most attention. Third, the notion that fiction operates differently than 
nonfiction has fueled ideas about the potential cognitive benefits of reading fiction, 
primarily empathy. The following discussion of key findings in this body of research 
highlights how researchers have worked within these themes to explore what narrative 
simulation entails. 
Fiction vs. Nonfiction—Two levels  
The “literariness” of fiction in comparison to nonfiction almost seems implicit, 
but as suggested above, there are distinctive features in a literary reading experience 
versus a nonfiction one. According to David S. Miall (2009), “there are two standard 
claims about what makes our reading literary: that it is triggered, first, by our encounter 
with a rich, organized array of stylistic features (Miall & Kuiken, 1999), or, second, by 
the (usually empathic) engagement with characters in literary narratives (Oatley & Mar, 
2005)” (p. 235).  In the chapter, “Neuroaesthetics of Literary Reading,” Miall emphasizes 
the reader’s unique aesthetic experience of fiction in the context of recent advances in 
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neuropsychology that explore real-time online processing of narratives through brain 
imaging studies. Given the progress of studies in this field and advances in the 
technology, Miall contends “the fine discrimination of literary from nonliterary 
experience should now be within reach of brain scanning technology” (p. 236). Though 
enthusiasm about these advances may be warranted, this is a significant claim to make, 
and one which should raise eyebrows and a lot of questions. Seeing parts of the brain 
light up tells us something certainly, but only generally, about narrative processing; 
neuroimaging remains severely lacking in specificity, a limitation Miall recognizes when 
he asks, even “if we find a difference due to literary processing, can we understand what 
it means, that is, how it contributes to a conception of literariness?” (p. 237). Well, maybe 
he contends, if we take an interdisciplinary approach that also entails identifying core 
features specific to fiction and isolating their effects. The empirical studies that have 
waded into research questions about processing fiction versus nonfiction are a step in the 
right direction, but Miall’s point is an important one for the field as it moves forward. If 
we are to truly capture “what is distinctive to literary response” in a reader’s cognitive 
processing of fiction compared to expository texts, we need to approach the difference 
between fiction and nonfiction at two levels—how we cognitively process the two 
genres, and how the content and its features moderate that processing.  
 Recall from the last chapter the distinction Bruner (1986) made between two 
modes of thought, or “two modes of knowing” – the logico-scientific mode and the 
narrative mode. In doing so, Bruner brought to light an important aspect of how humans 
deal with the varied influx of information they encounter on a daily basis. As Bruner 
writes, “There are two modes of cognitive functioning, two modes of thought, each 
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providing distinctive ways of ordering experience, of constructing reality. The two 
(though complementary) are irreducible to one another” (p. 11). Essentially, we have 
cognitive strategies, or frameworks, that we apply depending on the material we 
encounter. In the logico-scientific mode of knowing we order truth by logic, causality, 
testable hypotheses—essentially facts and information about the empirical world.  The 
narrative mode speaks to our subjective state of being and supplies a way of 
understanding our experiences with the empirical world as well as other humans and their 
actions.  
Not only do we have two modes of thought, the information generated by these 
two modes then gets compiled in certain formats, a process which inherently causes them 
to be designated as one of two categories—fiction or nonfiction. In these two modes of 
cognitive functioning we produce different ways of knowing and subsequently, different 
products. Bruner (1991) writes, “unlike the constructions generated by logical and 
scientific procedures that can be weeded out by falsification, narrative constructions can 
only achieve ‘verisimilitude.’ Narratives, then, are a version of reality whose 
acceptability is governed by convention and ‘narrative necessity’ rather than by empirical 
verification and logical requiredness…” (p. 4).  
The parallel distinctions of the logico-scientific mode and narrative modes of 
thought, and nonfiction and fiction discourse or texts, thus provide a fruitful starting point 
for empirical studies on text and discourse processing. The result is a two-tiered concept 
of, to use Bruner’s words, verisimilitude; we apply different standards of truth to each of 
these modes. If we process information differently depending on our cognitive 
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framework, then it follows that different mechanisms are at play depending on the mode 
we apply, or the mode that the text facilitates.  
Rolf Zwaan (1994) explored this possibility in “Effect of Genre Expectations on 
Text Comprehension.” In this set of experiments, Zwaan split participants into two 
groups that read the same text materials, but were either told it was a literary story or a 
news story. With this instruction manipulation, Zwaan investigated whether the discourse 
genre would influence the process and products of text comprehension; “given that reader 
goals affect mental representations and that there are three levels at which text can be 
represented, one may assume that readers will, depending on their goals, differentially 
allocate resources to processes that construct these levels during reading” (p. 920). Zwaan 
was specifically attending to comprehension processes in this study, hence his focus on 
the three levels of discourse comprehension—surface structure, textbase, and the 
situation model (Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978).  
By giving participants the same text to read, but changing the genre identified, 
any differences captured in comprehension measurements could be “attributed to 
differences between a news- and a literary-comprehension control system rather than to 
particular text features or to a reading goal explicitly provided by the experimenter” (p. 
921). What Zwaan refers to as news- vs. literary-comprehension control systems, we can 
read as Bruner’s logico-scientific mode vs. narrative mode of thought. In these two 
experiments, the results indicated the participants did formulate different mental 
representations of the text and allocate processing resources differently depending on 
their genre expectation; differences were identified in post-reading measures on 
comprehension and memory of the text at the three discourse levels identified earlier. 
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While participants in both categories within the experiment, or conditions, performed 
equally well on basic comprehension of the text, participants “reading under a literary 
perspective had longer reading times, better memory for surface information, and a 
poorer memory for situational information than those reading under a news perspective” 
(p. 920). In other words, participants allocated cognitive processing resources differently 
because the genre expectation they had established the “verisimilitude” they were seeking 
and the corresponding genre standards for said truth. Thus, participants in the news 
reading condition spent more time on forming a causality-coherent situation model, and 
participants in the literary condition spent more time on the surface structure, seeking 
meaning from the text structure itself, rather than information to check against and fit into 
their knowledge of the real world. As Zwaan hypothesized, the study “suggests that 
information about text genre triggers strategic processes in reading” (p. 931).  
  However, we must remember that discourse processing remains a two-way 
interaction between the reader and the text.11 While the notion that readers activate a 
different processing framework when reading fiction has received some empirical 
support, these studies have limitations12 and the authors are certainly not making the 
claim that the text contents and structure do no matter. But the question becomes, how 
much do they matter and what features of fiction actually accomplish these effects? From 
                                                 
11 This statement rests on well-established understandings of how a text’s meaning depends on an 
interaction between the text and the reader, which is robustly supported by reader-response theories (see 
Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? (1980), and Wolfgang Iser, The Implied Reader (1972) and The 
Act of Reading (1978)). The basic idea behind reader-response theories is that the texts contain gaps and the 
reader is tasked with filling those gaps to establish meaning, based on cues from the text and from what 
they bring to the text, such as prior knowledge. The influence of reader-response theory in discourse 
processing research (i.e. situation models and schemata) is prevalent, providing another example of 
disciplinary crossover between literary theory and cognitive psychology in the context of the reading 
experience.  
12 To be discussed in next chapter. 
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this discussion, it may seem that fiction is not that special after all, but fiction is clearly 
distinctive from nonfiction.  
The experience of reading a piece of literature, especially an engaging one, is 
vastly dissimilar from reading newspaper articles about plights around the world; we 
know this from repeated personal experience. When I read that Dumbledore—a wizard 
from not just a fictional storyworld, but a hyper-fictionalized one at that—died, I was 
genuinely emotionally upset. I had to stop reading. My mom did not understand my 
sudden mood change, as I went from walking around reading voraciously to being teary-
eyed and tossing the book on the kitchen counter in disbelief and grief. And yet, I read 
the news every day in which real deaths are narrated. But when I read another story about 
civilian deaths in a war-torn locale, or the state of the refugee crisis in Syria, I just keep 
reading. I simply switch tasks and move on to the next headline. There is a moment at 
times when I experience a cognitive, or conscious, recognition that this story upsets me, 
but it is (in a troubling way) a fleeting perception that occurs before I move on to the next 
story. Though perhaps I should not say it upsets me at all really because upon further 
thought, that fleeting perception is more akin to knowing something is wrong, rather than 
feeling the depths of that wrongness in an experiential and emotional way, which 
contrasts how I feel when reading Harry Potter, or Michael Chabon’s The Amazing 
Adventures of Kavalier and Clay, or John Steinbeck’s Grapes of Wrath. In reading those 
stories I become emotionally entangled with the characters’ experiences as a co-
experiencer. The palpable distinction between the experience of reading fiction versus 
nonfiction is compelling, even in the brief case sketched above, but the reasons for the 
difference are complex.  
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Reading fiction certainly feels different, but there are also important technical 
reasons for this as well. First, to state the obvious, fiction entails imaginary worlds 
created by a writer’s imagination; even if you read a realist novel that correlates strongly 
to the details of our world and how it works, the story remains anchored in fantasy. 
Fiction narratives do not present an account of reality, but a representation of it, whereas 
nonfiction narratives deal with real world content, real people, real facts. Second, fiction 
tends to incorporate figurative language, while nonfiction rarely does. Third, fiction uses 
genre-specific devices, such as free indirect discourse, multiple points of view, narrators, 
defamiliarization, and internal monologue, just to name a few.  
Recognizing these two levels of difference between fiction and nonfiction is a 
core component of the foundation for research in cognitive narratology. From this 
distinction, we can explore the mechanisms that underlie narrative processing and 
simulation, as well as the differences in the outcomes of reading fiction versus nonfiction.  
Components of Simulation—Transportation and Perspective Taking 
Richard Gerrig (1993) establishes the theory of narrative transportation in his 
work, Experiencing Narrative Worlds: On the Psychological Activities of Reading. The 
core of this concept speaks to the feeling of “getting lost” in a story, to the extent that real 
world surroundings are no longer at the forefront of an individual’s thoughts and are, 
essentially, forgotten. When this happens, to varying degrees, a reader is immersed in a 
narrative and becomes transported into the storyworld of the narrative they’re engaging 
with; though Gerrig claimed transportation can occur readily in a wide range of narrative 
experiences, the research so far supports the idea that transportation is more prevalent in 
fiction than nonfiction reading processes. Regardless, ever since Gerrig hypothesized the 
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same cognitive mechanisms are behind how we process narratives and how we process 
the day-to-day real world, and that readers could be “transported” into fictional worlds in 
a way that leads them to emotionally engage and react mentally to that world, the concept 
of transportation has been linked to almost all potential outcomes of reading fiction (Mar 
et al., 2006).  
Though Gerrig’s idea became highly influential, he was not particularly explicit 
about how transportation took place. In fact, he wrote: 
“…little is formally required to bring about experiences of narrative worlds: 
the means are quite diverse and sometimes mundane. Great artistry might 
facilitate the journey, but the only a priori requirement for a means of 
transportation is that it serve as an invitation to the traveler to abandon the 
here and now. (In terms of our metaphor, I’m claiming that a pickup truck 
isn’t as elegant as a Cadillac, but it will still get us to Texas.) (p. 12) 
 
This underwhelming general description of the factors involved in transportation left 
ample room for researchers to expand the concept, both in terms of what facilitates a 
reader to be transported and what a reader does once in this immersed state. Narrative 
transportation is now typically conceived of as a multidimensional concept, which occurs 
on a low-high spectrum that depends on how good a reader’s mental image of the 
storyworld is, and the degree to which a reader becomes emotionally involved in the 
narrative (Green, 2004). Though there is some support for the claim that high levels of 
imagery invite mental simulation and immersion, the factors that influence the level of a 
reader’s transportation into narrative remain largely up for debate. 
Despite these unknowns, transportation is now considered a key mechanism of 
narrative impact (Green & Brock, 2000), a claim that entails an assumption that 
transportation either induces or entails cognitive outcomes, such as empathy and 
perspective taking. The concept has become so prevalent among researchers in cognitive 
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psychology that “the phenomenology of transportation is taken to be a fact of readers’ 
immersion” (Keen, 2013, para. 4). The literature so far indicates that “the persuasive 
effect of fiction is only likely to be realized if fiction is read as fiction, that is if it is not 
processed in the same way as a factual story or textbook. The persuasive power of fiction 
is tied to transportation, which presupposes that fiction is read as an end in itself, for 
pleasure, in a state of immersion, with the reader being entranced by the fictional world” 
(Nunning, 2015, p. 44). 
In addition, the notion that transportation enables empathy has received some 
experiment support. Bal and Veltkamp (2013) tested the hypothesis that reading fiction 
influences empathy, and that those empathy outcomes are directly correlated to the level 
of transportation readers experience.  In their study, participants either read a fiction 
chapter or newspaper articles. Overall, participants in the fiction condition reported 
enhanced empathy, but only when they experienced high levels of emotional 
transportation. Of note, this enhancement held over a week period, which suggests that 
engaging with certain narratives does not just have temporary effects on a reader, but 
potentially long-term ones as well.  
In the first study to consider the moderating role of transportation, Bal and 
Veltkamp (2013) did find a correlation between transportation and empathy. However, 
transportation did not just play a positive moderating role as predicted. While reports of 
high transportation correlated with better scores on empathy, reports of low transportation 
actually reduced empathy outcomes in the fiction condition. Perhaps more interesting was 
the finding that readers in the nonfiction condition showed opposite results. When readers 
in the nonfiction condition experienced higher transportation their empathy actually 
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lessened after reading. These findings are particularly important because they highlight 
the role of transportation as a moderator for empathy, and they show genre matters 
because transportation levels did not lead to the same positive cognitive outcomes when 
participants read nonfiction. On top of that, “these results are important, because previous 
research has claimed that fiction reading has positive effects, while we are amongst the 
first who also show that fiction reading might have negative effects, when readers do not 
become transported, and hence, disengage from literature” (Bal & Veltkamp, 2013, p. 8). 
The findings in this study support the claim that transportation is a key component of the 
reading experience, while also bringing to light the complexities of transportation and its 
potential relationship to empathy outcomes. 
Research about processing narrative has also often assumed that transportation 
enables or entails “the ability to infer what is in the minds of others” (Mar et al., 2006, p. 
696), or theory of mind. Thus far, the research on this topic has produced conflicting 
results. Kidd and Castano (2013), for instance, found no correlation between 
transportation and outcomes on theory of mind in any of their three conditions – literary 
fiction, popular fiction and nonfiction. In addition, transportation was not significantly 
different across those conditions, in direct contrast to the Bal and Veltkamp (2013) 
findings about transportation variance in fiction and nonfiction conditions. 
While transportation and Theory of Mind [ToM] may not be correlated, mind-
reading is still considered a core component of narrative simulation. In addition to the 
theoretical convictions and evidence provided by Zunshine (2006), Mar (2011) was able 
to show there is “substantial overlap between areas of the brain concerned with theory-of-
mind and areas concerned with understanding stories” (Djikic et al., 2013, p. 32) with an 
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extensive meta-analysis of functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging studies on narrative 
processing.  
In a study conducted by Kidd and Castano (2013), “Reading Literary Fiction 
Improves Theory of Mind,” the authors tested the hypothesis that reading literary fiction 
would promote theory of mind compared to both nonfiction and popular fiction because 
literary fiction especially encourages perspective taking. The results showed temporary 
boosts in theory of mind for readers in the literary fiction condition only. The authors 
interpreted these results as evidence that literary fiction—above popular fiction and 
nonfiction—increases readers’ mind-reading skills because the “features [of literary 
fiction] mimic those of ToM” (p. 378), and “by prompting readers to take an active 
writerly role [i.e., seek meaning in the gaps] to form representations of characters’ 
subjective states, literary fiction recruits ToM” (p. 380). Their interpretation of the data 
more than coincidentally mirrors the claims about the connections between fictional and 
actual minds that were strongly supported by Zunshine (2006) as well.  
While these studies provide support for the concept of narrative simulation, and 
provide intriguing information about that simulation, they also point to complexities. Yes, 
transportation is involved in simulation and so is perspective taking, but not always. 
Prosocial Outcomes—Empathy 
 Perhaps the most enticing aspect of narrative simulation is what readers may take 
away from the experience. In one of the first studies to investigate the potential benefits 
of reading fiction versus nonfiction, Mar et al. (2006) state, “The close relation between 
navigating social- and story-worlds has a number of implications, not the least interesting 
of which is the proposal that readers of predominantly narrative fiction may actually 
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improve or maintain their social-inference abilities through reading” (p. 698). In the 2006 
study, “Bookworms versus nerds: Exposure to fiction versus nonfiction, divergent 
associations with social ability, and the simulation of fictional social words,” Mar et al. 
asked whether or not exposure to literature or nonfiction influences an individual’s social 
ability, which the authors consider to be a combination of empathy and Theory of Mind. 
Participants in the study completed the Author Recognition Test to provide a 
measurement of their print exposure and then completed a series of tasks that measured 
empathy and Theory of Mind.  
As hypothesized, Mar et al. (2006) found a positive correlation between exposure 
to fiction and performance on the social ability tasks, while participants with more 
exposure to nonfiction generally had a negative correlation to performance on empathy 
and Theory of Mind. “While a causal direction has yet to be established for the observed 
relations, the possibility that social skills may be improved as a result of exposure to 
social narratives remains a compelling one” Mar et al. conclude (p. 708). Though, as the 
authors caution, correlation is not the same as causation, identifying a long-term 
connection between readers of fiction versus nonfiction and their prosocial cognition 
helped expose a tangible link between fiction and empathy.13  
In a follow-up study, “Exploring the link between reading fiction and empathy: 
ruling out individual differences and examining outcomes,” Raymond A. Mar, Keith 
                                                 
13 In concurrent efforts to empirical explorations of fiction and empathy, narrative theory scholars such as 
Martha Nussbaum (1990) and Suzanne Keen (2006, 2007) contributed to the theoretical foundation of what 
they termed narrative empathy. Of note, the literary conception of narrative empathy essentially 
encapsulates the same mechanisms as psychological theories of narrative simulation. As Keen writes in the 
entry for narrative empathy in the living handbook of narratology, “Narrative empathy is the sharing of 
feeling and perspective-taking induced by reading, viewing, hearing, or imagining narratives of another’s 
situation and condition. Narrative empathy plays a role in […] in mental simulation during reading, in the 
aesthetics of reception when readers experience it, and in the narrative poetics of texts when formal 
strategies invite it.”  
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Oatley and Jordan B. Peterson (2009) fine-tuned the conclusion of the 2006 study by 
ruling out the explanation that individual differences explained the positive correlation 
between fiction and prosocial cognition, and the negative correlation between nonfiction 
and prosocial cognition. By having participants complete the Author Recognition Test 
and a personality test, Mar et al. (2009) could account for individual differences when 
analyzing participants’ performance on prosocial cognition measures; the data showed 
“that it is not merely the case that individuals who are more open to experience tend to 
enjoy fiction more and also perform better on tests of empathy” (p. 421). Mar et al. 
(2009) replicated the 2006 findings that exposure to fiction predicts performance on 
empathy, and extended those findings by looking more closely at the role of participants’ 
tendency to get transported into a story. An individual’s tendency to become transported 
also positively correlated to empathy outcomes. In discussing these findings, Mar et al. 
(2009) write: 
It seems that a ready capacity to project oneself into a story may assist in 
projecting oneself into another’s mind in order to infer their mental states. 
It has recently been observed that a very similar pattern of brain activity 
underlies such diverse cognitive processes as autobiographical memory, 
future-thinking, spatial navigation and mental inferencing, and that this 
network may represent self-projections (Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Spreng, 
Mar and Kim, 2009). (p. 421) 
 
This set of studies contributes to growing evidence of a relationship between fiction and 
empathy. In addition, it seems to indicate that transportation continues to play a role of 
some kind. Furthermore, the studies support the claim that narratives, both fiction and 
nonfiction, differentially impact readers cognitively – not only when they are in the midst 
of processing the narratives, but also after the actual reading experience occurs. 
 Building from Mar and Oatley’s (2008) theory on simulation, Dan R. Johnson 
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(2013) explored the potential of exposure to fiction stories featuring out-group 
protagonists to reduce prejudices against that out-group. Out-group is any social group 
given an “other” status by virtue of being different from the in-group, and due to that 
difference, members of the in-group do not identify with members of the out-group, 
which may lead to a variety of issues, including prejudice. Johnson hypothesizes that 
literary fiction “offers a vehicle for prejudice reduction that combines multiple successful 
interventions, including perspective-taking, indirect contact, counter-stereotypical 
imagery and culture exposure” (p. 78). Johnson ran two experiments, which assessed 
participants’ changes in affective empathy—feeling for the character, as in compassion or 
sympathy—and prejudice toward Arab-Muslims, as well as the role of transportation in 
moderating those outcomes.  
 Participants read an excerpt from Saffron Dreams (2009), written by Shaila 
Abdullah, in which the protagonist—an educated and strong-willed Muslim woman, who 
also happens to be pregnant—stands up to attackers that verbally and physically assault 
her in a subway station (Johnson, 2013). The passage contains “significant inner 
monologue that accentuates the protagonist’s strength of character while also providing 
exposure to Muslim culture (p. 81). Before reading, Johnson obtained a baseline measure 
of participants’ prejudice using the Anti-Arab-Muslim Attitudes scale, which included 
statements for participants to rate agreement with, such as, “Islam is an archaic religion, 
unable to adapt to the present” and “Most Arab countries are fanatic, nationalist, and in 
conflict with human rights.” After reading the passage, participants rated how much 
empathy they felt toward Arab-Muslims and completed Green and Brock’s (2000) 
transportation scale; prejudice was assessed by asking participants to rate Arab-Muslims 
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as a group on stereotypical traits. In addition, Johnson asked participants explicitly, “To 
what degree do you believe the reading improved your attitudes toward Arab-Muslims?” 
(p. 81). 
 The results of the study confirmed Johnson’s hypothesis. Participants who were 
more transported into the story rated Arab-Muslims significantly lower in stereotypical 
negative traits and expressed significantly lower negative attitudes toward Arab-Muslims 
as well, after reading the passage. In addition, affective empathy and motivation to reduce 
prejudice were also significantly increased post-reading. Effects held after controlling for 
baseline prejudice and demand characteristics.14 Johnson interpreted these results as 
support for Mar and Oatley’s (2008) simulation theory because “readers of literary fiction 
who were more transported into the story exhibited empathic growth and prejudice 
reduction” indicating that “high levels of emotional reaction, mental imagery, and full 
attentional engagement appear requisite for empathic growth and prejudice reduction” (p. 
87). The results of Johnson’s studies highlight the potential benefits of reading fiction, 
which is particularly exciting because he tackles a real-world issue. As he writes, “the 
current studies have practical implications for the use of narrative fiction in educational 
and work settings” (p. 88). Johnson’s study also aligns with results in the narrative 
persuasion literature, since transportation has also been linked to persuasion but 
importantly, only in the case of fiction (Green & Brock, 2000; Busselle and Bilandzic, 
2009). These studies showed “that individuals who were more transported into a story 
exhibited more story-consistent beliefs post reading,” which means that literary fiction 
                                                 
14 Demand characteristics refers to cues that alter the way participants behave in an experiment, or 
complete tasks in an experiment, because they have become aware of the experiment’s purpose and 
therefore change their answers to align with that interpretation. By controlling for this, the experimenters 
ensured that participant responses were in fact authentic and not compromised. 
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possess the potential to achieve desired learning outcomes or, even desired changes in 
personality (Djikic et al., 2009).  
Unfortunately, experimental support for the claim that fiction enables, or 
enhances, empathy among readers is not consistent. Maja Djikic, Keith Oatley and 
Mihnea C. Moldoveanu (2013) investigated the potential of literature to increase empathy 
by having participants read either an essay or short story. Prior to reading, participants 
completed the Author Recognition Test, personality and empathy measures; after reading, 
participants were again tested for empathy15. The results were mixed. For empathy, there 
were significant changes in what the authors termed “Cognitive Empathy”—a 
measurement corresponding to the Perspective Taking subscale in the Interpersonally 
Reactivity Index (IRI, Davis, 1983) and the Mind in the Eyes Test, which is a non-self-
report measure of Theory of Mind ability. For participants in the fiction condition, the 
results showed they did have higher scores on both of these measures after reading, but 
“it is important to note that the significant effect (for both Change of Cognitive Empathy 
and Mind in the Eyes Test) was driven by the covariates, and that the overall effect of 
Condition (short stories vs. essays) was not significant” (p. 40). The significant covariates 
driving the effect included a participant’s openness, as measured on the Big Five 
personality trait questionnaire, and reported interest in the text.  
Interestingly, participants identified with low-Openness experienced a positive 
change, an improvement on their cognitive empathy in the fiction condition, whereas 
                                                 
15 Before reading, personality was measured using the Big-Five Inventory (John, Donahue, & Kentle, 
1991). Empathy was measured with two subscales taken from the Interpersonally Reactivity Index (IRI)—
Empathic Concern and Perspective Taking (Davis, 1983). The IRI has been validated as general measure of 
empathy and is frequently used in this line of research. Post-reading measures included the two IRI scales 
again and the Minds in the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001)—a measurement more commonly 
considered to measure perspective taking ability.   
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participants with high openness seemed to exhibit a ceiling effect with their cognitive 
empathy scores (i.e., they started out with higher empathy scores to begin with, leaving 
little room to go up after reading the story). This finding suggests that improvements to 
empathy after reading a fiction story do not occur as a standard outcome, but a potential 
one nonetheless, especially for those who may require it most (i.e., readers measuring 
low in openness). In contrast, participants in the nonfiction condition did not show 
significant improvements in cognitive empathy at all, even with covariates factored in. In 
addition, the effect for change in “Affective Empathy”—a measurement corresponding to 
the Empathic Concern subscale of the IRI—was not significant for either the fiction or 
nonfiction condition. 
These results suggest “a role of fictional literature in facilitating development of 
empathy” (p. 29), but are surprising because there was not a main overall effect of 
condition, fiction versus nonfiction. The improvements to empathy that were found 
stemmed from individual differences in readers and those improvements were limited to 
“cognitive empathy” rather than “affective empathy.” An argument can also be made that 
what the authors called “cognitive empathy” is actually measuring Theory of Mind.16 
However, readers with the necessary individual traits to experience improvements on 
empathy, significantly improved only after reading fiction, so there is also evidence of a 
causal effect of reading fictional literature on empathy. Djikic et al. (2013) conclude: 
Since humans are not born with cognitive empathy but develop it in middle 
childhood, it seems reasonable that there could be a potential of continuing 
to develop it throughout one’s lifetime, and that fictional literature could be 
one means of doing this. While we have obtained some evidence for this 
relationship, in order to answer questions about the quality, speed, and 
mechanism of this development, it is necessary to conduct further 
                                                 
16 This point will be addressed in the next chapter, which discusses the limitations of existing empirical 
work and how the experiments conducted in this thesis try to address them. 
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experiments. (p. 44) 
 
Though the results of this study are complex, and not nearly as clean as necessary to 
justify the claim that reading fiction has positive potential to improve readers’ empathy, 
the study still shows that fiction does influence (certain) readers differently than 
nonfiction does. 
Though the authors expressed concern that their results may have been muted 
because texts in the fiction and nonfiction conditions were comparable in their 
“literariness,” it can also be seen as a strength of their study. The authors took particular 
care to level out the materials in both conditions, so that length, reading difficulty, artistic 
merit (literariness) and engagement, were comparable. Participants in each condition read 
one of eight potential options, in both the fiction and nonfiction condition. The use of 
multiple stories in each condition discourages skeptical interpretations that the results are 
a one-off response specific only to a single story, and bolsters the claim that literary 
fiction generally does have the capacity to improve a reader’s empathy.  
That said, if both fiction and nonfiction texts can be considered literary, then the 
next question becomes: What exactly about reading fiction makes it special, such that it 
can increase empathy, if not its literariness? What matters more – the “literariness” of the 
text, or the genre expectation of the reader when they engage with the text? In the next 
chapter, I consider the limitations of the studies presented here to inform the development 
of my own experimental design in an effort to increase clarity about how narrative 






CHAPTER 3: ADRESSING LIMITATIONS IN CURRENT RESEARCH 
 
The research conducted so far should be considered exploratory and far from 
definitive. Certainly, as the previous chapter demonstrates, there is growing evidence that 
reading narratives, and in particular, reading fiction, influences readers in intriguing, and 
potentially beneficial, ways. Existing studies provide a critical step in pushing the 
empirical study of narrative, and especially that of literature, forward. Their cumulative 
evidence provides support for longstanding theoretical arguments about narrative 
simulation, as well as hunches held regarding the unique qualities of fiction.  
However, broadly demonstrating that a theorized process occurs does not equate 
to an explanation of how it occurs. As Raymond A. Mar, Keith Oatley and Jordan B. 
Peterson (2009) write in “Exploring the link between reading fiction and empathy: Ruling 
out individual difference and examining outcomes,” “[…] evidence is accumulating that 
the reading of narrative fiction can have important consequences, whose quality and 
underlying mechanisms require closer study” (p. 424). As Mar et al. suggest, a single 
study cannot uncover all the facets involved in reading fiction or nonfiction; rather, 
collectively we should strive to fill the gaps in the research by acknowledging limitations 
in studies as they are conducted, and the subsequent restrictions of the conclusions put 
forward. In doing so, we open the doors to not only ask more questions, but better and 
more nuanced questions, which lead to clarity and increased understanding. So far, the 
empirical study of narrative confronts limitations in two key areas: 1) variance in stimuli, 




Considering Stimuli: Don’t The Stories Participants Read Matter? 
 Is it really fair to draw comparisons between how readers process a fictional short 
story, or chapter from a work of fiction, and how readers process a brief news article, or 
multiple news articles? On one hand, it may represent a realistic difference in the texts 
readers are exposed to on a daily basis. On the other, drawing comparisons about 
cognitive processing and outcomes between fiction and nonfiction while using texts that 
vary so greatly, not only in content, but also in style and reading experience, raises 
concerns that the comparison these studies have drawn between fiction and nonfiction is 
not as clean, or as meaningful, as it could be. 
In terms of style, news stories have a distinct structure, which may trigger readers 
to process the information in a specific way. Considering the findings of Zwaan (1994) 
and Bruner’s contributions, it is conceivable that the visible structure of news stories 
alone causes readers to engage with the text from the logico-scientific mode rather than 
the narrative mode, regardless of content.  Second, a reading experience that entails a 
single exposure to a contained story does not mirror the reading experience of reading 
multiple and shorter articles; even if the articles cover the same topic generally, each is a 
separate story. 
The strength of the Bal and Veltkamp (2013) study was that their results held over 
a week delay, which suggests that engagement with fiction or nonfiction does have 
lasting effects on readers. Their study also provided support for the idea that 
transportation levels enable empathy of the reader both positively and negatively. But the 
materials used in the fiction and nonfiction conditions should be considered severe 
limitations of their study. In the nonfiction condition, participants read multiple short 
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news stories, which reduced the likelihood of transportation due to task switching. 
Immersion in a storyworld is much less likely to occur without sufficient time or material 
with which to do so. Additionally, the fiction material used was a chapter out of a 
Sherlock Holmes story. This presents three potential problems: (1) the fiction material 
didn’t present a closed narrative, which may change how readers interact with the text; 
(2) because Sherlock Holmes is such a well-known literary figure, it’s possible the 
participants engaged at different levels purely out of prior of knowledge of the Sherlock 
Holmes storyworld;17 and (3) the mystery genre may not invoke as much emotional 
engagement because the focus of mystery novels is to gather information and solve the 
mystery, which could make the text susceptible to the logico-scientific mode rather than 
the narrative mode. 
The conclusions of Zwaan’s (1994) study, which brought to light the role of genre 
expectations in discourse processing, are similarly hampered by the materials used. A key 
strength of the study was that readers in both conditions, news story and literary story 
perspectives, read the same texts. However, the texts Zwaan used are not necessarily 
representative of natural texts we typically encounter. In the study, Zwaan chose stories 
that covered “interactions between civilians and authorities (e.g., the police)” but used 
excerpts averaging just 216 words in length. Though the excerpts came from both novels 
and news articles about roughly the same topic, a reader’s engagement with such a brief 
amount of text is not representative of nonfiction texts readers encounter in day-to-day 
                                                 
17 In the case of Sherlock Holmes, readers’ familiarity with the character and that fictional storyworld are 
even further complicated by the presence of Sherlock stories in other media, especially the popular TV 
series (2010-current). This complexity brings up another interesting question for future research, however. 
How does increased familiarity with fictional characters and their storyworlds in other media platforms 
influence individuals processing written narrative? Does it enhance or hinder factors like transportation, 
identification and empathy? 
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life,18 and certainly not representative of fiction reading experiences. In addition to the 
brevity of the text excerpts, another concern is that Zwaan had participants in the literary 
expectation and news expectation conditions read seven of these brief passages. Again, 
along the same lines as the criticism of the Bal and Veltkamp (2013) nonfiction condition 
(read multiple new stories vs. one fiction chapter), reading multiple short excerpts in this 
study could have led to results stemming from task repetition under a certain instruction 
rather than actually capturing a genuine genre effect. In other words, the genre effect may 
have been experimentally magnified by repeated exposure to multiple brief texts, which 
had been prefaced with specific reading instructions.19 Yet, despite these considerations, 
the fact that Zwaan still identified an interaction between genre expectation and discourse 
processing outcomes with such brief materials may speak to the potential potency of 
genre expectations on all text processing.  
Though limitations in these studies exist, it is important to also recognize that the 
empirical study of literature is in the early stages of development. In these early stages, a 
central part of the discovery focuses on experimental design. A single experiment cannot 
answer a research question completely, but collectively the research seeks to fill in the 
gaps by addressing limitations, such as those discussed above, in future studies. We 
                                                 
18 From 10 years of experience in journalism, as a writer and an editor, an article less than 400-500 words is 
the exception, and far from the rule. An article less than 300 words is typically considered a brief, or a 
snapshot of information, for instance. Of course, this point could be debated within the context of social 
media now, but in terms of traditional media (even when online), and even more so in terms of a reader’s 
interaction with fiction content, an analysis of texts that average 216 words (less than half a page of double-
spaced text) raises questions regarding the generalizability of the findings.  
19 Participants in the news reading condition received instructions stating: “The following texts are all 
excerpts from news stories that appeared in either NRC-Handelsblad or de Volksrant [two quality Dutch 
journals]. These stories describe important events that happened during the 1980s. Please read these stories 
just like you would normally read a news story.” Participants in the literary reading condition received 
instructions stating: “The following texts are all excerpts from novels by famous Dutch and other European 
literary authors. Please read these texts just like you would normally read a novel.” (Zwaan, 1994, p. 924) 
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should add that not all empirical studies on reading fiction are susceptible to the critique 
launched above.  
For instance, Kidd and Castano (2013) put significantly more consideration into 
the materials they selected in both the fiction and nonfiction conditions. In their first 
experiment, the authors selected literary fiction short stories, ranging from Anton 
Chekhov’s 1884 Chameleon to Don DeLillo’s The Runner, first published in Harper’s 
Magazine in 1988. Participants in the nonfiction condition read articles from the 
Smithsonian that focused on a nonhuman subject, including “How the Potato Changed 
the World” and “The Story of the Most Common Bird in the World.” In their second 
experiment, the authors used roughly the first 10 pages of recently published novels, 
specifically three recent finalists for the National Book Award for fiction. Participants in 
the popular fiction condition read excerpts from bestsellers identified on Amazon that are 
fiction but not literary fiction.20  
Though the line between literary fiction and popular fiction can be critiqued as 
being arbitrary, or unclear, the primary difference to consider between the two in this 
context pertains to the representation of consciousness in the works of fiction. Literary 
fiction is far more likely to portray multiple, and metarepresentations, of character, 
author, and narrator, consciousness; it is those portrayals of consciousness, the qualia, 
that potentially enables readers to become co-experiencers during the reading experience. 
Popular fiction, in contrast, is less prone to interior monologue and metarepresentation, 
                                                 
20 The excerpts from the National Book Award finalists came from The Round House by Louise Erdrich, 
The Tiger’s Wife by Tea Obreht, and Salvage the Bones by Jesmyn Ward. The popular fiction excerpts 
came from Gone Girl by Gillian Flynn, The Sins of the Mother by Danielle Steel, and Cross Roads by W. 
Paul Young. 
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and its content can primarily be broken down into action following action, with 
interspersed dialogue. 
The authors made deliberate choices about the material in each experiment and 
each condition to help them specifically assess the potential of literary fiction to improve 
a reader’s perspective taking abilities. In this study, they conducted three additional 
experiments with new literary short stories and popular fiction short stories each time.  
The difference in writing style, publishing dates, and genre, in both conditions, 
strengthens the findings of their study considerably. Only participants who read literary 
fiction showed enhanced Theory of Mind after reading, compared to participants who 
read popular nonfiction in five of the six experiments and participants who read 
nonfiction in the first experiment. In the context of this thesis, the only critique that can 
be applied to the materials in this study is that the authors did not carry the nonfiction 
condition through all the experiments, or include a nonfiction condition with materials 
that featured human subjects rather than potatoes or plants, though to be fair, the authors 
wanted to focus on literary fiction versus popular fiction. However, that factor limits the 
comparison between literary fiction and nonfiction.  
Similarly, the findings of the Johnson (2013) study are also limited because he did 
not incorporate a comparison group. Participants who read fiction featuring a female 
Muslim protagonist under duress showed a reduction in bias toward Arab-Muslims, but a 
comparison group in which participants read a nonfiction text about Arab-Muslims 
encountering similar acts of aggression and bias toward them in the real world would 
have extended the study in interesting ways, while also likely augmenting the 
interpretation of the results obtained in the fiction group. 
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It is imperative for empirical studies of narrative to consider the material used 
more thoroughly and thoughtfully, particularly when comparing fiction and nonfiction 
reading experiences. In consideration of the way previous studies have drawn 
comparisons between varied fiction and nonfiction texts, it was decided for the 
experiments conducted in this thesis that the nonfiction material would be as comparable 
to the fiction material as possible. Accordingly, the nonfiction story used in the 
experiment is a single enclosed narrative that is comparable in length, ease of reading, 
and engagement. By not using newspaper articles or short expository pieces from the 
Smithsonian, but a narrative that is still clearly nonfiction, this experiment aims to isolate 
the genre effect more clearly than previous studies. 
Conflating Constructs & Measuring Them 
 Another difficulty with existing research stems from the variance in definitions of 
the construct the studies aim to measure—transportation, perspective taking, and 
empathy. When researchers conflate constructs, or conceptualize or define them 
differently, it becomes difficult to synthesize the data about the topic of concern, such as 
narrative empathy, in a meaningful way. As the field moves forward, and more 
experiments are conducted, researchers will need to move away from general, and 
murkier, descriptions of constructs, toward clear and exacting operational definitions. 
The experiments conducted for this thesis project were designed with a heightened 
awareness of this issue and aim to add clarity to the field’s conceptualization of these 
constructs—transportation, perspective taking, and empathy—in the context of narrative 
simulation specifically.  
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Getting a grasp on transportation 
Ever since Gerrig (1993) hypothesized that the same cognitive mechanisms are 
behind how we process narratives and how we process the day-to-day real world, and 
that readers could be “transported” into fictional worlds in a way that led them to 
emotionally engage and react mentally to that world, the concept of transportation has 
been linked to almost all potential outcomes of reading fiction (Mar et al., 2006). As 
noted earlier in the proposal, transportation has been linked to persuasion but importantly, 
only in the case of fiction. The literature so far indicates “the persuasive effect of fiction 
is only likely to be realized if fiction is read as fiction, that is if it is not processed in the 
same way as a factual story or textbook. The persuasive power of fiction is tied to 
transportation, which presupposes that fiction is read as an end in itself, for pleasure, in a 
state of immersion, with the reader being entranced by the fictional world” (Nunning, 
2015, p. 44). 
Research about processing narrative has often assumed that transportation enables 
or entails “the ability to infer what is in the minds of others” (Mar et al., 2006, p. 696), or 
theory of mind. Thus far, the research on this topic has produced conflicting results. 
Djikic et al. (2013) did not measure transportation, a shortcoming the authors recognize 
in the discussion of their results (p. 42). Kidd and Castano (2013), for instance, found no 
correlation between transportation and outcomes on theory of mind in any of their three 
conditions – literary fiction, popular fiction and nonfiction. Bal and Veltkamp (2013), 
however, did find a correlation between transportation and self-reports of empathy in 
both fiction and nonfiction conditions. Interestingly, reports of high transportation 
 45 
correlated with better scores on empathy and reports of low transportation actually 
reduced empathy outcomes across all material conditions.  
Johnson (2013) also measured transportation, using the same scale (Green & 
Brock, 2000).  He writes: 
To integrate with Mar and Oatley’s (2008) [simulation] theory, the current study 
will test the idea that individuals who are more transported in the story likely 
simulate the characters’ thoughts and feelings (i.e., engage in perspective-taking) 
to a greater a degree and consequently their attitudes should be subject to greater 
influence while reading and identified a significant interaction between 
transportation level and reduced prejudiced post-reading. (p. 79)  
 
Johnson did identify a significant interaction between the degree of transportation and 
reduced prejudice and higher empathy post-reading, but that is not the whole story.  
Johnson assumes transportation inherently entails that readers “simulate the 
characters’ thoughts and feelings (i.e., engage in perspective-taking);” Johnson, however, 
did not measure perspective taking. Therefore, the deduction cannot be made that the 
transportation levels correlate with empathy outcomes because transportation enables or 
entails perspective taking. Furthermore, Johnson found that “affective empathy and 
intrinsic motivation independently and significantly mediated transportation’s association 
with reductions in negative Arab-Muslim attitudes. After including [these measures] in 
the model, transportation was no longer significantly associated with Arab-Muslim 
attitudes” (p. 85). In other words, it’s not clear that a reader’s level of transportation led 
to reduced bias and increased empathy, or whether affective empathy or intrinsic 
motivation did.  
The concept of immersion in a story makes transportation seem like a mechanism 
that would naturally and inherently be linked to theory of mind and empathy effects. 
However, the proposed study does not accept that assumption. In addition to conflicting 
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findings about how transportation correlates to the outcomes of interest, it is feasible that 
the concept of transportation as Gerrig originally posited it has been imbued with other 
faculties it never claimed to possess, like perspective taking. Transportation in its essence 
is a matter of attention, “the extent to which readers forget about their immediate 
environment and enter the fictional world” (Nunning, 2015, p. 44). Therefore, it is 
conceivable that transportation may be more important in terms of the richness of the 
mental representation formed, but perhaps less so in terms of perspective taking or 
subsequent empathy. Just because readers feel transported into a storyworld, in the sense 
that they become more aware of the storyworld setting than that of the world around 
them, does not mean that they automatically take on the perspective of a character. A 
transported reader may simply visit and watch. By treating transportation as a distinct 
construct from perspective taking, the proposed study aims to dissect the role, and 
meaning, of transportation in more detail than existing studies. 
A closer look at Theory of Mind and empathy 
Existing theory and limited evidence suggest that reading fiction entails theory of 
mind activities because fiction enables us, perhaps even compels us, to take on the 
perspectives of others (Zunshine, 2006). This act of perspective taking might even have 
the potential to increase our ability to empathize with others. As Nunning (2015) writes, 
perspective taking may be at the root of the potential of fiction to improve readers’ 
cognitive abilities: the necessity to follow and share characters’ thoughts and feelings, 
and to practice the combination of empathy and ‘theory of mind’ in a situation which 
provides ideal conditions for learning” (p. 48; Nunning, 2014). However, the relationship 
between Theory of Mind, or perspective taking, and empathy remains unclear. How does 
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perspective taking moderate changes in empathy post-reading, if it in fact does? As noted 
earlier, the relationship between perspective taking and transportation also remains 
unclear (Kidd & Castano, 2013). Rather than assuming causality exists between these 
three constructs in some manner, the following experiments considers all three constructs 
in isolation. 
Like Kidd and Castano (2013), the following study also posits “fiction affects 
ToM processes because it forces us to engage in mind-reading and character 
construction” (p. 377). However, the scope of the proposed study will not focus on a 
comparison based on qualitative judgments of the text (i.e., literary fiction vs. popular 
fiction), but specifically on the influence of genre expectation that is induced by 
activating either the narrative mode or logico-scientific mode. This approach also has 
support from Djikic et al. (2013), who “did not find that the type of writing (literary 
fiction vs. literary nonfiction) made a significant difference for our outcome measures” 
(p. 41).  
While the results from Kidd and Castano (2013) present intriguing implications 
for future research, their study, along with other studies investigating these constructs, 
cannot answer whether or not the approach readers take going into the text matters above 
and beyond what the text itself does. The authors also acknowledged the results as 
preliminary, but it’s worthwhile to note they also ruled out variables, like enjoyment of 
the text, perceptions of how literary the text was, or exposure to fiction, as relevant to the 
outcomes. This strongly suggests that engagement with narrative involves processes that 
extend beyond individual differences.  
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However, a replication attempt (Panero et al., 2016) of Kidd and Castano by three 
independent research groups, with 792 participants randomly assigned to 1 of 4 
conditions (literary fiction, popular fiction, nonfiction and no reading), found no 
significant changes in Theory of Mind performance for participants in the literary 
condition; and contrary to Mar et al. (2009), Panero et al. (2016) also found that 
individual differences do matter, since scores on the Author Recognition Test predicted 
performance on the Theory of Mind task in all four conditions (p. 46).  The work 
conducted by Panero et al. (2016), combined with ambiguity around operational 
definitions across various studies—does empathy entail perspective taking, or are they 
different mechanisms?—appropriately raises caution about drawing conclusions that link 
reading fiction to improvements on social cognition. The results about how reading 
fiction varies from reading nonfiction are simply mixed at this point, and thus require 
further and more rigorous investigation. 
The proposed study will isolate the genre effect specifically and explore if the 
genre and related features of the text induce theory of mind independently, or if the 
framework readers apply to the text dictates subsequent theory of mind activities 
regardless of the actual material presented. Following the impetus of this chapter, the 
next chapter identifies the operational definitions of transportation, perspective taking 
(Theory of Mind) and empathy, and details a description of the experimental design, 





CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESES 
The goal of the following experiments is to explore the effect of genre expectation 
on the degrees of transportation and empathy experienced by readers in each condition. 
These dependent variables will be measured pre- and post-test through a series of 
questionnaires, with the goal of identifying potential relationships between text genre, 
genre expectation and cognitive outcomes. How do genre expectation and text genre 
influence a reader’s transportation, or changes in empathy? Secondly, does the degree of 
transportation correlate with increased empathy? If reading activates or exercises an 
individual’s Theory of Mind, then it follows that reading stories may promote perspective 
taking and thus, empathy. But which stories and under what conditions? 
Operational Definitions 
 Transportation into the narrative captures a reader’s immersion into a storyworld. 
Theory of Mind, as previously discussed, is the ability to identify others’ mental states, 
and in doing so, better understand their emotions and behavior. In other words, it is a 
mind-reading ability (Zunshine, 2006) that hypothetically facilitates, or accompanies, 
perspective taking. Empathy is defined here as the capacity to share the feelings and 
emotions of another. Empathy is distinguished from sympathy, which correlates with 
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feeling “for another” rather than “with another”21. However, as discussed in the previous 
chapter empathy is typically treated as encompassing perspective taking and sometimes 
sympathy as well; the measurement of empathy used in the following experiments 
therefore treats empathy as a multidimensional concept. 
Measurements 
1) Author Recognition Test-Revised (ART) (Mar et al., 2006). The ART has 
been validated extensively as a way to assess participants’ exposure to fiction, 
and book reading habits, while avoiding the problem of participants wanting 
to appear ‘better read.’ Participants have to check off author names they 
recognize, but are discouraged from lying since there are fake author names 
on the list. The Mar et al. (2006) revision of the ART was used because the 
researchers updated the ART to include an equal amount of fiction and 
nonfiction authors. Therefore, we can potentially see a difference between 
participants’ experience based on a predilection for fiction or nonfiction. (See 
Appendix A for all ART items) 
                                                 
21 Empathy is a very complex concept, which continues to have entangled meanings. For an authoritative 
look at empathy in the context of narrative studies, see Suzanne Keen’s Empathy and the Novel (2007).  
Currently, in cognitive psychology especially, empathy is increasingly conceived of as a multidimensional 
concept. Though empathy has often been generalized as a sensation that simultaneously entails both sharing 
feelings and perspective taking, in recent years it has become more common to delineate empathy into 
cognitive and affective components. The cognitive component correlates to perspective taking, “the ability 
to understand the world from another person’s point of view and to infer beliefs and intentions” and 
affective empathy “refers to the capacity to share another’s feelings and emotions” (Stansfield & Bunce, 
2014, p. 9). However, the combined conception of empathy continues its presence in narratology, which 
defines narrative empathy in the living handbook of narratology as “the sharing of feeling and perspective-
taking induced by reading, viewing, hearing, or imaging narratives of another’s situation and condition” 
(Keen, Narrative Empathy, para. 1). Whether or not perspective taking is better conceived as a component 
of empathy, or Theory of Mind, remains up for debate, which is further complicated by mixed uses of these 
constructs and their definitions in current research (Bal and Veltkamp, 2013; Kidd and Castano, 2013; 
Johnson, 2012; Dvash & Shamay-Tsoory, 2014). The discussion of the experimental results aims to 
contribute, if only a little, to advancing this conversation toward a resolution. 
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2) Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis, 1983). The IRI will provide an 
overall measure of empathy. Changes in the participants answers on the IRI 
from pre- to post-reading will be analyzed for the measurement overall, as 
well as for the individual subscales. In addition to the perspective taking 
subscale, the IRI includes the subscales personal distress, empathic concern 
and fantasy. However, the subscales were not validated using a factor analysis 
and as a result, a single score was used in the analysis.  
a. Personal distress measures feelings that impede on helping others.  
i. Example item: Being in a tense emotional situation scares me. 
b. Empathic concern measures sympathy.  
i. Example item: I often have tender, concerned feelings for 
people less fortunate than me. 
c. Fantasy measures the tendency to get transported into the story. 
i. Example item: When I am reading an interesting story or 
novel, I imagine how I would feel if the events in the story 
were happening to me. 
d. Perspective taking measures the tendency to take others points of 
view. 
i. Example item: I sometimes try to understand my friend better 
by imagining how things look from their perspective. (See 
Appendix A for the complete scale) 
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3) Transportation Scale (Green & Bock, 2000). This scale assesses immersion 
into a story, or the phenomenological experience of being absorbed in a story 
(Green & Brock, 2000). 
a. This scale was used in its entirety (all 12-items) in Experiment 1. In 
Experiment 2, the Transportation Scale-Short Form was used, which 
consisted of 6 items. These 6 items were identified following a 
factorial validity analysis of the original 12-item scale (Appel et al., 
2015). Following the development of the 6-item scale, Appel et al. 
write, “Theoretically, these analyses provide empirical support for the 
conceptual definition of transportation as an integrative melding of 
affect, cognition and imagery” (p. 259-260). (See Appendix A for 
complete scales) 
4) Narrative Engagement (Busselle & Bilandzic, 2009). This narrative 
engagement scale was developed “based on a mental models approach to 
narrative processing” and “distinguishes among four dimensions of 
experiential engagement in narratives: narrative understanding, attentional 
focus, emotional engagement, and narrative presence” (p. 321). This scale was 
brought into the Experiment 2 to provide a comparison measure to the Green 
and Brock (2000) Transportation Scale.  
a. Narrative understanding measures ease in comprehending a narrative. 
b. Attentional focus describes a reader’s focus or distraction from the 
narrative. 
c. Emotional engagement refers to feeling for and with characters. 
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d. Narrative presence, differentiated from attentional focus, is the 
sensation that one has left the actual world and entered the story. 
According to Busselle and Bilandzic (2009), narrative presence entails 
both a “loss of awareness of self and surroundings” and a “sensation of 
entering another space and time, which should be unique to 
narratives…as a result of mentally constructing an alternate world” (p. 
341). 
e. The items in the scale, as well as their dimension-correlations, can be 
found in the appendices. (See Appendix A for complete scale) 
5) Sentence Verification Task (SVT; Royer et al., 1979). The SVT is a 16-item 
comprehension task that served both as a comprehension measure and a check 
to make sure participants read the story. Participants were presented with 16 
sentences, 8 of which were either taken directly from the text or paraphrased 
sentences in the text, and 8 of which were not in the text at all. Participants 
had to identify which of the sentences were “old”, from the text, or “new”, not 
from the text. 
6) Manipulation Check. At the end of the survey every participant was asked: Do 
you believe the story you read was fiction/nonfiction? This question modified 
to align with the genre instructions the participant received. Therefore, a 
participant who was told they were reading fiction, but read nonfiction, would 
answer Yes/No to “Do you believe the story you read was fiction?” In 
addition to supplying a Yes/No answer to this question, participants were also 
asked to explain their answer.  
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Materials 
Prior to conducting the following experiments, a fiction and nonfiction short story 
were edited to comparable lengths and reading difficulty. The fiction story was developed 
from My Oedipus Complex, written by Frank O’Connor, and was edited down to 2,934 
words. The nonfiction story was developed from Phineas Gage: A Gruesome But True 
Story About Brain Science, written by John Fleishman, and was edited down to 2,561 
words. The texts measured a 5.1 and 5.3, respectively on the Flesch-Kincaid Level 
Readability Formula. The texts were normed by 40 participants, who read both texts in 
counter-balanced order and rated engagement and difficulty, and identified the text genre 
as nonfiction or fiction on a 10-point Likert scale ranging from “Absolutely Nonfiction” 
to “Absolutely Fiction”. The norming established that the texts did not differ in 
engagement or reading difficulty, and that they were clearly recognized as fiction and 
nonfiction, respectively.  
The shortened versions of each story were used for Experiment 1. In Experiment 
2, the text length of both stories was extended. In the case of the fiction story, this meant 
including the entire short story without edits, totaling 4,521 words. For the nonfiction 
story, edits were still applied to maintain the narrative nonfiction content and voice, since 
the goal was to present readers with text as narratively comparable as possible despite the 
differences in genre and content matter. The nonfiction text in Experiment 2 totaled 4,047 







Participants were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants received 
$1.25 for completing the study (N = 68). Six participants, who spent too little time in the 
survey for their responses to be valid and representative of completing the tasks as 
directed, were dropped from the analysis resulting in final total of 62 participants. The 
average age of participants in this group was 39, with a minimum of 21 and a maximum 
of 68. Of the 62 participants, 30 identified as male and 32 as female.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions (genre expectation 
x text genre).  
1. Fiction x Fiction 
2. Fiction x Nonfiction 
3. Nonfiction x Fiction 
4. Nonfiction x Nonfiction 
Table 1: Participant x Condition – Experiment 1 
 1-F/F 2-NF/NF 3-F/NF 4-NF/F 
Male 7 5 13 5 
Female 8 13 2 9 
Total 15 18 15 14 
 
Prior to receiving instructions that manipulated genre expectations and reading the 
text, participants completed the Author Recognition Test (ART; Mar et al., 2006), a 
measurement of print exposure to both fiction and nonfiction. Participants also completed 
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the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983), a multidimensional scale for 
measuring empathy.  
Participants then read the text, fiction or nonfiction story, after which they 
completed a 16-item Sentence Verification Task (SVT) to evaluate comprehension. Three 
participants were removed from analysis for having more than 8 incorrect answers on the 
SVT. After the SVT, participants completed the Transportation Scale (Green & Brock, 
2000) and completed the IRI again.   
Experiment 2 
Participants were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants received 
$1.25 for completing the study (N = 130). Six participants, who spent too little time in the 
survey for their responses to be valid and representative of completing the tasks as 
directed, were dropped from the analysis resulting in final total of 124 participants. The 
average age of participants in this group was 39, with a minimum of 19 and a maximum 
of 72. Of the 124 participants, 51 identified as male and 73 as female.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions (genre expectation 
x text genre).  
1. Fiction x Fiction 
2. Nonfiction x Nonfiction 
3. Fiction x Nonfiction 





Table 2: Participant x Condition – Experiment 2 
 1-F/F 2-NF/NF 3-F/NF 4-NF/F 
Male 9 19 13 10 
Female 19 14 20 20 
Total 28 33 33 30 
 
Prior to receiving instructions that manipulated genre expectations and reading the 
text, participants completed the Author Recognition Test (ART; Mar et al., 2006), a 
measurement of print exposure to both fiction and nonfiction. Participants also completed 
the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983), a multidimensional scale for 
measuring empathy.  
Participants then read the text, fiction or nonfiction story, after which they 
completed a 16-item Sentence Verification Task (SVT) to evaluate comprehension. Three 
participants were removed from analysis for having more than 8 incorrect answers on the 
SVT. After the SVT, participants completed the Transportation Scale (Green and Brock, 
2000) and completed the IRI again.  
Hypotheses 
The primary aim of the proposed study is to investigate if, and how, genre 
expectations and text genre influence how readers process narrative. The dependent 
variables measured in this study are empathy, transportation and comprehension. The 
goal is to identify if, and how, genre expectation and text genre (fiction, nonfiction) 
influence the dependent variables.  
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Experiment 1  
In congruence with the theoretical background, research on genre expectations 
(Zwaan, 1994), and the distinction between narrative mode of thought and the logico-
scientific mode of thought, the first hypothesis is that genre expectations will influence 
text processing such that readers with a fiction expectation will show increases in 
empathy, as captured in the IRI from pre- to post-reading. In contrast, readers with a 
nonfiction expectation will exhibit decreased IRI scores. It also, however, possible that 
the genre-defining features and style of each story will override the genre expectation 
accordingly. If this is the case, empathy outcomes will instead be influenced by text 
genre, such that participants who read fiction will show increases in empathy and 
participants who read nonfiction will exhibit decreased IRI scores.  
The second hypothesis that will be tested is whether genre expectations or text 
genre influence the degree of transportation. In line with existing research on 
transportation, it is expected that readers of the fiction text will report higher 
transportation than readers of the nonfiction text. It is also possible, however, that the 
genre expectation will moderate these outcomes. 
The third hypothesis that will be tested is if transportation levels are reflected in 
the empathy outcomes. If this is the case, then the more a reader feels transported, the 
more likely the reader is to engage with theory of mind practice and experience empathy, 
and vice versa. This view has received conflicting support in the literature thus far (Bal & 
Veltkamp, 2013; Johnson, 2013; Kidd & Castano, 2013), and researchers have often 
assumed going in that transportation enables the perspective taking that leads to changes 
in empathy. I do not make that assumption, and hypothesize that the proposed study will 
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show that transportation functions independently, and is not correlated with empathy 
outcomes. 
 Finally, in regards to the manipulation check, I anticipate that a majority of the 
participants will buy into the manipulation. Secondly, even if participants realize, when 
prompted after reading, that the story they read was not the genre they were told, I predict 
the genre expectation will still have exerted its influence on the online processing. In 
other words, the post-hoc realization is precisely that, an offline post-reading realization 
that arrives too late to affect conscious awareness to counteract the genre expectation 
framework I established in the task instructions.  
Experiment 2  
The primary change to Experiment 2 was the length of the stories read in each 
condition. I hypothesize that the increased reading time will lead to deeper processing, 
which will intensify the effects on empathy from pre- to post-reading that were found in 
Experiment 1. The hypotheses of Experiment 2 match those of Experiment 1, but I 
predict the effects will be enhanced, or become cleaner, due to the increased exposure to 
the text. 
 The additional hypothesis in Experiment 2 concerns transportation. The inclusion 
of the Narrative Engagement scale in the second experiment is intended to help explain 
the findings concerning transportation in the first experiment. Using both the 
Transportation Scale and the Narrative Engagement scale enables a comparison of the 
two scales, which will hypothetically provide additional insight into the theoretical 
concept of transportation. The aim is to determine the level of correlation between the 
two scales, and in doing so, better understand what immersion into a storyworld entails. 
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The outcomes of these experiments and the alignment of the outcomes with these 





CHAPTER 5: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In a society saturated with stories, narrative plays the critical role of enabling us 
to comprehend and navigate the human experience. As a tool for understanding, narrative 
is fundamental to human cognition and a wealth of theory and growing empirical 
evidence strongly indicate that reading activates a simulation with critical cognitive and 
emotional components (Mar, 2008; Tamir, 2016). Importantly, these components have 
been linked to prosocial outcomes, specifically empathy. 
Recent research has provided some support for the claim that reading fiction 
versus reading nonfiction influences positive changes in readers’ empathy (Mar et al., 
2009; Djikic et al., 2013; Johnson, 2013). In addition, these outcomes have been linked to 
the degree of narrative transportation experienced (Gerrig, 1993; Bal & Veltkamp, 2013; 
Johnson, 2013). Furthermore, there is also evidence that genre expectations moderate text 
comprehension processes (Zwaan, 1994).  
While there is growing experimental support that reading narratives entails a 
simulated experience that involves transportation, the conditions under which reading 
leads to improvements in empathy remains understudied. Thus, this study proposed the 
following research questions: What matters more? “Literary” features of a text, or the 
genre expectation a reader brings into a text? To answer this question, I examined 
whether genre expectations and text genre—in combination or independently—






Experiment 1-Statistical Analysis 
A series of 2x2 ANCOVA were conducted with genre expectation and text genre 
as the independent variables, print exposure in each genre (ART) as the covariates, and 
comprehension (SVT) and transportation as the dependent variables. The analyses 
showed that there were no genre expectation or text genre effects on comprehension (all 
ps > .05). There was, however, a significant effect of text genre on transportation F(1, 52) 
= 11.28, p = .001, partial eta squared = .178, such that participants who read nonfiction 
reported significantly higher levels of transportation (M = 63.13, SE = 1.80) than 
participants who read fiction (M = 54.04, SE = 2.00).  
A 2x2x2 ANCOVA also was conducted with genre expectation, text genre, and 
time (pre- to post-reading) as the independent variables, print exposure in each genre 
(ART) as the covariates, and empathy (IRI scale) as the dependent variable. The analysis 
showed a genre expectation by time interaction, F(1, 52) = 5.76, p = .020, partial eta 
squared = .10, such that empathy increased from pre- to post-reading for the fiction 






Means and Standard Deviations on the Measure of Transportation – Experiment 1 
 
Condition n M SD 
F/F 13 51.08 2.83 
NF/NF 17 62.94 2.5 
F/NF 15 63.33 2.73 
NF/F 13 57.0 2.87 
Total – Fiction 26 54.04 2.00 
Total – Nonfiction** 32 63.13 1.80 
**p<.01 
 
Note: The maxim score is 84. F/F = Fiction Expectation / Fiction Text; NF/NF = 
Nonfiction Expectation / Nonfiction Text; F/NF = Fiction Expectation / Nonfiction Text; 
NF/F = Nonfiction Expectation / Fiction Text. Covariates appearing in the model are 








Means and Standard Deviations on the Measure of Comprehension (Sentence-
Verification Task) – Experiment 1 
 
Condition n M SD 
F/F 13 11.48 .62 
NF/NF 17 12.13 .55 
F/NF 15 12.26 .60 
NF/F 13 10.82 .63 
Note: The maxim score is 16. F/F = Fiction Expectation / Fiction Text; NF/NF = 
Nonfiction Expectation / Nonfiction Text; F/NF = Fiction Expectation / Nonfiction Text; 
NF/F = Nonfiction Expectation / Fiction Text. Covariates appearing in the model are 








Means and Standard Deviations on the Measure of Empathy (Interpersonality-Reactivity 
Index Total) Pre- to Post-Reading Based on Genre Expectations 
 
Genre Expectation Time* M SD 
Fiction 1 65.29 2.78 
 2 66.53 2.91 
Nonfiction 1 72.74 2.72 
 2 71.03 2.84 
* p < .05 
Note: Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: ART_F = 
10.397, ART_NF = 5.293. 
 
 
Experiment 1-Qualitative Analysis  
In addition to calculating changes in the dependent variables, participants were 
asked if they believed the story they read was in fact the genre they were told it was in 
the task instructions. They were then asked to “Please explain your answer to the 
previous question.”  In Experiment 1, the breakdown of participants who correctly 
identified the genre of the story is as follows (Genre expectation/Text genre):  
1) Fiction/Fiction: 99 percent of participants agreed the story they read was fiction 
and stated reasons corresponding to its literariness. Below are some of the 
participant responses. 
(1) The style of writing. 
(2) …seemed specific and literary 
(3) The story had the flow of a work of fiction, not a true story. 
(4) The way that language was used made this story seem like a work of 
fiction. 
(5) ...because the story kept me in suspense like the fiction work should. 
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2)  Nonfiction/Nonfiction: 67 percent of participants agreed the story they read was 
nonfiction. A sample of responses from each group is below. 
i)  Participants who correctly identified the story as nonfiction gave much more 
varied reasons for their answer. 
(1)  …although descriptive like a book, it had the facts and scenery to make 
believe it to be true. 
(2) I think it sounds so unbelievable that it is most likely true. I really liked the 
story and felt a little bit sad for Phineas. 
(3) It is very informative. 
(4) I believe this was a work of nonfiction because of the amount of detail and 
the way the story was told in a historical narrative. 
(5) It seems crazy enough to be true. If Trump can become president, anything 
is possible. 
ii) Interestingly, the participants who disagreed that the story was nonfiction 
stated issues with the story’s believability (i.e., Phineas’ accident was too 
extreme to be plausible). Since many participants who correctly identified the 
story as nonfiction also justified their answer with the story’s believability, 
this suggests a greater degree of variability in reader standards for nonfiction 
in comparison to fiction. 
(1) I think it was cleverly written but I don’t think it was true because that 
would have been a miracle story that I think I would have heard about at 
some point in my life…I don’t think that even today someone could survive 
a tragedy like that. 
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(2) I’m assuming it wasn’t a true story. Amazing if true! 
(3) It seems too extreme to be true. 
(4) It just didn’t seem believable. 
3) Fiction/Nonfiction: 53 percent correctly identified the story genre as nonfiction 
despite the manipulation. However, all these participants indicated some degree of 
familiarity with Phineas Gage and his story.  
i) Of the remaining 47 percent who believed the manipulation, half supplied 
reasons very similar to those on the Nonfiction/Nonfiction condition who 
incorrectly identified the genre as fiction due to a lack of believability.  
(1) This story seems imaginary because of the severity of the injuries. 
(2) It just seems really hard to believe something like that would really 
happen to someone and they would survive. 
ii) The other half, however, gave explanations that indicate the manipulation in 
the task instructions was sufficiently convincing. 
(1) It was presented as a fiction short story, so I believe it was. 
(2) Because the story plot is very fictional. 
(3) I believe the story was a work of fiction because it was stated that it was. 
4) Nonfiction/Fiction: 36 percent of participants correctly identified the story genre 
as fiction despite the manipulation. 
i) For the participants who did not buy the manipulation, overall their responses 
suggest that the story’s literariness was the primary influencer. 
(1) It sounds like fiction. 
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(2) I believe the story was entirely fictional. I do not really know exactly why. 
It is just the impression I got from it. 
(3) It could have been nonfiction but read like a novel. I lean toward novel. 
ii) The remaining 64 percent of participants, however, believed the manipulation. 
The explanations provided by these participants suggest the genre 
manipulation worked to influence how readers processed the story by 
adopting standards typically associated with the nonfiction genre. 
(1)  I think that it is nonfiction because there is too much detail as far as being 
realistic for it to be fiction. 
(2) Everything in the story was more real than not. 
(3) There is no reason to believe it is not so. The story is very plausible. 
(4) It is [a] very informative story. 
Taken together, these responses support the broader, and uncontroversial, idea 
that readers apply genre-specific standards of coherence to narratives they read. More 
importantly, these responses indicate that those standards of coherence can be influenced 
by genre expectation. Furthermore, it does not take much to influence them, just the 
words—fiction and nonfiction. The task instructions before reading each narrative stated, 
“You will now be presented with a short [fiction/nonfiction] story, after which you will 
complete a brief set of tasks about the reading. Please read the following short 
[fiction/nonfiction] story at a leisurely pace.” This was the only paratextual indication of 
the genre that participants were exposed to. 
As expected, most participants did not struggle to identify the genre correctly 
when they were in a control group. In the manipulation groups these numbers dropped 
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significantly, to 53 and 36 percent correctly identifying the genre in the fiction/nonfiction 
and nonfiction/fiction groups, respectively. However, in the case of the fiction/nonfiction 
group, the percentage of correct genre identification in this group was solely a factor of 
participants having familiarity with the story and main character prior to the partaking in 
the experiment, rather than them picking up signals from the text’s nonfiction features to 
counter the manipulation. This familiarity was unanticipated, and was addressed in the 
second experiment by redirecting potential participants away from the study if they 
responded to yes to the question, “Do you recognize the name Phineas Gage?” 
In the nonfiction/fiction group, the participants who did not fall for the 
manipulation cited reasons indicating that they picked up on the fictionness of the story; 
the fiction features of the text, content and style, were evident enough that when 
prompted, they could identify the genre as fiction correctly. Two thirds of participants, 
however, did not do this. Instead, they continued to believe the story was nonfiction even 
after being prompted to consider it might not be. In addition, their explanations support 
the hypothesis that how a narrative is processed by a reader can be predicated on their 
genre expectation prior to reading the narrative.  
These participant responses provide interesting insight into how genre 
expectations establish a framework for processing narratives. At first glance, it seems 
readers may have a better detection for the features and standards of fiction than 
nonfiction since it was easier to influence readers that a story was nonfiction than fiction. 
Also, the third of participants in the nonfiction/nonfiction group who mistook the story 
for fiction, provided explanations regarding its believability that bring up questions for 
future consideration regarding the entangled role of belief and realism in fiction and 
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nonfiction22. Finally, regardless of whether participants correctly identified the genre or 
not after reading, the changes in pre- to post-reading on empathy were still influenced by 
genre expectation, suggesting that genre expectations exerted their influence on the 
online processing of the texts. It also raises the question of how likely are readers to 
recognize they were misled about a narrative’s fiction or nonfiction value, unless 
specifically prompted to consider the possibility after reading.  However, it is important 
to note that these analyses are tempered by the small sample size in Experiment 1, which 
is why the participant pool was doubled in Experiment 2. 
Experiment 2-Statistical Analysis  
A series of 2x2 ANCOVA were conducted with genre expectation and text genre 
as the independent variables, print exposure in each genre (ART) as the covariates, and 
comprehension (SVT), transportation-short form, and narrative engagement as the 
dependent variables. The analyses showed that there were no genre expectation or text 
genre effects on comprehension, transportation, or narrative engagement (all ps > .05). 
The results, in part, contrast the findings in Experiment 1 in which there was a significant 
effect of text genre on transportation. In Experiment 2 only, a Pearson’s r was also 
computed to assess the relationship between the transportation and narrative engagement. 
There was a strong correlation between the Transportation-Short Form and Narrative 
Engagement scales, (r(124) = .80, p < . 01). 
 A 2x2x2 ANCOVA also was conducted with genre expectation, text genre, and 
time (pre- to post-reading) as the independent variables, print exposure in each genre 
(ART) as the covariates, and empathy (IRI scale) as the dependent variable. The analysis 
                                                 
22 This idea will be explored in the Chapter 6. 
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showed there were no genre expectation or text genre effects on empathy from pre- to 




Means and Standard Deviations on DVs: Transportation, Narrative Engagement, and 






M SD n 
Transportation F F 33.33 1.375 28 
NF 32.30 1.269 33 
NF F 31.39 1.330 30 
NF 32.79 1.267 33 
Narrative 
Engagement 
F F 64.46 2.072 28 
NF 63.09 1.912 33 
NF F 63.03 2.004 30 




F F 10.78 .434 28 
NF 10.85 .401 33 
NF F 10.40 .420 30 
NF 11.19 .400 33 
Note: F = fiction and NF = nonfiction. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at 





Means and Standard Deviations on the Measure of Empathy (IRI) – Experiment 2 
 
Genre 
Expectation Genre Read Time M STD 
F F 1 70.12 2.68   
2 70.23 2.67  
NF 1 67.52 2.47   
2 67.2 2.46 
NF F 1 67.85 2.59   
2 66.69 2.58  
NF 1 68.79 2.46   
2 68.4 2.46 
Note: F = fiction and NF = nonfiction. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at 
the following values: ART_F = 8.750, and ART_NF = 4.685. 
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Experiment 2-Qualitative Analysis  
 
As in Experiment 1, I presented a check to see how many participants bought the 
genre manipulation and asked them to provide an explanation for their choice. Though 
Experiment 2 did not yield significant differences from pre- to post-reading on the 
dependent variables, participant responses still overwhelmingly indicate the presence of 
the genre manipulation during processing.  
1) Fiction/Fiction: 99 percent of participants (27/28) agreed the story they read was 
fiction and stated reasons corresponding to its fictional features. Below are some 
of the participant responses. 
(1) It was more descriptive and immersive than I would expect from 
nonfiction. 
(2) The way it was written it seemed like a fictional story. 
(3) It carried itself like a work of fiction.  
(4) It didn’t seem real to me because I felt like if the boy was a real person he 
wouldn’t have disclosed so much about his disdain for his father. 
(5) The narrator was telling the story more from a fictional perspective than 
real… 
(6) It sounds like something from a novel set after WWI, based on realistic 
events but with fictional characters. 
(7) I believe it was a work of fiction because it felt like something that would 
not usually happen in real life or would happen very rarely. 
2) Nonfiction/Nonfiction: 73 percent of participants (24/33) agreed the story they 
read was nonfiction. A sample of responses from each group is below. 
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(1)  Obviously, I have no way of telling so I have to base my decision on the 
writing style, which was clearly nonfiction. 
(2) Too real not to be true. It had too many points right on target which made 
it all the more telling. 
(3) It was so detailed. It feels like it really happened. 
(4) It seems so realistic, plus it brings in Lister, Pasteur, and Barnum in 
historically correct roles, so it seems authentic and not fiction. 
(5) The story seemed like a real historical account and medical phenomenon 
of what actually happened to this poor man. It read like a newspaper or a 
magazine article. 
ii) As in Experiment 1, participants who disagreed that the story was nonfiction 
indicated issues with the story’s believability. 
(1) I don't believe the story was true, I don't have much of a reason why, but it 
just sounded fake. 
(2) …it is an unbelievable nonfiction. 
(3) Because I don't believe that could have really happened. 
3) Fiction/Nonfiction: 69 percent (22/32) percent correctly identified the story genre 
as nonfiction despite the manipulation. The majority of responses suggest longer 
exposure to the text increased reader sensitivity to nonfiction features and content 
of the narrative. A sample of responses is below.  
(1) Just sounds real and plausible and has enough historical details.  
(2) It sounded pretty realistic. 
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(3) The way the story was written, how detailed it was about the accident and 
the time period, led me to believe that it was, indeed, a true story. 
(4) It seemed like an account or a real person. 
i) Of the remaining 31 percent who believed the manipulation, the reasons again 
corresponded to believability.  
(1) Some of the scenes described in the story are consistent with fiction and 
cannot actually happen in real life. 
(2) …because I don’t see how he could have survived the accident that 
happen to him. It all seems made up in certain parts. 
(3) It didn’t seem like something that would be true. 
2) Nonfiction/Fiction: 40 percent of participants correctly identified the story genre 
as fiction despite the manipulation. 
i) For the participants who did not buy the manipulation, overall their responses 
suggest that the story’s literariness was the primary influencer. 
(1) The story seemed to make points and have themes from other writings, 
where the boy was in competition with his father for affection, it just did 
not seem like a nonfiction work. 
(2) It sounded like a novel. 
(3) It reads too much like a fictional tale. 
(4) To me it definitely seemed like a work of fiction. Maybe it was the style of 
writing, but I definitely felt it was fiction. 
ii) The remaining 60 percent of participants, however, believed the manipulation. 
The reasons for this answer were more varied and developed than in 
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Experiment 1. Some participants focused on the story’s realism. Others took 
this notion a bit farther to suggest the story was nonfiction in the sense it 
could be autobiographical and/or historical.  
(1) It felt quite real in every aspect, from the time period to the settings and 
issues that were involved. 
(2) It sounded too real to be fake. 
(3) It sounds very much like it could have been nonfiction. There was a lot of 
detail. 
(4) I assume it is an old memoir? It's a believable story from WWI. 
(5) It seemed like a written tale of the author's young life. 
(6) Because back in the 2 world wars, stories like this could very likely 
happen. 
 
 Since the texts were doubled in length in Experiment 2, readers had much more 
exposure to genre-specific features and content of each story. In the case of the nonfiction 
story, its nonfiction features were much more prevalent than in Experiment 1 due to the 
inclusion of more exposition and factual material. In the case of the fiction story, the 
extended length meant the inclusion of more dialogue and access to the narrator’s inner 
monologue. Therefore, we would expect readers to do better at catching the manipulation 
when prompted. The question is: how much better and would this vary between the two 
manipulations? 
 Readers were more successful at correctly identifying the genre, but only 
significantly so in the fiction/nonfiction condition. From Experiment 1 to Experiment 2, 
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this group improved by 16 percent, from 53 to 69 percent, respectively. Participants also 
improved in the nonfiction/fiction condition, but only by 4 percent, from 36 to 40 in 
Experiment 1 and 2, respectively. Collectively, these results strengthen the notion that 
readers’ standards for fiction are more rigorous than their standards for nonfiction; 
readers were more willing to fit the fiction story into nonfiction standards than vice versa. 
In both experiments, participants were less likely to believe the nonfiction story was 
fiction, and even less so when reading the longer text. Conversely, participants were more 
likely to believe the fiction story was nonfiction, an outcome that did not change with the 
longer text. As in Experiment 1, realism and believability played a role in the reasoning 
readers applied to justify their choices.  
General Discussion  
We examined whether genre expectations and text genre (fiction, nonfiction) 
influence participants’ empathy, transportation, and comprehension. In Experiment 1, the 
results showed that empathy was influenced by genre expectations, whereas 
transportation was influenced by text genre; there were no effects on comprehension. 
Specifically, participants with a fiction expectation reported higher empathy after 
reading, whereas participants with a nonfiction expectation reported lower empathy after 
reading. Interestingly, participants who read nonfiction reported significantly higher 
transportation than participants who read fiction. After identifying a genre expectation 
effect on empathy in Experiment 1, it was decided to lengthen the text of both stories in 
Experiment 2 to test how more exposure to the material would alter this effect. Secondly, 
because of the unexpected transportation results in Experiment 1 (NF Transportation: M 
= 63.13; F Transportation: M = 54.04,) a Narrative Engagement Scale (Busselle & 
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Bilandzic, 2009) was added in Experiment 2 to provide a comparison measure to the 
Transportation Scale (Green & Brock, 2000). In Experiment 2, the effects identified in 
Experiment 1 did not replicate. These mixed results are discussed in further detail below.  
Experiment 1 
The findings in Experiment 1 support the hypothesis that genre expectation plays 
a role in how readers process fiction and nonfiction texts. Specifically, participants who 
had a fiction perspective when reading both fiction and nonfiction texts exhibited 
increases in empathy. In contrast, participants reading with a nonfiction perspective 
showed decreases in empathy from pre- to post-reading. Of note, this effect was also seen 
when isolating the Perspective Taking subscale of the IRI. However, genre expectations 
did not alter participant performance on comprehension, nor reported transportation.  
Contrary to expectations, there was no effect of text genre on empathy from pre- 
to post-reading. There was a significant effect of text genre on transportation, but it was 
in the opposite direction as expected. Participants who read nonfiction reported higher 
levels of transportation than participants who read fiction. How these results fit into the 
body of evidence on the link between reading fiction and enhanced empathy requires 
further study, since these findings are at odds with results obtained in other experiments 
that support the link between reading fiction and enhanced empathy, as well as the claim 
that transportation moderates those outcomes (Bal & Veltkamp, 2013; Johnson, 2013). 
The results of the present study suggest that transportation may not, at least not always, 
be a predictor of changes in empathy. These unanticipated results led to the decision to 
also include the Narrative Engagement scale in Experiment 2 to try and discern if the 
Transportation Scale is in fact capturing transportation, or perhaps something else, such 
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as Narrative Engagement. The Transportation Scale was still used in Experiment 2, but in 
a shortened form with 6 items instead of 12. The shortened form of the scale was 
developed after conducting a factorial validity analysis and exploratory bifactor modeling 
of the Transportation Scale (Green & Brock, 2000); the short form was also assessed for 
reliability and validity (Appel et al., 2015).  
Experiment 2 
 Experiment 2 failed to replicate both effects identified in the first experiment even 
though the texts participants read were longer to encourage deeper processing. Genre 
expectation did not influence empathy outcomes as measured by the IRI from pre- to 
post-reading. Text genre also did not influence empathy outcomes as measured by the IRI 
from pre- to post-reading. Contrary to expectations, no significant differences were found 
in any of the four conditions in the IRI from pre- to post-reading.  
 In addition, there were no main effects on transportation in any of the four 
conditions either. This also does not mirror the results of Experiment 1 in which 
participants who read nonfiction reported significantly higher transportation scores than 
participants who read fiction. In Experiment 2, participants in all four conditions recorded 
comparable scores across all measurements. This also applied to the added measurement 
of Narrative Engagement. The longer texts seem to have levelled the effects obtained in 
Experiment 1, which suggests that the perspective effect may be transient and fragile. 
 Interestingly, the Transportation-Short Form and Narrative Engagement Scales 
were highly correlated. With such a strong correlation between two instruments 
professing to measure different components of engaging with narrative, an important 
follow-up question for the field is: What are these instruments actually capturing?  
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Limitations  
 One of the limitations of the current study was the lack of controlled reading 
environment for participants. Participants were recruited with Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk), an online platform that allows individuals to select Human Intelligence 
Tasks, or HITs, to complete of their own choosing at any location via Internet access. The 
freedom to take the survey online in any location increases the chance that participants 
encounter disruptions or may be generally more distracted during reading, which may 
impact the likelihood of participants becoming immersed in the storyworlds of the 
narratives they read. To decrease this likelihood, qualification parameters were set to 
allow only MTurk workers with an 80 percent or above approval rating, and who had 
completed more than 500 HITs, to take the survey. A time limit was also placed on the 
survey to prevent participant responses that extended over too long a time period, which 
would indicate they did not complete the task in one session. Further, comparison studies 
using MTurk participants and traditional lab settings to complete the same tasks, provide 
evidence of the validity of MTurk data and indicate that the majority of MTurk workers 
are motivated to not simply click through surveys to attain the incentive (Buhrmester et 
al., 2011; Kaufmann et al., 2011).23 Still, ideally future replications and extensions of 
these experiments would also be conducted in a controlled traditional lab setting to 
increase the generalization and stability of the findings. 
 Another limitation of this study was participant familiarity with the nonfiction 
story. This limitation was identified in Experiment 1 when more than 50 percent of the 
participants who read the nonfiction story cited familiarity with the narrative. To address 
                                                 
23 MTurk was also used by some of the studies discussed in this thesis (Johnson, 2013; Kidd & Castano, 
2013; Panero et al., 2016) 
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this problem in Experiment 2, participants were asked if they recognized the name 
Phineas Gage prior to beginning the survey. If they responded yes, then they were 
prevented from going further in the survey. 
 A third limitation of these experiments relates to the limitations of the IRI scale 
and its psychometrics. The four subscales of the IRI—perspective taking, empathic 
concern, fantasy, and personal distress—were note validated using a factor analysis, and 
as a result, a single score was used in the analysis. Future research needs better scales to 
isolate the sub-constructs of interest, especially perspective taking.  
Research Implications and Future Directions 
 The results of the current study are surprising in a couple ways. First, in 
accordance with other studies that investigated the link between empathy and 
transportation, it was expected that the degree of transportation would be related to 
empathy and also that participants who read fiction would report higher levels of 
transportation than nonfiction. In both experiments, transportation was not strongly 
related to empathy outcomes. In addition, transportation was not higher for readers of 
fiction than nonfiction. In fact, in Experiment 1, transportation was actually significantly 
higher for readers of nonfiction than fiction; in Experiment 2, both groups reported 
comparable levels of transportation.  
These results contradict the findings of other studies that identified a correlation 
between transportation and empathy, as well as the idea that fiction is more likely to 
induce transportation than nonfiction (Bal & Veltkamp, 2013; Johnson, 2013; Djikic et 
al., 2013; Mar et al., 2009; Green et al., 2004). The implication of the current study is that 
while transportation continues to be a feature of the narrative experience, assuming an 
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automatic division between its role in fiction versus nonfiction is problematic because it 
does not take into account the narrative range of both genres. In this study, a narrative 
nonfiction short story with human actors was specifically chosen rather than news articles 
or purely expository pieces for the nonfiction reading group. By using a nonfiction text 
with content and features that still strongly distinguish it as nonfiction, but that also has 
human actors and uses narrative storytelling techniques, this study presented readers with 
a text representative of most nonfiction readers access today—long-form literary 
journalism, magazine articles, memoires, biographies, and so forth.  
The transportation results suggest that future studies aiming to delineate 
differences between fiction and nonfiction reading should take into account not just the 
identification of the text as nonfiction or fiction, but the narrative features of those texts. 
Also, by using a nonfiction text that was not blatantly nonfiction by virtue of its form 
alone (i.e., news articles), the hope was to isolate the impact of the genre expectation 
manipulation from the text content and features.  
Future studies could contribute to the delineation between fiction and nonfiction 
reading experiences by including conditions with multiple nonfiction comparison texts 
that encompass a range from expository nonhuman nonfiction to narrative nonfiction 
with human actors. In addition, future extensions and replications of this study should 
include different texts as well to determine that the results were not solely a function of 
the texts and to explore the extent that genre expectations can exert an influence on the 
reading process and potential outcomes. 
The second surprising result of these experiments also troubles the generic fiction 
and nonfiction divide that has pervaded this field. Reading fiction did not significantly 
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improve empathy in either experiment. In Experiment 1, being told you were reading 
fiction influenced positive changes on empathy post-reading but there was no main effect 
of the fiction text itself on empathy. Conversely, being told you were reading nonfiction 
led to decreased empathy post-reading but there was not a main effect of reading the 
nonfiction text either. Again, this result contradicts other findings in the field that suggest 
reading fiction versus nonfiction positively influences prosocial cognition, like empathy 
and perspective taking.  
The second experiment found no changes from pre- to post-reading on empathy 
outcomes, either as a function of the text genre or genre expectation. This is particularly 
surprising since the stories were much longer in Experiment 2. It was expected that the 
increased reading time would deepen processing and draw out the genre expectation 
effects identified in the first experiment. Instead, longer exposure to both texts diluted the 
effect. This suggests the influence of genre manipulations may be transient and fragile, 
which actually aligns with Zwaan’s (1994) findings since the stimuli he used averaged 
216 word. To look into this possibility, the next experiment will shorten the length of 
both texts. It will also be imperative to use additional texts in each condition to improve 
the understanding of this study’s findings and their generalizability. 
Overall, the results of this study bring to light the role of genre expectation in 
processing fiction and nonfiction texts and suggest genre expectation is an important 
factor that future studies should take into account when investigating the reading 
experience. The unexpected empirical results across experiments, in combination with 
participant performance on correctly identifying the text genre, raise more questions than 
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answers. In particular, this study raises some caution about drawing conclusions about the 
relationship between transportation and empathy, and transportation and genre.  
The strong correlation between transportation and narrative engagement also 
means that additional research is needed to delineate the difference between these two 
constructs. What does transportation truly entail? Vivid mental imagery only, or mental 
imagery plus emotional investment in the story, or mental imagery plus emotional 
investment plus identification with the characters? Finally, though reading narratives can 
impact readers, this study provides evidence that this is not always the case. Discerning 
the conditions that lead to improvements on prosocial cognition requires much more 
research. Though this investigation of processing fiction versus nonfiction narratives may 
have elicited more questions than answers, it underscores the importance of continuing 
empirical studies of narrative to better understand their underlying mechanisms and 








CHAPTER 6: FRAMING THE FICTION/NONFICTION DIVIDE IN THE 
CONTEXT OF (DIS)BELIEF 
This project began with the basic premise that narrative matters, that the stories 
we read can shape us in a variety of interesting ways by fostering a simulated experience 
for the reader because narrative is a mode of cognition. But from this premise, two very 
large questions arise: 1) Which stories have this potential and why? and 2) What are the 
tangible, and possible, cognitive outcomes of reading narratives (if we are in fact so 
influenced by them)? The experiments conducted in this thesis carved out a thin slice of 
those overarching questions by focusing on two conditions that inform our reading 
experiences, genre expectation and story genre—fiction or nonfiction. While the previous 
chapter addressed future directions for additional empirical studies, the findings also 
evoke a need to address the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis—the division between 
fiction and nonfiction.  
 In contemporary culture, the shifting and blurring of boundaries between 
subjectivity and objectivity, or instances of fiction and nonfiction, is increasingly 
prevalent. This is evidenced by a few troubling trends: 1) the rise of fake news—
intentional and coordinated dissemination of false information that is presented to the 
public as if it is true, objective, and nonfiction24; 2) the coopting of the term “fake news” 
with the aim to delegitimize actual information (e.g., facts) by labeling it as “fake”, or as 
fiction; and 3) the increase in the spread of misconceptions, accompanied by the 
                                                 
24 The trend to spread misinformation has been widely tracked in the last year, and has resulted in the 
development of guides, like “5 Ways to Spot and Stop Fake News-Don’t Get Taken In” 
(http://guides.library.harvard.edu/fake), and websites dedicated to fact checking have also become more 
active to counter disinformation campaigns (e.g., fakenewswatch.com, factcheck.org, and politifact.com). It 
also now commonplace to see Fact Check headlines across media platforms, which speaks to the very 
present battle between true and false narratives in the public eye. 
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persistence and strength of belief in those misconceptions among the general public25. 
The proliferation of misinformation also contributes to the inability of readers to 
successfully draw distinctions between real, or evidence-based, and manufactured 
information. This concern is further complicated by the fact that some readers partake in 
this practice willingly by seeking out information that supports an existing belief. Taken 
together, these trends result in competing knowledge representations between true and 
untrue information that are difficult to reconcile, and overcome, even in laboratory 
settings with designed materials and learning goals (Trevors et al., 2016; Sinatra & 
Seyranian, 2016; Nyhan & Reifler, 2015)26. The literature so far indicates that conceptual 
change researchers have many challenges ahead in efforts to attain successful knowledge 
revision. 
When Fiction Becomes a Category 
 The shifting boundaries of objectivity and subjectivity in nonfiction and fiction is 
not a new phenomenon, however. Readers have been navigating the difficulties stemming 
from the fact that “the primary categorical division in our textual universe is between 
‘fiction’ and ‘nonfiction’” (Gallagher, 2006, p. 336), for hundreds of years. In the 
insightful chapter, “The Rise of Fictionality” (2006), Catherine Gallagher makes the case 
                                                 
25 A prime example of this is the uptick in misconceptions about perceived dangers of vaccines, a public 
health problem that actually led the U.S. Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions to hold a 
hearing addressing this issue February 10, 2015. The outcomes of that hearing were recently drafted into a 
report, “The reemergence of vaccine-preventable diseases: exploring the public health successes and 
challenges” (2017).  
26 For additional reading on conceptual change research, especially regarding socioscientific, or warm 
misconceptions like climate change, also see Lewandowsky’s article, “Future global change and cognition” 
(2016); Lewandowsky et al. (2012); Sinatra et al. (2014). The expansion of this research in the last few 
years speaks to increased concern about the problem of misconceptions in educational settings, as well as 
their potential impact on society. 
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that the fictionality of 18th century British works was so unique that it jointly established 
conceptions of the novel and of fiction that cannot be disentangled. She writes: 
The novel is not just one kind of fictional narrative among others; it is the kind in 
which and through which fictionality became manifest, explicit, widely 
understood, and accepted. The historical connection between the terms novel and 
fiction is intimate; they were mutually constitutive. (p. 337) 
 
That description makes the development sound like a simple one, but as Gallagher shows, 
it was complex and often murky. Readers27 were put in a position that required them to 
oscillate between old and new understandings of truth while authors played with a story’s 
believability in innovative, but often confusing, ways. Before the mid-18th century, “the 
only reliable ‘operator’ of fictionality was mere incredibility [while] believability was 
tantamount to a truth claim” (2006, p. 339). In other words, if the plausibility of a 
narrative was high then readers believed the story referred to real individuals and made 
“particular referential truth claims” about these individuals. Furthermore, readers were 
typically expected to believe the supposed characters in the story represented actual 
people since most 17th and early 18th century narratives “were meant to be read either as 
factual accounts or as ‘allegorical’ reflections on contemporary people and events” (p. 
339). By making a truth claim, narratives prior to the establishment of the conceptual 
category of fiction were thus positioned to be, and understood as either true 
representations or lies. 
 Writers of fiction were thus tasked with differentiating their work from libel while 
also retaining plausibility, which meant convincing readers to process stories about 
“purely imaginary individuals” by repackaging narratives to be “believable stories that 
                                                 
27 A similar statement applies to authors, and what that entailed is fascinating in its own right, but for the 
current purposes I would like to maintain a focus on the impact on readers specifically.  
 86 
did not solicit belief” (340). This was no easy task considering that literary predecessors 
engaged in intentional deception of their audience by making false truth claims, or 
conversely, claiming that their writing was fictional to avoid accusations of libel.28 As 
Gallagher writes: 
In England, between the time when Defoe insisted that Robinson Crusoe was a 
real individual (1720) and the time when Henry Fielding urged just as strenuously 
that his characters were not representations of actual specific people (1742), a 
discourse of fictionality appeared in and around the novel, specifying new rules 
for its identification and new modes of nonreference. And it is on the basis of this 
overt and articulated understanding that the novel may be said to have discovered 
fiction. (p. 345) 
 
These instances were emblematic of the “‘news-novel matrix’—a tangled mess of 
journalism, scandal, and political and religious controversy” (Gallagher, cited Davis 
1983, p. 340) and they prefaced the impending, and simultaneous, development of the 
novel and fictionality. Also accompanying the arrival of the novel was an expansion of 
“the idea of truth to include verisimilitude” (Gallagher, cited McKeon 2012, p. 341), 
which was “part of a larger epistemological shift from a narrow construction of truth as 
historical accuracy to a more capacious understanding that could include truth conceived 
as mimetic simulation” (p. 341).  
 Readers of the novel had to be guided through this new process of reading that 
sought the “just right” goldilocks level of believability. If authors were successful, then a 
reader “is dissuaded from believing the literal truth of a representation so that one can 
instead admire its likelihood and extend enough credit to buy into the game” (p. 346). 
Gallagher discusses this transition as a development of contained disbelief among 
                                                 
28 Gallagher provides examples of both instances, including Daniel Defoe who claimed Robinson Crusoe 
(1719) was a historically accurate narrative about a real person, and Delarivier Manley who “declared that 
she had published a mere work of the imagination when she was prosecuted for libeling prominent 
aristocrats in 1709” (329). 
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readers. Gallagher leans on Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1817), who famously coined the 
term “the willing suspension of disbelief,”29 when she writes, “Disbelief is thus the 
condition of fictionality, prompting judgments, not about the story’s reality, but about its 
believability, its plausibility” (p. 347). This noncritical form of disbelief, or “self-induced 
susceptibility,” provided a way for readers of the burgeoning novel to recognize a story 
as fiction without rejecting its realism, so that “knowingly reading a novel [would] not 
involve the continuous activity of negating its objective correspondence to reality” (p. 
348). Instead, reading a novel entails suspension of typical real-world disbelief to enable 
a disbelief tailored to the reality presented in the fiction and contained to the momentary 
act of reading. 
Disbelief-Suspended or Constructed? 
 Gallagher’s claim has significant merit. Readers of the time certainly had to 
establish a new method for reading fiction in order to understand these new narratives as 
neither fact nor outright deception, which entailed a complex reconceptualization of 
verisimilitude in light of the novel’s realism. Notably, the suspension of disbelief did not 
arrive in a vacuum exclusive to the novel. The concept was fueled by modern 
developments, such as paper money. Playing the game was not just limited to fiction. 
“Indeed, almost all of the developments we associate with modernity—from greater 
religious toleration to scientific discovery—required the kind of cognitive provisionality 
                                                 
29 Coleridge coined the term, willing suspension of disbelief, in Biographia Literaria (1817). Though 
Coleridge discussed the concept in the context of poetry, it has become widely used and understood as an 
action performed by readers or views of anything unbelievable in order to process, and enjoy, the 
unbelievable on the basis of its fictional premises, rather than reality. Getting readers to believe the 
unbelievable was a concern for Coleridge because of the rise of realism and rational thinking during the 
Enlightenment. An intriguing extension of the current project would entail tracing the arc of realism over 
time to consider its correlation to shifts in literary narratives as well as adaptations in readers’ use of 
disbelief.  
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one practices in reading fiction, a competence in investing contingent and temporary 
credit” (Gallagher, p. 347). Gallagher provides a convincing analysis that the game of 
fiction was unique specifically because it solicited: 
…a willing suspension of disbelief, and this sensation of individual control over 
disbelief set novel reading apart from those mandatory suppositional acts that 
required the constant maintenance of active skepticism. Detaching incredulity 
from the guarded wariness that normally accompanies it, one could use it as a 
protective enclosure that would cordon off imaginary yielding from any 
dangerous consequences. (p. 348) 
 
The establishment of the category of fiction and the novel’s fictionality fostered an 
understanding of disbelief that readers could tap into consciously to read fiction as 
fiction.  
At least, that was the case initially, in fiction’s earliest moments. But after that? 
Does Coleridge’s willing suspension of disbelief continue to dominate how readers 
process fiction? Richard Gerrig (1993) argues against that very notion in Experiencing 
Narrative Worlds: On the Psychological Activities of Reading. In this work, based on 
empirical findings and theoretical analysis, Gerrig contends that “readers naturally 
experience narrative information as continuous with information gleaned from real 
experience and thus must exert themselves consciously to regard fictive narratives as 
fictional” (Keen, 2013, para. 8). This position has received additional empirical support 
as well (Prentice & Gerrig, 1999; Prentice et al., 1997; Gerrig, 1993). Gerrig and Rapp 
(2004) extend this line of work in which they intentionally contrast Coleridge’s notion of 
“the willing suspension of disbelief” to instead posit that readers engage, at times, in “the 
willing construction of disbelief” (p. 267-268, emphasis mine). According to the authors, 
this construction entails an active and effortful process on the part of the reader to 
remember the work is fictional. In addition, they also claim that readers are not naturally 
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inclined to partake in this process, which “leaves open the question of under what 
circumstances readers expend effort to construct disbelief” (p. 268). 
The crucial distinction between these contrasting views of disbelief—suspension 
versus construction—concerns the reader. The construction view asserts that the reader’s 
default mode for processing narrative, including fiction, is belief or acceptance. In this 
view, the need for suspended disbelief to process fiction as fiction is not considered 
necessary. Instead, readers can be prompted to engage in a conscious and active 
construction of disbelief.30 However, doing so is unlikely both since it is effortful and 
would only be of use as part of a specific reading goal (e.g., an analysis of Marxist 
ideology as portrayed in Tolstoy’s War and Peace). In contrast, the suspension view 
stems from the premise that the reader’s default mode for processing narrative is 
disbelief; the reader enters narrative processing as a skeptic who is expected to check 
representations against real-world knowledge to assess validity. With the arrival of 
novel’s fictionality, engaging in the suspension of that disbelief was a necessary solution 
for readers to grasp the complexity, and successfully navigate, the demands of this new 
narrative form. 
The initial struggle for the reader involved recognizing fiction’s fictionality in 
order to process fiction as fiction, according to Gallagher. According to Gerrig, readers 
do not process fiction as fiction unless they actively remind themselves the story they are 
reading is fictional. Instead, he believes we process fiction the same way we process any 
other narrative information, and he further claims that this state of processing is one of 
                                                 
30 The authors posit a correlation between the likelihood of construction disbelief to a reader’s degree of 
transportation, but the empirical support for this idea is murky. Research on other factors, like familiarity 
with the location of the storyworld, has also produced mixed findings. Overall, more research on the 
theoretical notion of construction of disbelief, to discern its properties and how it may function, is needed. 
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noncritical belief. At the starting point, Gallagher’s reader was too skeptical, and needed 
to find a way to harness that skepticism appropriately to read fiction, hence the need for 
the willing suspension of disbelief. Nearly 300 years later, Gerrig’s reader on the other 
hand, lacks skepticism, hence the need for the willing construction of disbelief. Both of 
these positions have merit, but neither adequately captures the complexity of how readers 
process fiction versus nonfiction in the current cultural context. While the tension 
between these positions on disbelief is problematic, I hope to suggest that it is not 
irreconcilable.  
A New Cultural Imperative 
Reclaiming the Division Between Fiction and Nonfiction 
  The time between the opposing notions—the willing suspension of disbelief vs. 
the construction of disbelief—is the key to resolving this tension. Rather than debate 
which one of these notions of how readers apply disbelief is correct, I wish to suggest 
that there is not a debate to be had once we consider the context of the mid-18th century 
reader to the contemporary reader. In other words, disbelief should not be considered a 
static concept, but one with a developmental and context-dependent trajectory. 
The early readers of the novel needed an explicit strategy to comprehend fiction 
as fiction. The willing suspension of disbelief was not merely an optional exercise, as 
Gerrig suggests with the construction of disbelief, but a pivotal tool that allowed readers 
to enter storyworlds and experience them without constantly having to question their 
truth value in relation to realities of the external world. This analysis makes even more 
sense when we consider how new and different the novel and its fictionality were in 
comparison to prior narrative forms. Fiction had to establish a distinctive identity as a 
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new narrative form apart from nonfiction and fantasy (e.g., fairytales), and in doing so, it 
made new demands of its readers. As Gallagher writes, a “cultural imperative” fostered 
the rise of the novel and its fictionality, the establishment of fiction as a category, and 
how the reader adapted to deal with those changes. 
With that moment, the categorical division between fiction and nonfiction 
embedded its imprint on literary culture and on readers. The division still stands, but 
faces considerable scrutiny in contemporary times due to its vastly increased complexity. 
While we retain the division, one can argue it has almost been reduced to pure 
pragmatism. The seemingly clear-cut simplicity of the “Fiction” and “Nonfiction” labels 
in the bookstore does not capture how severely blurred the lines between fiction and 
nonfiction, or subjectivity and objectivity, have become. Again, adapting a 
developmental perspective is useful. It is difficult to imagine now, when fiction narratives 
are so commonplace, and fictionality so pervasive in most every instance of discourse, 
that fiction as a category was ever small, or for that matter, new.   
But the shear exponential growth of the category of fiction since the mid-18th 
century needs to be considered. Less than 300 years ago, the formal category of fiction 
had to stake its claim and establish a distinct identity from nonfiction and fantasy based 
on its self-contained and non-referential (but somehow also universal) realism. 
Furthermore, the category was founded with a fairly small sample size, especially in 
comparison to how many fiction titles I now have access to in the average bookstore. The 
volume of fiction narratives exploded in the 19th century thanks to technological 
innovations that lowered the cost of printing books and was accompanied by higher 
levels of literacy among the populace.  
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Not only are fiction books exceedingly commonplace now, but after the category 
of fiction was established, it did not take long for fiction to develop an expanse of 
subgenres that make their own contributions to the blurring of boundaries between fiction 
and nonfiction, especially memoire and historical fiction. It also seems very unlikely that 
the escalated popularity of these genres in recent times is merely coincidental with the 
parallel weakening of the fiction/nonfiction divide.31  
In addition to the infiltration of nonfiction elements into the realm of fiction, over 
time distinctive elements of fiction have also permeated the nonfiction category. This is 
most evident in journalistic trends, such as the advent of New Journalism in the 1960s,32 
which was followed by an increasing role for literary journalism in more traditional 
outlets, to the current state of TV journalism—infotainment.   
This brief and broad stroke timeline still manages to show that in less than 300 
years we have managed to establish and erode the fiction/nonfiction divide to the degree 
that a reader today listens to news as entertainment while the 18th century reader had to 
develop a concept of fiction and a method for processing fiction just so that they could 
enjoy fiction as fiction.  
Once we consider the state of the blurred boundaries between fiction and 
nonfiction today, it is not far stretched to suggest that the modern reader is navigating the 
brink of a new “cultural imperative” in which fiction has become so normalized as a 
                                                 
31 A promising direction for future study would be a comparison of the sociohistorical contexts of times 
when historical fiction experienced high popularity (e.g., the 19th century with classics like War and 
Peace, and more recently, and the more recent peak in popularity of historical fiction).   
32 New Journalism is defined by its subjective approach. New Journalists did not report from a distance, but 
immersed themselves in the stories they told in order to tell a more ‘true’ story. Notably, works from New 
Journalists typically were/are printed in magazines rather than newspapers. The official starting point of 
New Journalism is typically linked to Tom Wolfe, who actually published a collection of these articles in 
the book, The New Journalism (1973). 
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mode of cognition that its very fictionality has truly faded into the background. Following 
this logic, an amended version of Gerrig’s notion of the willing construction of disbelief 
makes more sense for the contemporary reader, who can be charged with believing too 
much and questioning too little—a significant problem in the current cultural context 
troubled by the rise of deliberate fake news, disinformation campaigns, and 
misconceptions.  
Gerrig mistakenly focuses on the need for readers to construct disbelief in terms 
of fiction processing, but the very fact that the modern reader does not need to engage in 
the willing suspension of disbelief indicates that the modern reader no longer needs a 
strategy for processing fiction as fiction. We have moved from the willing suspension of 
our disbelief, to an automatic unconscious suspension of disbelief as the game of fiction 
became easy and conventional, finally to, plain belief. Remember that the goal of 
suspending disbelief was to free the reader up to believe in the fictional storyworld in the 
closed context of the fictional storyworld. If it’s the case that the new default mode for 
processing narrative is belief, this is not necessary antithetical to processing fiction as 
fiction; if belief is the new default mode, it’s because we learned to process fiction too 
well. Therefore, the problem is not that the contemporary reader needs a strategy for 
processing fiction as fiction, like the 18th century reader did.  
The new problem, the new cultural imperative, is that readers need to relearn how 
to read nonfiction as nonfiction because the fictional framework has become so pervasive 
over time that the new default mode of processing is dominated by fictional parameters 
rather than those of nonfiction. The results reported in the previous chapter also provide 
support for this notion. Readers’ standards for fiction are both more rigorous and rigid, 
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whereas their standards for nonfiction appear to less sensitive to the material presented to 
them. Instead, the standards are driven by preconceived expectations of nonfiction’s 
implicit truth value. Two thirds of the readers who were lied to and told they were 
reading nonfiction but actually read fiction, actively conceptualized the text within the 
framework of nonfiction even when prompted to consider that what they read was not in 
fact true. Taken together, the empirical findings and developmental trajectory of 
disbelief, suggest the division between fiction and nonfiction has not lost any complexity 
over time. The inner workings of that complexity have, however, changed. 
Implications for future consideration 
The problem of disbelief has turned back on itself. The 18th century reader had to 
learn how to read fiction as fiction, which meant learning how to read fiction with the 
goal of meaning-making rather than the goal associated with reading nonfiction, 
information extraction. The modern reader needs to relearn how to read nonfiction as 
nonfiction, with the aim of information extraction rather than meaning-making. Not 
surprisingly, these descriptions reflect Bruner’s concepts of the narrative mode versus the 
logico-scientific mode of cognition. Upon further reflection, in light of the differing 
concepts of disbelief, aligning Bruner’s narrative mode with fiction processing and the 
logico-scientific mode with nonfiction processing may be too blunt of an approach for 
untangling how the modern reader processes fiction and nonfiction narratives. Tracing 
the arc of disbelief suggests that when the division between fiction and nonfiction loses 
stability, readers adjust their processing strategies accordingly. Moving forward, when 
investigating how and why readers process fiction and nonfiction differently, it will be 
important to consider how those modes of processing have shifted over time, so that we 
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may also ask: What strategies can, or should, readers adopt when fiction contains truths 
and nonfiction contains lies? 
Gallagher claimed the paradox of the novel was that it explicitly provided fiction, 
while simultaneously trying to hide that very fact. She writes, “the novel reader opens 
what she knows is a fiction because it is a fiction and soon finds that enabling knowledge 
to be the subtlest of the experience’s elements. Just as it declares itself, it becomes that 
which goes without saying” (p. 349. Put another way, “the novel slowly opens the 
conceptual space of fictionality in the process of seeming to narrow its practice” (p. 340). 
While that paradox may be accurate to describe the early stages of the fiction category, 
the destabilizing of the fiction and nonfiction divide strongly indicates that fiction and its 
fictionality have done anything but narrow their practice. Instead, fiction has radically 
expanded its presence and its fictionality has infiltrated nonfiction to such a degree that 
readers may no longer even be using disbelief strategically, if at all.  
The contemporary reader no longer needs strategies to process fiction as fiction if 
we have come to the point that belief is our default processing mode, and we are 
consequently more likely to process all narratives as fiction. The contemporary reader 
needs strategies to discern nonfiction from fiction, not the other way around. To this end, 
it may be time to revisit the epistemological shift that opened truth to mimetic simulation, 
and reign it in, before nonfiction completely loses its remaining stronghold, its distinctive 
identity and relationship to truth, in the narrative realm. 
It is not particularly surprising that readers’ genre-specific standards of coherence 
and believability are anything but static. What matters is how and why those standards 
shift. Those changes should elicit concern and further consideration because they impact 
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how readers cognitively construct fiction and nonfiction narratives. They also provide 
some insight into how readers toggle between ideas of truth in fiction and nonfiction 
frameworks. The anxiety at the onset of the novel revolved around how to extend the 
reader’s concept of truth outside of nonfiction in a way that would enable fiction to be 
processed as fiction and achieve its own truth value. The current anxiety confronts the 
unanticipated consequences of that operation. We learned to read fiction as fiction, but 
not without damaging the disbelief necessary for processing nonfiction and the 
subsequent ability to successfully extract truthful information and discern lies.  
The problem of truth value in fiction and nonfiction raises a new set of questions 
for research that explores the division between fiction and nonfiction narratives.  
Discovering the mechanisms underlying narrative processing and the potential cognitive 
outcomes of reading stories is essential, but lacking in the sense that it focuses on the 
how, and neglects the why. Future research must also take into account the context that 
constitutes why readers approach and process fiction and nonfiction narratives 
differently, in order to understand the implications of how those dynamics change to 
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A2. Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980) 
 
28-items answered on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “Does not describe me well” to 
“Describes me very well”. The measure has 4 subscales, each made up of 7 different 
items. These subscales are (taken directly from Davis, 1983): 
• Perspective Taking – the tendency to spontaneously adopt the 
psychological point of view of others 
• Fantasy – taps respondents' tendencies to transpose themselves 
imaginatively into the feelings and actions of fictitious characters in 
books, movies, and plays 
• Empathic Concern – assesses "other-oriented" feelings of sympathy and 
concern for unfortunate others 
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• Personal Distress – measures "self-oriented" feelings of personal anxiety 
and unease in tense interpersonal settings 
 
INTERPERSONAL REACTIVITY INDEX 
 
The following statements inquire about your thoughts and feelings in a variety of 
situations. For each item, indicate how well it describes you by choosing the appropriate 
letter on the scale at the top of the page: A, B, C, D, or E. When you have decided on 
your answer, fill in the letter next to the item number. READ EACH ITEM 
CAREFULLY BEFORE RESPONDING. Answer as honestly as you can. Thank you. 
 
ANSWER SCALE: 
A   B   C   D   E 
DOES NOT          DESCRIBES 
DESCRIBE          ME 
ME WELL          VERY WELL 
 
1. I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to me. 
(FS) 
2. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. (EC) 
3. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view. (PT) (-) 
4. Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems. 
(EC)(-) 
5. I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel. (FS) 
6. In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease. (PD) 
7. I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, and I don't often get completely 
caught up in it. (FS) (-) 
8. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision. (PT) 
9. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them. 
(EC) 
10. I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation. (PD) 
11. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from 
their perspective. (PT) 
12. Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare for me. 
(FS)(-) 
13. When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm. (PD) (-) 
14. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. (EC) (-) 
15. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other 
people's arguments. (PT) (-) 
16. After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters. (FS) 
17. Being in a tense emotional situation scares me. (PD) 
18. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for 
them. (EC) (-) 
19. I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies. (PD) (-) 
20. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. (EC) 
21. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both. (PT) 
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22. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. (EC) 
23. When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a leading 
character. (FS) 
24. I tend to lose control during emergencies. (PD) 
25. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while. 
(PT) 
26. When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the 
events in the story were happening to me. (FS) 
27. When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces. (PD) 
28. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place. 
(PT) 
 
A3. Transportation (Green & Brock, 2000) 
 
Circle the number under each question that best represents your opinion about the 
narrative you just read. 
 
1.  While I was reading the narrative, I could easily picture the events in it taking place. 
1  2  3  4  5  6 7 
not at all          very much 
 
2.  While I was reading the narrative, activity going on in the room around me was on my mind. 
1  2  3  4  5  6 7 
not at all          very much 
 
3.  I could picture myself in the scene of the events described in the narrative. 
1  2  3  4  5  6 7 
not at all          very much 
 
4.  I was mentally involved in the narrative while reading it. 
1  2  3  4  5  6 7 
not at all          very much  
 
5.  After the narrative ended, I found it easy to put it out of my mind. 
1  2  3  4  5  6 7 
not at all          very much  
 
6.  I wanted to learn how the narrative ended. 
1  2  3  4  5  6 7 
not at all          very much  
 
7.  The narrative affected me emotionally. 
1  2  3  4  5  6 7 
not at all          very much  
 
8.  I found myself thinking of ways the narrative could have turned out differently. 
1  2  3  4  5  6 7 
not at all          very much 
 
9.  I found my mind wandering while reading the narrative. 
1  2  3  4  5  6 7 
not at all          very much 
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10.  The events in the narrative are relevant to my everyday life. 
1  2  3  4  5  6 7 
not at all          very much 
 
11.  The events in the narrative have changed my life. 
1  2  3  4  5  6 7 
not at all          very much 
 
12. I had a vivid mental image of [character name]. 
1  2  3  4  5  6 7 
not at all          very much 
 
Notes: Items 2, 5, and 9 are reverse-scored.  
Item 12 can be repeated for the number of main characters in the story, substituting a 
different character name for each item.  
 







Facet TS-SF English 
1 3 Cognitive I could picture myself in the scene of the events 
described in the narrative 
2 4 Cognitive I was mentally involved in the narrative while 
reading it. 
3 6 General I wanted to learn how the narrative ended. 
4 7 Emotional The narrative affected me emotionally. 
5 12 Imaginative While reading the narrative I had a vivid image 
of [character name]. 
6 13 Imaginative While reading the narrative I had a vivid image 
of [character name]. 
 
Note: Items 5 and 6 can be repeated if there is more than 1 main character. “Setting” can 
also be inserted in to the character name slot for Item 6. Items were presented with a 7-
point response scales from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Item numbers TS correspond to 
those provided by Green and Brock (2000).  
 
A5. Narrative Engagement (Busselle & Bilandzic, 2009) 
 
 Narrative understanding 
• NR4*: At points, I had a hard time making sense of what was going on in 
the program. (-) 
• CP4: My understanding of the characters is unclear. (-) 
• EC2: I had a hard time recognizing the thread of the story. (-) 
Attentional focus 
• DS1: I found my mind wandering while [the program was on/reading the 
narrative]. (-) 
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• DS2: While [the program was on/reading the narrative] I found myself 
thinking about other things. (-) 
• DS3: I had a hard time keeping my mind on the [program/narrative]. (-) 
Narrative presence 
• NP4: [During the program/while reading the narrative, my body was in the 
room, but my mind was inside the world created by the story. 
• NP3: The [program/narrative] created a new world, and then that world 
suddenly disappeared when the program ended. 
• NP1: At times [during the program/while reading the narrative], the story 
world was closer to me than the real world. 
Emotional engagement 
• EP5: The story affected me emotionally. 
• EP3: [During the program/while reading the narrative], when a main 
character succeeded, I felt happy, and when they suffered in some way, I 
felt sad. 
• SM1: I felt sorry for some of the characters in the [program/narrative]. 
 
(-) indicates reverse coded. 
 
*Key to items’ original theoretical constructs: CP = cognitive perspective taking; EP = 
empathy; SM = sympathy; NP = narrative presence; NI = narrative involvement; LT = 
loss of time; LS = loss of self; EC = ease of cognitive access; DS = distraction; NR = 
narrative realism.  
 
Note: Items across the four subscales were counterbalanced in their presentation to the 




Text of the Short Stories Used in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 
 The texts from Experiment 1 are provided in full. The fiction story was developed 
from My Oedipus Complex, written by Frank O’Connor, and was edited down to 2,934 
words. The nonfiction story was developed from Phineas Gage: A Gruesome But True 
Story About Brain Science, written by John Fleishman, and was edited down to 2,561 
words 
 My Oedipus Complex. Father was in the army all through the war – the first war, 
I mean – so, up to the age of five, I never saw much of him, and what I saw did not worry 
me. Sometimes I woke and there was a big figure in khaki peering down at me in the 
candlelight. Sometimes in the early morning I heard the slamming of the front door and 
the clatter of nailed boots down the cobbles of the lane. These were Father’s entrances 
and exits. Like Santa Claus he came and went mysteriously. 
 
In fact, I rather liked his visits, though it was an uncomfortable squeeze between Mother 
and him when I got into the big bed in the early morning. He smoked, which gave him a 
pleasant musty smell, and shaved, an operation of astounding interest. Each time he left a 
trail of souvenirs – model tanks and Gurkha knives with handles made of bullet cases, 
and German helmets and cap badges and button sticks, and all sorts of military equipment 
– carefully stowed away in a long box on top of the wardrobe. 
 
The war was the most peaceful period of my life. Life never seemed so simple and clear 
and full of possibilities as then. I put my feet out from under the clothes – I called them 
Mrs. Left and Mrs. Right – and invented dramatic situations for them in which they 
discussed the problems of the day. At least Mrs. Right did; she was very demonstrative, 
but I hadn’t the same control of Mrs. Left, so she mostly contented herself with nodding 
agreement. 
 
They discussed what Mother and I should do during the day, what Santa Claus should 
give a fellow for Christmas, and what steps should be taken to brighten the home. There 
was that little matter of the baby, for instance. Mother and I could never agree about that. 
Ours was the only house in the terrace without a new baby, and Mother said we couldn’t 
afford one till Father came back from the war because they cost seventeen and six. 
 
After breakfast we went into town, heard Mass at St. Augustine’s and said a prayer for 
Father, and did the shopping. If the afternoon was fine we either went for a walk in the 
country or a visit to Mother’s great friend in the convent, Mother Saint Dominic. Mother 
had them all praying for Father, and every night, going to bed, I asked God to send him 
back safe from the war to us. Little, indeed, did I know what I was praying for! 
 
One morning, I got into the big bed, and there, sure enough, was Father in his usual Santa 
Claus manner, but later, instead of uniform, he put on his best blue suit, and Mother was 
as pleased as anything. I saw nothing to be pleased about, because, out of uniform, Father 
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was altogether less interesting, but she only beamed, and explained that our prayers had 
been answered, and off we went to Mass to thank God for having brought Father safely 
home. 
 
The irony of it! That very day he began to talk gravely to Mother, who looked anxious. 
Naturally, I disliked her looking anxious, so I interrupted him. 
 
"Just a moment, Larry!" she said gently. This was only what she said when we had boring 
visitors, so I attached no importance to it and went on talking. 
 
"Do be quiet, Larry!" she said impatiently. "Don’t you hear me talking to Daddy?" 
 
This was the first time I had heard those ominous words, "talking to Daddy."   
 
In the afternoon, at Mother’s request, Father took me for a walk. This time we went into 
town instead of out in the country, and I thought at first, in my usual optimistic way, that 
it might be an improvement. It was nothing of the sort. Father and I had quite different 
notions of a walk in town. He had no proper interest in trams, ships, and horses, and the 
only thing that seemed to divert him was talking to fellows as old as himself. When I 
wanted to stop he simply went on, dragging me behind him by the hand; when he wanted 
to stop I had no alternative but to do the same.  
 
At teatime, "talking to Daddy" began again, complicated this time by the fact that he had 
an evening paper, and every few minutes he put it down and told Mother something new 
out of it. I felt this was foul play. Man for man, I was prepared to compete with him any 
time for Mother’s attention, but when he had it all made up for him by other people it left 
me no chance. Several times I tried to change the subject without success. 
 
"You must be quiet while Daddy is reading, Larry," Mother said impatiently. 
 
It was clear that she either genuinely liked talking to Father better than talking to me, or 
else that he had some terrible hold on her which made her afraid to admit the truth. 
 
Next morning I woke at my usual hour, feeling like a bottle of champagne. I put out my 
feet and invented a long conversation in which Mrs. Right talked of the trouble she had 
with her own father till she put him in the Home. I didn’t quite know what the Home was 
but it sounded the right place for Father. My head bursting with stories and schemes, I 
stumbled in next door, and in the half-darkness scrambled into the big bed.  
 
There was no room at Mother’s side so I had to get between her and Father. He was 
taking up more than his fair share of the bed, and I couldn’t get comfortable, so I gave 
him several kicks that made him grunt and stretch. He made room all right, though. 
Mother waked and felt for me. I settled back comfortably in the warmth of the bed with 
my thumb in my mouth. 
 
"Mummy!" I hummed, loudly and contentedly. 
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"Sssh! dear," she whispered. "Don’t wake Daddy!" 
 
This was a new development, which threatened to be even more serious than "talking to 
Daddy."  
 
But it was too late. He was awake, or nearly so. He grunted and reached for the matches. 
Then he stared incredulously at his watch. 
 
"Like a cup of tea, dear?" asked Mother in a meek, hushed voice I had never heard her 
use before. It sounded almost as though she were afraid. 
 
"Tea?" he exclaimed indignantly. "Do you know what the time is?" 
 
I began to snivel. I couldn’t concentrate, the way that pair went on, and smothering my 
early-morning schemes was like burying a family from the cradle. Father said nothing, 
but lit his pipe and sucked it, looking out into the shadows without minding Mother or 
me. I knew he was mad. Every time I made a remark Mother hushed me irritably. I was 
mortified. I felt it wasn’t fair; there was even something sinister in it. He got up early and 
made tea, but though he brought Mother a cup he brought none for me. 
 
That settled it. Either Father or I would have to leave the house. But that night when she 
was putting me to bed she said gently: 
 
"Larry, I want you to promise me something." 
 
"What is it?"  
 
"Not to come in and disturb poor Daddy in the morning. Promise?" 
 





"Well, you know, don’t you, that while he was at the war Mummy got the pennies from 
the post office?" 
 
"From Miss MacCarthy?" 
 
"That’s right. But now, you see, Miss MacCarthy hasn’t any more pennies, so Daddy 





"Well, I think we might have to go out and beg for them like the poor old woman on 
Fridays. We wouldn’t like that, would we?" 
 
"No," I agreed. "We wouldn’t." 
 
"So you’ll promise not to come in and wake him?" 
 
"Promise." 
I meant that. I knew pennies were a serious matter, and I was all against having to go out 
and beg like the old woman on Fridays. Mother laid out all my toys in a complete ring 
round the bed so that, whatever way I got out, I was bound to fall over one of them. 
When I woke I remembered my promise all right. I got up and sat on the floor and played 
– for hours, it seemed to me. Then I got my chair and looked out the attic window for 
more hours.  
 
At last I could stand it no longer. I went into the next room. As there was still no room at 
Mother’s side I climbed over her and she woke with a start. "Larry," she whispered, 
gripping my arm very tightly, "what did you promise?" 
 
"But I did, Mummy," I wailed, caught in the very act. "I was quiet for ever so long." 
 
The injustice of it got me down. Full of spite, I gave Father a kick, which she didn’t 
notice but which made him grunt and open his eyes in alarm. 
 
"What time is it?" he asked in a panic-stricken voice, not looking at Mother but at the 
door, as if he saw someone there. 
 
"Now, Larry," she said, getting out of bed, "you’ve wakened Daddy and you must go 
back." 
 
This time, for all her quiet air, I knew she meant it, and knew that my principal rights and 
privileges were as good as lost unless I asserted them at once. As she lifted me, I gave a 
screech, enough to wake the dead, not to mind Father. 
 
He groaned. "That damn child! Doesn’t he ever sleep?" 
 
"It’s only a habit, dear," she said quietly, though I could see she was vexed. 
 
"Well, it’s time he got out of it," shouted Father, beginning to heave in the bed. He 
suddenly gathered all the bedclothes about him, turned to the wall, and then looked back 
over his shoulder with nothing showing only two small, spiteful, dark eyes. The man 
looked very wicked. To open the bedroom door, Mother had to let me down, and I broke 
free and dashed for the farthest corner, screeching. 
 
Father sat bolt upright in bed. "Shut up, you little puppy," he said in a choking voice. 
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I was so astonished that I stopped screeching. Never, never had anyone spoken to me in 
that tone before. I looked at him incredulously and saw his face convulsed with rage. It 
was only then that I fully realized how God had codded me, listening to my prayers for 
the safe return of this monster. 
 
"Shut up, you!" I bawled, beside myself. 
 
At this he lost his patience and let fly at me. He did it with the lack of conviction you’d 
expect of a man under Mother’s horrified eyes, and it ended up as a mere tap, but the 
sheer indignity of being struck at all by a stranger, a total stranger who had cajoled his 
way back from the war into our big bed made me completely dotty. I shrieked and 
shrieked, and danced in my bare feet, and Father, looking awkward and hairy in nothing 
but a short gray army shirt, glared down at me like a mountain out for murder. I think it 
must have been then that I realized he was jealous too.  
 
From that morning out my life was a hell. Father and I were enemies, open and avowed. 
We conducted a series of skirmishes against one another, he trying to steal my time with 
Mother and I his. When she was sitting on my bed, telling me a story, he took to looking 
for some pair of old boots which he alleged he had left behind him at the beginning of the 
war. While he talked to Mother I played loudly with my toys. 
 
What made it worse was that I couldn’t grasp his method or see what attraction he had for 
Mother. In every possible way he was less winning than I. He had a common accent and 
made noises at his tea. I thought for a while that it might be the newspapers she was 
interested in, so I made up bits of news of my own to read to her. Then I thought it might 
be the smoking, and took his pipes and went round the house dribbling into them till he 
caught me. I even made noises at my tea, but Mother only told me I was disgusting.  
 
It all seemed to hinge round that unhealthy habit of sleeping together, so I made a point 
of dropping into their bedroom and nosing round, talking to myself, so that they wouldn’t 
know I was watching them, but they were never up to anything that I could see. In the 
end it beat me. It seemed to depend on being grown-up and giving people rings, and I 
realized I’d have to wait. But at the same time I wanted him to see that I was only 
waiting, not giving up the fight. 
 
One evening when he was being particularly obnoxious, chattering away well above my 
head, I let him have it. 
 
"Mummy," I said, "do you know what I’m going to do when I grow up?" 
 
"No, dear," she replied. "What?" 
 
"I’m going to marry you," I said quietly. 
 
Father gave a great guffaw. But Mother, in spite of everything, was pleased. I felt she was 
probably relieved to know that one day Father’s hold on her would be broken. 
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"Won’t that be nice?" she said with a smile. 
 
"It’ll be very nice," I said confidently. "Because we’re going to have lots and lots of 
babies." 
 
"That’s right, dear," she said placidly. "I think we’ll have one soon, and then you’ll have 
plenty of company." 
 
It didn’t turn out like that, though. To begin with, she was very preoccupied – I supposed 
about where she would get the seventeen and six – and though Father took to staying out 
late in the evenings it did me no particular good. She stopped taking me for walks, 
became as touchy as blazes, and smacked me for nothing at all. Sometimes I wished I’d 
never mentioned the confounded baby. I seemed to have a genius for bringing calamity 
on myself. 
 
And calamity it was! Sonny arrived in the most appalling hullabaloo – even that much he 
couldn’t do without a fuss – and from the first moment I disliked him. He was a difficult 
child – so far as I was concerned he was always difficult – and demanded far too much 
attention. As company he was worse than useless. He slept all day, and I had to go round 
the house on tiptoe to avoid waking him. It wasn’t any longer a question of not waking 
Father. I couldn’t understand why the child wouldn’t sleep at the proper time, so 
whenever Mother’s back was turned I woke him.  
 
One evening, when Father was coming in from work, I was playing trains in the front 
garden. I let on not to notice him, pretended to be talking to myself, and said in a loud 
voice: "If another bloody baby comes into this house, I’m going out." 
 
Father stopped dead and looked at me over his shoulder. "What’s that you said?" he 
asked sternly. 
 
""I was only talking to myself," I replied, trying to conceal my panic. "It’s private." 
 
He turned and went in without a word. 
 
I intended it as a solemn warning, but its effect was quite different. Father started being 
quite nice to me. I could understand that, of course. Mother was quite sickening about 
Sonny. Even at mealtimes she’d get up and gawk at him in the cradle with an idiotic 
smile, and tell Father to do the same. He was always polite about it, but he looked so 
puzzled you could see he didn’t know what she was talking about. He complained of the 
way Sonny cried at night, but she only got cross and said that Sonny never cried except 
when there was something up with him – which was a flaming lie, because Sonny never 
had anything up with him, and only cried for attention. It was really painful to see how 
simpleminded she was. 
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Father wasn’t attractive, but he had a fine intelligence. He saw through Sonny, and now 
he knew that I saw through him as well. One night I woke with a start. There was 
someone beside me in the bed. For one wild moment I felt sure it must be Mother, having 
come to her senses and left Father for good, but then I heard Sonny in convulsions in the 
next room.  
 
It was Father. He was lying beside me, wide-awake, breathing hard and apparently as 
mad as hell. After a while it came to me what he was mad about. It was his turn now. 
After turning me out of the big bed, he had been turned out himself. Mother had no 
consideration now for anyone but that poisonous pup, Sonny. 
 
I couldn’t help feeling sorry for Father. I had been through it all myself, and even at that 
age I was magnanimous.  
 
He wasn’t exactly responsive. "Aren’t you asleep either?" he snarled. 
 
"Ah, come on and put your arm around us, can’t you?" I said, and he did, in a sort of 
way. Gingerly, I suppose, is how you’d describe it. He was very bony but better than 
nothing. 
 
At Christmas he went out of his way to buy me a really nice model railway. 
 
Phineas Gage. The most unlucky/lucky moment in the life of Phineas Gage is 
only a minute or two away. It’s almost four-thirty in the afternoon on September 13, 
1848. Phineas is the foreman of a track construction gang that is in the process of blasting 
a railroad right-of-way through granite bedrock near the small town of Cavendish, 
Vermont. Phineas is twenty-six years old, unmarried, and five feet, six inches tall, short 
for our time but about average for his. He is good with his hands and good with his men, 
“possessing an iron will as well as an iron frame,” according to his doctor. In a moment, 
Phineas will have a horrible accident. 
 
It will kill him, but it will take another eleven years, six months, and nineteen days to do 
so. In the short run, Phineas will make a full recovery, or so it will seem to those who 
didn’t know him before. Old friends and family know the truth. Phineas will never be his 
old self again. His character will change. The ways in which he deals with others, 
conducts himself, and makes plans will all change. Long after the accident, his doctor 
will sum up his case for a medical journal. “Gage,” his doctor will write, “was no longer 
Gage.” Phineas Gage’s accident will make him world famous, but fame will do him little 
good. Yet for many others—psychologists, medical researchers, doctors, and especially 
those who suffer brain injuries—Phineas Gage will become someone worth knowing. 
 
That’s why we know so much about Phineas. It’s been 150 years since his accident, yet 
we are still learning more about him. There’s also a lot about Phineas we don’t know and 
probably never will. The biggest question is the simplest one and the hardest to answer: 
Was Phineas lucky or unlucky? Once the reader hears his story, they can decide for 
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themselves. But right now, Phineas is working on the railroad and his time has nearly 
come. 
 
Building a railroad in 1848 is muscle work. There are no bull dozers or power shovels to 
open a way through Vermont’s Green Mountains for the Rutland & Burlington Railroad. 
Phineas’ men work with picks, shovels, and rock drills. Phineas’ special skill is blasting. 
With well-placed charges of black gunpowder, he shatters rock. To set those charges, he 
carries the special tool of the blasting trade, his “tamping iron.”  
 
Some people confuse a tamping iron with a crowbar, but they are different tools for 
different jobs. A crowbar is for lifting up or prying apart something heavy, whereas a 
tamping iron is for the delicate job of setting explosives. Phineas’ tamping iron was not 
an average tamping iron either. Phineas had his tamping iron made to order by a 
neighborhood blacksmith, resulting in a tapered iron rod three feet, seven inches long and 
weighing thirteen and a half pounds. It looks like an iron spear. At the base, it’s fat and 
round, an inch and three quarters in diameter. The fat end is for tamping—packing 
down—loose powder. The other end comes to a sharp, narrow point and is for poking 
holes through the gunpowder to set the fuse. Phineas’ tamping iron was very smooth to 
the touch, smooth from the blacksmith’s forge as well as from constant use. 
 
His task is to blast the solid rock into pieces small enough for his crew to dig loose with 
hand tools and haul away in ox carts. The first step is to drill a hole in the bedrock at 
exactly the right angle and depth, or the explosion will be wasted. All day, Phineas must 
keep an eye on his diggers to make sure they keep up. All the time between, Phineas and 
his assistant are working with touchy explosives. 
 
They follow a strict routine. His assistant “charges” each new hole by filling the bottom 
with coarse-grained gunpowder. Phineas uses the narrow end of his iron to carefully press 
the rope like fuse down into the powder. The assistant then fills up the rest of the hole 
with loose sand to act as a plug. Phineas will tamp the sand tight to bottle up the 
explosion, channeling the blast downward into the rock to shatter it.  
 
While his assistant pours the sand, Phineas flips his tamping iron around from the pointy 
end to the round end for tamping. Black powder is ticklish stuff. When it’s damp, nothing 
will set it off. When it’s too dry or mixed in the wrong formula, almost anything can set it 
off, without warning. But Phineas and his assistant have done this a thousand times—
pour the powder, set the fuse, pour the sand, tamp the sand plug, shout a warning, light 
the fuse, and run like mad. 
 
But something goes wrong this time. The sand is never poured down the hole; the black 
powder and fuse sit exposed at the bottom. Does his assistant forget, or does Phineas 
forget to look? Witnesses disagree. A few yards behind Phineas, a group of his men are 
using a hand-cranked derrick crane to hoist a large piece of rock. Some of the men 
remember seeing Phineas standing over the blast hole, leaning lightly on the tamping 
iron. Others say Phineas was sitting on a rock ledge above the hole, holding the iron 
loosely between his knees. 
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There is no argument about what happens next. Something or someone distracts Phineas. 
Does he hear his name called? Does he spot someone goofing off? The reason didn’t 
really matter though because Phineas turned his head. The fat end of his tamping iron 
slips down into the hole and strikes the granite. A spark flies onto the exposed blasting 
powder.  
 
Blam! The drill hole acts as a gun barrel. Instead of a bullet, it fires Phineas’ rod straight 
upward. The iron shrieks through the air and comes down with a loud clang about thirty 
feet away. 
 
The pointed end of the rod enters under his left cheekbone, passes behind his left eye, 
through the front of his brain, and out the middle of his forehead just above the hairline. 
It takes a fraction of a fraction of a second for the iron rod to pass from cheekbone to 
forehead, through and through. 
 
Amazingly, Phineas is still alive. The iron throws him flat on his back, but as his men 
come running through the gunpowder smoke, he sits up. A minute later, he speaks. Blood 
is pouring down his face from his forehead, but Phineas is talking about the explosion. 
His men insist on carrying him to an ox cart for the short ride into town. They gently lift 
him into the back of the cart so he can sit up with his legs out before him on the floor. An 
Irish workman grabs a horse and races ahead for the doctor while the ox cart ambulance 
rumbles slowly down the half-mile to Cavendish. Phineas’ excited men crowd alongside, 
walking next to their injured boss. Still acting as a foreman, Phineas calls out for his time 
book and makes an entry as he rolls toward town. 
 
Something terrible has happened, yet Phineas gets down from the cart without help. He 
climbs the steps of the Cavendish hotel, where he has been living, and takes a seat on the 
porch beside his landlord, Joseph Adams. A few minutes earlier, Adams had seen the 
Irishman ride past shouting for Dr. Harlow, the town physician. Dr. Harlow was not to be 
found, so the rider was sent on to the next village to fetch Dr. Williams. Now Phineas 
takes a neighborly seat on the porch and tells his landlord what happened to him. 
 
That's how Dr. Edward Williams finds Phineas nearly thirty minutes after the accident. 
Dr. Williams pulls up in his buggy at the hotel porch, and there is Phineas, talking away. 
Friends, workmates, and the curious, crowd around as Dr. Williams climbs down from 
his carriage.  
 
"Well, here's work enough for you, Doctor," Phineas says to him quite cheerfully. Dr. 
Williams examines Phineas' head. He can't believe that this man is still alive. His skull is 
cracked open, as if something has popped out from the inside. Accident victims are often 
too shaken to know what happened, so Dr. Williams turns to Phineas' workmen for the 
story, but Phineas insists on speaking for himself. He tells Dr. Williams that the iron went 
right through his head. 
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Dr. Williams does not believe him. "I thought he was deceived," Dr. Williams wrote in 
his notes. "I asked him where the bar entered, and he pointed to the wound on his cheek, 
which I had not before discovered. This was a slit running from the angle of the jaw 
forward about one and a half inch. It was very much stretched laterally, and was 
discolored by powder and iron rust, at least appeared so. Mr. Gage persisted in saying 
that the bar went through his head. An Irishman standing by said, 'Sure it was so, sir, for 
the bar is lying in the road below, all blood and brains.'" 
 
An hour after the accident, the town’s regular physician, Dr. John Martyn Harlow, finally 
arrives at the hotel. The two doctors confer, but Dr. Harlow takes over the case. Phineas 
is a gruesome sight. Bleeding freely from his forehead and inside his mouth, Phineas 
looks to Dr. Harlow like a wounded man just carried in from a battlefield. Yet Phineas is 
alert, uncomplaining, and still telling anyone who’ll listen about the accident.  
 
Dr. Harlow wants Phineas to come in off the porch so he can treat his wound. Phineas 
gets up and, leaning only lightly on Dr. Harlow’s arm, climbs up a long flight of stairs to 
his room. He lies down on his own bed so Dr. Harlow can shave his head and examine 
the wound more closely. What the doctor sees is terrible. Something has erupted through 
the top of Phineas’ head, shattering the skull in its path and opening the brain to plain 
sight. 
 
Dr. Harlow does what he can. He cleans the skin around the hole, extracts the small 
fragments of bone, and gently presses the larger pieces of skull back in place. He looks 
inside Phineas’ mouth and sees the hole where the iron passed upward through the roof of 
his mouth. Dr. Harlow decides to leave the hole open so the wound can drain. Then Dr. 
Harlow “dresses” the wound, pulling the loose skin back into position and taping it in 
place with adhesive strips. He puts a compress bandage directly over the wound and pulls 
Phineas’ nightcap down tightly over it. Finally, he winds a roller bandage around his 
forehead to hold all the bandages securely. Only then does he notice Phineas’ hands and 
forearms, which are black with powder burns. Dr. Harlow dresses the burnt skin and has 
Phineas put to bed with his head elevated. He gives strict orders that his patient is to 
remain in that position. 
 
Phineas should have been dead long before this. A thirteen-pound iron rod through the 
head should kill a person instantly. Surviving that, he should have died of shock soon 
after reaching Cavendish. He’s lost a lot of blood, yet he remains awake and talkative. 
Even surviving the loss of blood, Phineas should have died of brain swelling. Any hard 
blow to the body causes injured tissue to swell. The brain is soft, and the skull is hard. A 
hard blow to the head can rattle the brain around inside like a BB in a tin can. The ratline 
bruises the brain, and bruised tissue swells. The brain swells, but the skull stays the same 
size; a swollen brain can jam itself so tightly it will cut off its own blood supply. This 
swelling can choke off oxygen to parts of the brain long enough to cause permanent 
damage. It can also cause death. 
 
Here Phineas has a stroke of luck. His is an “open brain” injury. The hole on top of his 
head gives his battered brain swelling room. The bad news is that his brain is open to 
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infection. At first, though, he does remarkably well. The bleeding from his forehead 
slows and then stops within twenty-four hours. He remains cheerful and tells Dr. Harlow 
that he “does not care to see his friends as he shall be at work in a few days.” The 
morning after the accident, however, he is glad to see his mother and uncle when they 
arrive from New Hampshire. Two days after the accident, he takes a turn for the worse. 
He develops a fever and begins to have delirious spells. His wound is leaking a foul-
smelling liquid, a sure sign of infection. His death seems just a matter of time now. 
 
But instead, the patient gains strength. Too much strength, in his doctor’s opinion. Dr. 
Harlow is called out of town for a few days, and when he comes back he finds Phineas 
out of his sickbed. His head still heavily bandaged, Phineas is roaming about Cavendish 
in the rain with no coat and thin shoes. He is eating unwisely, refusing nursing advice, 
and ignoring doctor’s orders.  
 
Phineas says he wants to go home to his mother’s house in Lebanon, New Hampshire, 
twenty miles away. He intends to walk. According to the best medical theories of his day, 
Dr. Harlow diagnoses an imbalance of bodily “humors.” This theory, dating back to the 
ancient Greeks, declares that health is maintained by a balance of four liquids, or humors, 
in the body—blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile. To bring them into balance, Dr. 
Harlow prescribes two powerful drugs—an “emetic” to make Phineas throw up and a 
“purgative,” a powerful laxative, to evacuate his bowels. Phineas is knocked flat by the 
medicines and spends the next two weeks in bed, where Dr. Harlow keeps him on a 
“low,” or bland, diet. His humors may or may not be in balance, but Phineas is resting 
quietly at last. 
 
Ten weeks after the accident, Dr. Harlow declares Phineas fully recovered from his 
wounds. He puts Phineas in a closed carriage and sends him home to his mother in New 
Hampshire. Phineas is very weak, but he can walk short distances. He can count, feed and 
dress himself, and sing. He can speak clearly and make sense of what he hears. Yet there 
is something odd about the “recovered” Phineas.  
 
Just before he leaves Cavendish, Dr. Harlow gives Phineas a little test. The doctor offers 
Phineas $1,000 for the pocketful of pebbles that Phineas has collected walking along the 
Black River near town. Dr. Harlow knows that Phineas can add and subtract, yet Phineas 
angrily refuses the deal. Dr. Harlow tells himself that a man who was so badly hurt is 
going to need time to regain his full powers. 
 
In the spring, Phineas goes back to Cavendish, carrying his tamping iron. He never goes 
anywhere without it these days. Phineas has come for a final examination by Dr. Harlow 
and to reclaim his old job on the railroad. His left eye looks intact, but the vision has 
gradually faded away. Phineas has a huge scar on his forehead and a small scar under his 
cheekbone, but otherwise he is physically healed. Yet Dr. Harlow has private doubts 




In Experiment 2, the text length of both stories was extended. In the case of the 
fiction story, this meant including the entire short story without edits, totaling 4,521 
words. For the nonfiction story, edits were still applied to maintain the narrative 
nonfiction content and voice, since the goal was to present readers with text as narratively 
comparable as possible despite the differences in genre and content matter. The 
nonfiction text in Experiment 2 totaled 4,047 words. 
 
 My Oedipus Complex. Father was in the army all through the war – the first war, 
I mean – so, up to the age of five, I never saw much of him, and what I saw did not worry 
me. Sometimes I woke and there was a big figure in khaki peering down at me in the 
candlelight. Sometimes in the early morning I heard the slamming of the front door and 
the clatter of nailed boots down the cobbles of the lane. These were Father’s entrances 
and exits. Like Santa Claus he came and went mysteriously. 
 
In fact, I rather liked his visits, though it was an uncomfortable squeeze between Mother 
and him when I got into the big bed in the early morning. He smoked, which gave him a 
pleasant musty smell, and shaved, an operation of astounding interest. Each time he left a 
trail of souvenirs – model tanks and Gurkha knives with handles made of bullet cases, 
and German helmets and cap badges and button sticks, and all sorts of military equipment 
– carefully stowed away in a long box on top of the wardrobe, in case they ever came in 
handy. There was a bit of the magpie about Father; he expected everything to come in 
handy. When his back was turned, Mother let me get a chair and rummage through his 
treasures. She didn’t seem to think so highly of them as he did. 
 
The war was the most peaceful period of my life. The window of my attic faced 
southeast. My mother had curtained it, but that had small effect. I always woke with the 
first light and, with all the responsibilities of the previous day melted, feeling myself 
rather like the sun, ready to illumine and rejoice. Life never seemed so simple and clear 
and full of possibilities as then. I put my feet out from under the clothes – I called them 
Mrs. Left and Mrs. Right – and invented dramatic situations for them in which they 
discussed the problems of the day. At least Mrs. Right did; she was very demonstrative, 
but I hadn’t the same control of Mrs. Left, so she mostly contented herself with nodding 
agreement. 
 
They discussed what Mother and I should do during the day, what Santa Claus should 
give a fellow for Christmas, and what steps should be taken to brighten the home. There 
was that little matter of the baby, for instance. Mother and I could never agree about that. 
Ours was the only house in the terrace without a new baby, and Mother said we couldn’t 
afford one till Father came back from the war because they cost seventeen and six. 
 
That showed how simple she was. The Geneys up the road had a baby, and everyone 
knew they couldn’t afford seventeen and six. It was probably a cheap baby, and Mother 
wanted something really good, but I felt she was too exclusive. The Geneys’ baby would 
have done us fine. 
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Having settled my plans for the day, I got up, put a chair under the attic window, and 
lifted the frame high enough to stick out my head. The window overlooked the front 
gardens of the terrace behind ours, and beyond these it looked over a deep valley to the 
tall, red brick houses terraced up the opposite hillside, which were all still in shadow, 
while those at our side of the valley were all lit up, though with long strange shadows that 
made them seem unfamiliar; rigid and painted. 
 
After that I went into Mother’s room and climbed into the big bed. She woke and I began 
to tell her of my schemes. By this time, though I never seemed to have noticed it, I was 
petrified in my nightshirt, and I thawed as I talked until, the last frost melted, I fell asleep 
beside her and woke again only when I heard her below in the kitchen, making the 
breakfast. 
 
After breakfast we went into town; heard Mass at St. Augustine’s and said a prayer for 
Father, and did the shopping. If the afternoon was fine we either went for a walk in the 
country or a visit to Mother’s great friend in the convent, Mother Saint Dominic. Mother 
had them all praying for Father, and every night, going to bed, I asked God to send him 
back safe from the war to us. Little, indeed, did I know what I was praying for! 
 
One morning, I got into the big bed, and there, sure enough, was Father in his usual Santa 
Claus manner, but later, instead of uniform, he put on his best blue suit, and Mother was 
as pleased as anything. I saw nothing to be pleased about, because, out of uniform, Father 
was altogether less interesting, but she only beamed, and explained that our prayers had 
been answered, and off we went to Mass to thank God for having brought Father safely 
home. 
 
The irony of it! That very day when he came in to dinner he took off his boots and put on 
his slippers, donned the dirty old cap he wore about the house to save him from colds, 
crossed his legs, and began to talk gravely to Mother, who looked anxious. Naturally, I 
disliked her looking anxious, because it destroyed her good looks, so I interrupted him. 
 
"Just a moment, Larry!" she said gently. This was only what she said when we had boring 
visitors, so I attached no importance to it and went on talking. 
 
"Do be quiet, Larry!" she said impatiently. "Don’t you hear me talking to Daddy?" 
 
This was the first time I had heard those ominous words, "talking to Daddy," and I 
couldn’t help feeling that if this was how God answered prayers, he couldn’t listen to 
them very attentively. 
 
"Why are you talking to Daddy?" I asked with as great a show of indifference as I could 
muster. 
 
"Because Daddy and I have business to discuss. Now, don’t interrupt again!" 
 
 120 
In the afternoon, at Mother’s request, Father took me for a walk. This time we went into 
town instead of out in the country, and I thought at first, in my usual optimistic way, that 
it might be an improvement. It was nothing of the sort. Father and I had quite different 
notions of a walk in town. He had no proper interest in trams, ships, and horses, and the 
only thing that seemed to divert him was talking to fellows as old as himself. When I 
wanted to stop he simply went on, dragging me behind him by the hand; when he wanted 
to stop I had no alternative but to do the same.  
 
I noticed that it seemed to be a sign that he wanted to stop for a long time whenever he 
leaned against a wall. The second time I saw him do it I got wild. He seemed to be 
settling himself forever. I pulled him by the coat and trousers, but, unlike Mother who, if 
you were too persistent, got into a wax and said: "Larry, if you don’t behave yourself, I’ll 
give you a good slap," Father had an extraordinary capacity for amiable inattention. I 
sized him up and wondered would I cry, but he seemed to be too remote to be annoyed 
even by that. Really, it was like going for a walk with a mountain! He either ignored the 
wrenching and pummeling entirely, or else glanced down with a grin of amusement from 
his peak. I had never met anyone so absorbed in himself as he seemed. 
 
At teatime, "talking to Daddy" began again, complicated this time by the fact that he had 
an evening paper, and every few minutes he put it down and told Mother something new 
out of it. I felt this was foul play. Man for man, I was prepared to compete with him any 
time for Mother’s attention, but when he had it all made up for him by other people it left 
me no chance. Several times I tried to change the subject without success. 
 
"You must be quiet while Daddy is reading, Larry," Mother said impatiently. 
 
It was clear that she either genuinely liked talking to Father better than talking to me, or 
else that he had some terrible hold on her which made her afraid to admit the truth. 
 
"Mummy," I said that night when she was tucking me up, "do you think if I prayed hard 
God would send Daddy back to the war?" 
 
She seemed to think about that for a moment. 
 
"No, dear," she said with a smile. "I don’t think He would." 
 
"Why wouldn’t He, Mummy?" 
 
"Because there isn’t a war any longer, dear." 
 
"But, Mummy, couldn’t God make another war, if He liked?" 
 
"He wouldn’t like to, dear. It’s not God who makes wars, but bad people. 
 
"Oh!" I said. I was disappointed about that. I began to think that God wasn’t quite what 
He was cracked up to be. 
 121 
 
Next morning I woke at my usual hour, feeling like a bottle of champagne. I put out my 
feet and invented a long conversation in which Mrs. Right talked of the trouble she had 
with her own father till she put him in the Home. I didn’t quite know what the Home was 
but it sounded the right place for Father. Then I got my chair and stuck my head out of 
the attic window. Dawn was just breaking, with a guilty air that made me feel I had 
caught it in the act. My head bursting with stories and schemes, I stumbled in next door, 
and in the half-darkness scrambled into the big bed.  
 
There was no room at Mother’s side so I had to get between her and Father. For the time 
being I had forgotten about him, and for several minutes I sat bolt upright, racking my 
brains to know what I could do with him. He was taking up more than his fair share of the 
bed, and I couldn’t get comfortable, so I gave him several kicks that made him grunt and 
stretch. He made room all right, though. Mother waked and felt for me. I settled back 
comfortably in the warmth of the bed with my thumb in my mouth. 
 
"Mummy!" I hummed, loudly and contentedly. 
 
"Sssh! dear," she whispered. "Don’t wake Daddy!" 
This was a new development, which threatened to be even more serious than "talking to 
Daddy." Life without my early-morning conferences was unthinkable. 
 
"Why?" I asked severely.  
 
"Because poor Daddy is tired." This seemed to me a quite inadequate reason, and I was 
sickened by the sentimentality of her "poor Daddy." I never liked that sort of gush; it 
always struck me as insincere. 
 
"Oh!" I said lightly. Then in my most winning tone: "Do you know where I want to go 
with you today, Mummy?" 
 
"No, dear," she sighed. 
 
"I want to go down the Glen and fish for thornybacks with my new net, and then I want 
to go out to the Fox and Hounds, and –" 
 
"Don’t-wake-Daddy!" she hissed angrily, clapping her hand across my mouth. 
 
But it was too late. He was awake, or nearly so. He grunted and reached for the matches. 
Then he stared incredulously at his watch. 
 
"Like a cup of tea, dear?" asked Mother in a meek, hushed voice I had never heard her 
use before. It sounded almost as though she were afraid. 
 
"Tea?" he exclaimed indignantly. "Do you know what the time is?" 
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"And after that I want to go up the Rathcooney Road," I said loudly, afraid I’d forget 
something in all those interruptions. 
 
"Go to sleep at once, Larry!" she said sharply. 
 
I began to snivel. I couldn’t concentrate, the way that pair went on, and smothering my 
early-morning schemes was like burying a family from the cradle. Father said nothing, 
but lit his pipe and sucked it, looking out into the shadows without minding Mother or 
me. I knew he was mad. Every time I made a remark Mother hushed me irritably. I was 
mortified. I felt it wasn’t fair; there was even something sinister in it. Every time I had 
pointed out to her the waste of making two beds when we could both sleep in one, she 
had told me it was healthier like that, and now here was this man, this stranger, sleeping 
with her without the least regard for her health! He got up early and made tea, but though 
he brought Mother a cup he brought none for me. 
 
"Mummy," I shouted, "I want a cup of tea, too." 
 
"Yes, dear," she said patiently. "You can drink from Mummy’s saucer." 
 
That settled it. Either Father or I would have to leave the house. I didn’t want to drink 
from Mother’s saucer; I wanted to be treated as an equal in my own home, so, just to 
spite her, I drank it all and left none for her. She took that quietly, too. But that night 
when she was putting me to bed she said gently: 
 
"Larry, I want you to promise me something." 
 
"What is it?" I asked. 
 
"Not to come in and disturb poor Daddy in the morning. Promise?" 
 
"Poor Daddy" again! I was becoming suspicious of everything involving that quite 
impossible man. 
 
"Why?" I asked. 
 
"Because poor Daddy is worried and tired and he doesn’t sleep well." 
 
"Why doesn’t he, Mummy?" 
 
"Well, you know, don’t you, that while he was at the war Mummy got the pennies from 
the post office?" 
 
"From Miss MacCarthy?" 
 
"That’s right. But now, you see, Miss MacCarthy hasn’t any more pennies, so Daddy 
must go out and find us some. You know what would happen if he couldn’t?" 
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"No," I said, "tell us." 
 
"Well, I think we might have to go out and beg for them like the poor old woman on 
Fridays. We wouldn’t like that, would we?" 
 
"No," I agreed. "We wouldn’t." 
 






Mind you, I meant that. I knew pennies were a serious matter, and I was all against 
having to go out and beg like the old woman on Fridays. Mother laid out all my toys in a 
complete ring round the bed so that, whatever way I got out, I was bound to fall over one 
of them. When I woke I remembered my promise all right. I got up and sat on the floor 
and played – for hours, it seemed to me. Then I got my chair and looked out the attic 
window for more hours. I wished it was time for Father to wake; I wished someone 
would make me a cup of tea. I didn’t feel in the least like the sun; instead, I was bored 
and so very, very cold! I simply longed for the warmth and depth of the big feather bed. 
At last I could stand it no longer.  
 
I went into the next room. As there was still no room at Mother’s side I climbed over her 
and she woke with a start.  
 
"Larry," she whispered, gripping my arm very tightly, "what did you promise?" 
 
"But I did, Mummy," I wailed, caught in the very act. "I was quiet for ever so long." 
 
"Oh, dear, and you’re perished!" she said sadly, feeling me all over. "Now, if I let you 
stay will you promise not to talk?" 
 
"But I want to talk, Mummy," I wailed. 
 
"That has nothing to do with it," she said with a firmness that was new to me. "Daddy 
wants to sleep. Now, do you understand that?" 
 
I understood it only too well. I wanted to talk, he wanted to sleep – whose house was it, 
anyway? 
"Mummy," I said with equal firmness, "I think it would be healthier for Daddy to sleep in 
his own bed." 
 
That seemed to stagger her, because she said nothing for a while. 
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"Now, once for all," she went on, "you’re to be perfectly quiet or go back to your own 
bed. Which is it to be?" 
 
The injustice of it got me down. I had convicted her out of her own mouth of 
inconsistency and unreasonableness, and she hadn’t even attempted to reply. Full of spite, 
I gave Father a kick, which she didn’t notice but which made him grunt and open his eyes 
in alarm. 
 
"What time is it?" he asked in a panic-stricken voice, not looking at Mother but at the 
door, as if he saw someone there. 
 
"It’s early yet," she replied soothingly. "It’s only the child. Go to sleep again.... Now, 
Larry," she added, getting out of bed, "you’ve wakened Daddy and you must go back." 
 
This time, for all her quiet air, I knew she meant it, and knew that my principal rights and 
privileges were as good as lost unless I asserted them at once. As she lifted me, I gave a 
screech, enough to wake the dead, not to mind Father. 
 
He groaned. "That damn child! Doesn’t he ever sleep?" 
 
"It’s only a habit, dear," she said quietly, though I could see she was vexed. 
 
"Well, it’s time he got out of it," shouted Father, beginning to heave in the bed. He 
suddenly gathered all the bedclothes about him, turned to the wall, and then looked back 
over his shoulder with nothing showing only two small, spiteful, dark eyes. The man 
looked very wicked. To open the bedroom door, Mother had to let me down, and I broke 
free and dashed for the farthest corner, screeching. 
 
Father sat bolt upright in bed. "Shut up, you little puppy," he said in a choking voice. 
I was so astonished that I stopped screeching. Never, never had anyone spoken to me in 
that tone before. I looked at him incredulously and saw his face convulsed with rage. It 
was only then that I fully realized how God had codded me, listening to my prayers for 
the safe return of this monster. 
 
"Shut up, you!" I bawled, beside myself. 
 
"What’s that you said?" shouted Father, making a wild leap out of the bed. 
 
"Mick, Mick!" cried Mother. "Don’t you see the child isn’t used to you?" 
 
"I see he’s better fed than taught," snarled Father, waving his arms wildly. "He wants his 
bottom smacked." 
 
All his previous shouting was as nothing to these obscene words referring to my person. 
They really made my blood boil. 
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"Smack your own!" I screamed hysterically. "Smack your own! Shut up! Shut up!" 
 
At this he lost his patience and let fly at me. He did it with the lack of conviction you’d 
expect of a man under Mother’s horrified eyes, and it ended up as a mere tap, but the 
sheer indignity of being struck at all by a stranger, a total stranger who had cajoled his 
way back from the war into our big bed as a result of my innocent intercession, made me 
completely dotty. I shrieked and shrieked, and danced in my bare feet, and Father, 
looking awkward and hairy in nothing but a short gray army shirt, glared down at me like 
a mountain out for murder. I think it must have been then that I realized he was jealous 
too. And there stood Mother in her nightdress, looking as if her heart was broken between 
us. I hoped she felt as she looked. It seemed to me that she deserved it all. 
 
From that morning out my life was a hell. Father and I were enemies, open and avowed. 
We conducted a series of skirmishes against one another, he trying to steal my time with 
Mother and I his. When she was sitting on my bed, telling me a story, he took to looking 
for some pair of old boots which he alleged he had left behind him at the beginning of the 
war. While he talked to Mother I played loudly with my toys to show my total lack of 
concern. 
 
He created a terrible scene one evening when he came in from work and found me at his 
box, playing with his regimental badges, Gurkha knives and button sticks. Mother got up 
and took the box from me. 
"You mustn’t play with Daddy’s toys unless he lets you, Larry," she said severely. 
"Daddy doesn’t play with yours." 
 
For some reason Father looked at her as if she had struck him and then turned away with 
a scowl.  
 
"Those are not toys," he growled, taking down the box again to see had I lifted anything. 
"Some of those curios are very rare and valuable." 
 
But as time went on I saw more and more how he managed to alienate Mother and me. 
What made it worse was that I couldn’t grasp his method or see what attraction he had for 
Mother. In every possible way he was less winning than I. He had a common accent and 
made noises at his tea. I thought for a while that it might be the newspapers she was 
interested in, so I made up bits of news of my own to read to her. Then I thought it might 
be the smoking, which I personally thought attractive, and took his pipes and went round 
the house dribbling into them till he caught me. I even made noises at my tea, but Mother 
only told me I was disgusting.  
 
It all seemed to hinge round that unhealthy habit of sleeping together, so I made a point 
of dropping into their bedroom and nosing round, talking to myself, so that they wouldn’t 
know I was watching them, but they were never up to anything that I could see. In the 
end it beat me. It seemed to depend on being grown-up and giving people rings, and I 
realized I’d have to wait. But at the same time I wanted him to see that I was only 
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waiting, not giving up the fight. One evening when he was being particularly obnoxious, 
chattering away well above my head, I let him have it. 
 
"Mummy," I said, "do you know what I’m going to do when I grow up?" 
 
"No, dear," she replied. "What?" 
 
"I’m going to marry you," I said quietly. 
 
Father gave a great guffaw out of him, but he didn’t take me in. I knew it must only be 
pretense. 
 
And Mother, in spite of everything, was pleased. I felt she was probably relieved to know 
that one day Father’s hold on her would be broken. 
 
"Won’t that be nice?" she said with a smile. 
 
"It’ll be very nice," I said confidently. "Because we’re going to have lots and lots of 
babies." 
 
"That’s right, dear," she said placidly. "I think we’ll have one soon, and then you’ll have 
plenty of company." 
 
I was no end pleased about that because it showed that in spite of the way she gave in to 
Father she still considered my wishes. Besides, it would put the Geneys in their place. It 
didn’t turn out like that, though. To begin with, she was very preoccupied – I supposed 
about where she would get the seventeen and six – and though Father took to staying out 
late in the evenings it did me no particular good. She stopped taking me for walks, 
became as touchy as blazes, and smacked me for nothing at all. Sometimes I wished I’d 
never mentioned the confounded baby – I seemed to have a genius for bringing calamity 
on myself. 
 
And calamity it was! Sonny arrived in the most appalling hulla-baloo – even that much 
he couldn’t do without a fuss – and from the first moment I disliked him. He was a 
difficult child – so far as I was concerned he was always difficult – and demanded far too 
much attention. Mother was simply silly about him, and couldn’t see when he was only 
showing off. As company he was worse than useless. He slept all day, and I had to go 
round the house on tiptoe to avoid waking him. It wasn’t any longer a question of not 
waking Father. The slogan now was "Don’t-wake-Sonny!" I couldn’t understand why the 
child wouldn’t sleep at the proper time, so whenever Mother’s back was turned I woke 
him. Sometimes to keep him awake I pinched him as well. Mother caught me at it one 
day and gave me a most unmerciful flaking. 
 
One evening, when Father was coming in from work, I was playing trains in the front 
garden. I let on not to notice him; instead, I pretended to be talking to myself, and said in 
a loud voice: "If another bloody baby comes into this house, I’m going out." 
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Father stopped dead and looked at me over his shoulder. "What’s that you said?" he 
asked sternly. 
 
"I was only talking to myself," I replied, trying to conceal my panic. "It’s private." 
 
He turned and went in without a word. 
 
Mind you, I intended it as a solemn warning, but its effect was quite different. Father 
started being quite nice to me. I could understand that, of course. Mother was quite 
sickening about Sonny. Even at mealtimes she’d get up and gawk at him in the cradle 
with an idiotic smile, and tell Father to do the same. He was always polite about it, but he 
looked so puzzled you could see he didn’t know what she was talking about. He 
complained of the way Sonny cried at night, but she only got cross and said that Sonny 
never cried except when there was something up with him – which was a flaming lie, 
because Sonny never had anything up with him, and only cried for attention. It was really 
painful to see how simpleminded she was. 
 
Father wasn’t attractive, but he had a fine intelligence. He saw through Sonny, and now 
he knew that I saw through him as well. One night I woke with a start. There was 
someone beside me in the bed. For one wild moment I felt sure it must be Mother, having 
come to her senses and left Father for good, but then I heard Sonny in convulsions in the 
next room, and Mother saying: "There! There! There!" and I knew it wasn’t she. It was 
Father. He was lying beside me, wide-awake, breathing hard and apparently as mad as 
hell. After a while it came to me what he was mad about. It was his turn now. After 
turning me out of the big bed, he had been turned out himself. Mother had no 
consideration now for anyone but that poisonous pup, Sonny. 
 
I couldn’t help feeling sorry for Father. I had been through it all myself, and even at that 
age I was magnanimous. I began to stroke him down and say: "There! There!" 
 
He wasn’t exactly responsive. "Aren’t you asleep either?" he snarled. 
 
"Ah, come on and put your arm around us, can’t you?" I said, and he did, in a sort of 
way. Gingerly, I suppose, is how you’d describe it. He was very bony but better than 
nothing. 
 
At Christmas he went out of his way to buy me a really nice model railway. 
 
 Phineas Gage. The most unlucky/lucky moment in the life of Phineas Gage is 
only a minute or two away. It’s almost four-thirty in the afternoon on September 13, 
1848. Phineas is the foreman of a track construction gang that is in the process of blasting 
a railroad right-of-way through granite bedrock near the small town of Cavendish, 
Vermont. Phineas is twenty-six years old, unmarried, and five feet, six inches tall, short 
for our time but about average for his. He is good with his hands and good with his men, 
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“possessing an iron will as well as an iron frame,” according to his doctor. In a moment, 
Phineas will have a horrible accident. 
 
It will kill him, but it will take another eleven years, six months, and nineteen days to do 
so. In the short run, Phineas will make a full recovery, or so it will seem to those who 
didn’t know him before. Old friends and family know the truth. Phineas will never be his 
old self again. His character will change. The ways in which he deals with others, 
conducts himself, and makes plans will all change. Long after the accident, his doctor 
will sum up his case for a medical journal. “Gage,” his doctor will write, “was no longer 
Gage.” Phineas Gage’s accident will make him world famous, but fame will do him little 
good. Yet for many others—psychologists, medical researchers, doctors, and especially 
those who suffer brain injuries—Phineas Gage will become someone worth knowing. 
 
That’s why we know so much about Phineas. It’s been 150 years since his accident, yet 
we are still learning more about him. There’s also a lot about Phineas we don’t know and 
probably never will. The biggest question is the simplest one and the hardest to answer: 
Was Phineas lucky or unlucky? Once the reader hears his story, they can decide for 
themselves. But right now, Phineas is working on the railroad and his time has nearly 
come. 
 
Building a railroad in 1848 is muscle work. There are no bull dozers or power shovels to 
open a way through Vermont’s Green Mountains for the Rutland & Burlington Railroad. 
Phineas’ men work with picks, shovels, and rock drills. Phineas’ special skill is blasting. 
With well-placed charges of black gunpowder, he shatters rock. To set those charges, he 
carries the special tool of the blasting trade, his “tamping iron.”  
 
Some people confuse a tamping iron with a crowbar, but they are different tools for 
different jobs. A crowbar is for lifting up or prying apart something heavy, whereas a 
tamping iron is for the delicate job of setting explosives. Phineas’ tamping iron was not 
an average tamping iron either. Phineas had his tamping iron made to order by a 
neighborhood blacksmith, resulting in a tapered iron rod three feet, seven inches long and 
weighing thirteen and a half pounds. It looks like an iron spear. At the base, it’s fat and 
round, an inch and three quarters in diameter. The fat end is for tamping—packing 
down—loose powder. The other end comes to a sharp, narrow point and is for poking 
holes through the gunpowder to set the fuse. Phineas’ tamping iron was very smooth to 
the touch, smooth from the blacksmith’s forge as well as from constant use. 
 
His task is to blast the solid rock into pieces small enough for his crew to dig loose with 
hand tools and haul away in ox carts. The first step is to drill a hole in the bedrock at 
exactly the right angle and depth, or the explosion will be wasted. All day, Phineas must 
keep an eye on his diggers to make sure they keep up. All the time between, Phineas and 
his assistant are working with touchy explosives. 
 
They follow a strict routine. His assistant “charges” each new hole by filling the bottom 
with coarse-grained gunpowder. Phineas uses the narrow end of his iron to carefully press 
the rope like fuse down into the powder. The assistant then fills up the rest of the hole 
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with loose sand to act as a plug. Phineas will tamp the sand tight to bottle up the 
explosion, channeling the blast downward into the rock to shatter it.  
 
While his assistant pours the sand, Phineas flips his tamping iron around from the pointy 
end to the round end for tamping. Black powder is ticklish stuff. When it’s damp, nothing 
will set it off. When it’s too dry or mixed in the wrong formula, almost anything can set it 
off, without warning. But Phineas and his assistant have done this a thousand times—
pour the powder, set the fuse, pour the sand, tamp the sand plug, shout a warning, light 
the fuse, and run like mad. 
 
But something goes wrong this time. The sand is never poured down the hole; the black 
powder and fuse sit exposed at the bottom. Does his assistant forget, or does Phineas 
forget to look? Witnesses disagree. A few yards behind Phineas, a group of his men are 
using a hand-cranked derrick crane to hoist a large piece of rock. Some of the men 
remember seeing Phineas standing over the blast hole, leaning lightly on the tamping 
iron. Others say Phineas was sitting on a rock ledge above the hole, holding the iron 
loosely between his knees. 
 
There is no argument about what happens next. Something or someone distracts Phineas. 
Does he hear his name called? Does he spot someone goofing off? The reason didn’t 
really matter though because Phineas turned his head. The fat end of his tamping iron 
slips down into the hole and strikes the granite. A spark flies onto the exposed blasting 
powder.  
 
Blam! The drill hole acts as a gun barrel. Instead of a bullet, it fires Phineas’ rod straight 
upward. The iron shrieks through the air and comes down with a loud clang about thirty 
feet away. 
 
The pointed end of the rod enters under his left cheekbone, passes behind his left eye, 
through the front of his brain, and out the middle of his forehead just above the hairline. 
It takes a fraction of a fraction of a second for the iron rod to pass from cheekbone to 
forehead, through and through. 
 
Amazingly, Phineas is still alive. The iron throws him flat on his back, but as his men 
come running through the gunpowder smoke, he sits up. A minute later, he speaks. Blood 
is pouring down his face from his forehead, but Phineas is talking about the explosion. 
His men insist on carrying him to an ox cart for the short ride into town. They gently lift 
him into the back of the cart so he can sit up with his legs out before him on the floor. An 
Irish workman grabs a horse and races ahead for the doctor while the ox cart ambulance 
rumbles slowly down the half-mile to Cavendish. Phineas’ excited men crowd alongside, 
walking next to their injured boss. Still acting as a foreman, Phineas calls out for his time 
book and makes an entry as he rolls toward town. 
 
Something terrible has happened, yet Phineas gets down from the cart without help. He 
climbs the steps of the Cavendish hotel, where he has been living, and takes a seat on the 
porch beside his landlord, Joseph Adams. A few minutes earlier, Adams had seen the 
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Irishman ride past shouting for Dr. Harlow, the town physician. Dr. Harlow was not to be 
found, so the rider was sent on to the next village to fetch Dr. Williams. Now Phineas 
takes a neighborly seat on the porch and tells his landlord what happened to him. 
 
That's how Dr. Edward Williams finds Phineas nearly thirty minutes after the accident. 
Dr. Williams pulls up in his buggy at the hotel porch, and there is Phineas, talking away. 
Friends, workmates, and the curious, crowd around as Dr. Williams climbs down from 
his carriage.  
 
"Well, here's work enough for you, Doctor," Phineas says to him quite cheerfully. Dr. 
Williams examines Phineas' head. He can't believe that this man is still alive. His skull is 
cracked open, as if something has popped out from the inside. Accident victims are often 
too shaken to know what happened, so Dr. Williams turns to Phineas' workmen for the 
story, but Phineas insists on speaking for himself. He tells Dr. Williams that the iron went 
right through his head. 
 
Dr. Williams does not believe him. "I thought he was deceived," Dr. Williams wrote in 
his notes. "I asked him where the bar entered, and he pointed to the wound on his cheek, 
which I had not before discovered. This was a slit running from the angle of the jaw 
forward about one and a half inch. It was very much stretched laterally, and was 
discolored by powder and iron rust, at least appeared so. Mr. Gage persisted in saying 
that the bar went through his head. An Irishman standing by said, 'Sure it was so, sir, for 
the bar is lying in the road below, all blood and brains.'" 
 
An hour after the accident, the town’s regular physician, Dr. John Martyn Harlow, finally 
arrives at the hotel. The two doctors confer, but Dr. Harlow takes over the case. Phineas 
is a gruesome sight. Bleeding freely from his forehead and inside his mouth, Phineas 
looks to Dr. Harlow like a wounded man just carried in from a battlefield. Yet Phineas is 
alert, uncomplaining, and still telling anyone who’ll listen about the accident.  
 
Dr. Harlow wants Phineas to come in off the porch so he can treat his wound. Phineas 
gets up and, leaning only lightly on Dr. Harlow’s arm, climbs up a long flight of stairs to 
his room. He lies down on his own bed so Dr. Harlow can shave his head and examine 
the wound more closely. What the doctor sees is terrible. Something has erupted through 
the top of Phineas’ head, shattering the skull in its path and opening the brain to plain 
sight. 
 
Dr. Harlow does what he can. He cleans the skin around the hole, extracts the small 
fragments of bone, and gently presses the larger pieces of skull back in place. He looks 
inside Phineas’ mouth and sees the hole where the iron passed upward through the roof of 
his mouth. Dr. Harlow decides to leave the hole open so the wound can drain. Then Dr. 
Harlow “dresses” the wound, pulling the loose skin back into position and taping it in 
place with adhesive strips. He puts a compress bandage directly over the wound and pulls 
Phineas’ nightcap down tightly over it. 
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Finally, he winds a roller bandage around his forehead to hold all the bandages securely. 
Only then does he notice Phineas’ hands and forearms, which are black with powder 
burns. Dr. Harlow dresses the burnt skin and has Phineas put to bed with his head 
elevated. He gives strict orders that his patient is to remain in that position. 
 
Phineas should have been dead long before this. A thirteen-pound iron rod through the 
head should kill a person instantly. Surviving that, he should have died of shock soon 
after reaching Cavendish. He’s lost a lot of blood, yet he remains awake and talkative. 
Even surviving the loss of blood, Phineas should have died of brain swelling. Any hard 
blow to the body causes injured tissue to swell. The brain is soft, and the skull is hard. A 
hard blow to the head can rattle the brain around inside like a BB in a tin can. The ratline 
bruises the brain, and bruised tissue swells. The brain swells, but the skull stays the same 
size; a swollen brain can jam itself so tightly it will cut off its own blood supply. This 
swelling can choke off oxygen to parts of the brain long enough to cause permanent 
damage. It can also cause death. 
 
Here Phineas has a stroke of luck. His is an “open brain” injury. The hole on top of his 
head gives his battered brain swelling room. The bad news is that his brain is open to 
infection. At first, though, he does remarkably well. The bleeding from his forehead 
slows and then stops within twenty-four hours. He remains cheerful and tells Dr. Harlow 
that he “does not care to see his friends as he shall be at work in a few days.”  
 
The morning after the accident, however, he is glad to see his mother and uncle when 
they arrive from New Hampshire. Two days after the accident, he takes a turn for the 
worse. He develops a fever and begins to have delirious spells. His wound is leaking a 
foul-smelling liquid, a sure sign of infection. His death seems just a matter of time now. 
 
More than any other organ, the brain is sealed off from the outside world and from the 
rest of the body. There are many layers of tissue, bone, and skin to keep it protected from 
the outside, but there’s also a “blood-brain barrier” that keeps out many substances 
circulating in the blood. Oxygen and nutrients can cross the blood-brain barrier, but many 
dangerous substances like bacteria cannot. With his skull fractured, Phineas’ exposed 
brain is wide open, making an ideal candidate for a fatal infection.  
 
No one in Cavendish in 1848, no scientist in America or Europe, has the slightest notion 
that bacteria cause infection. Medical science at this time knows very little about bacteria, 
even though they were first seen through microscopes nearly two hundred years before. 
 
But few doctors have ever used a microscope, because it is not considered a medical 
instrument. These microscopic animals might be marvels of nature but no doctor suspects 
that they have anything to do with disease, let alone infections. Doctors at this time don’t 
use the word “infection,” but they know its symptoms well. They call it “sepsis,” and 
they know from bitter experience how quickly a “septic” wound can go from slight 
redness to gross swell to a fatal condition called gangrene. 
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But the doctors of the time don’t realize that gangrene is the end result of bacterial 
infection. They don’t realize that floating in the air on dust particles, lurking on 
fingertips, or growing on the shiny steel blades of their unwashed surgical scalpels are 
single-celled bacteria and other microscopic life forms. On the smallest surface, there are 
hundreds of millions of them. They represent thousands of different species; there are 
tiny plants, tiny fungi, tiny viruses, and tiny animals. Among the microanimals are two 
particularly dangerous families of bacteria—streptococci and staphylococci (“strep” and 
“staph,” for short). What doctors don’t know in 1848, strep and staph do: that the broken 
head of Phinease is an ideal location to land. 
 
A wound is an open door. A cut or break in the skin lets staph and strep bacteria colonize 
the warm, wet, nutrient-rich cells inside. Once these bacteria get established in the body, 
they reproduce wildly. The body’s immune system tries to kill the invading bacteria with 
an array of special immune cells, while the bacteria try to protect themselves against 
immune cells by cranking out toxic chemicals. That’s an infection. The site of this 
biological battle between the immune system and bacteria swells up and turns red. 
 
It will take nearly a century for science to develop the first “antibiotic,” penicillin, to 
counter infections. In 1848, a young Frenchman named Louis Pasteur is studying 
chemistry in Paris. Eventually, Pasteur will unravel the three great biological mysteries of 
his time—fermentation, decay, and infection. All three processes are the work of living 
microorganisms; Pasteur will call them “germs.” Pasteur’s “germ theory” will lead to a 
revolution in medicine. It will inspire an English surgeon named Joseph Lister to try 
performing surgery in sterile conditions that exclude or kill all microorganisms. Lister 
will scrub his hands almost raw before operating, he will boil surgical clothing and 
instruments, and he will set up a machine to spray carbolic acid in the operating room to 
kill germs in midair. Lister’s first sterile operations in 1868 will cut the number of deaths 
from infection after surgery by 90 percent. For the first time in history, doctors will help 
more patients with surgery than they harm with postsurgical infections. 
 
None of this progress to come will do Phineas a bit of good. Instead, Phineas is saved by 
luck and good care. Dr. Harlow follows the best medical advice of his time—keep the 
wound clean but covered and watch for inflammation. Fourteen days after the accident, 
Phineas develops a huge abscess under the skin just above his eyes. Phineas is feverish, 
losing his appetite, and sinking fast. Dr. Harlow lances the abscess, drains the pus and 
dresses Phineas’ forehead again. The fever abates. His scalp begins to heal. Phineas is 
saved by his youth, his iron constitution, and Dr. Harlow’s good nursing.  
 
And then, the patient gains strength. Too much strength, in his doctor’s opinion. Dr. 
Harlow is called out of town for a few days, and when he comes back he finds Phineas 
out of his sickbed. His head still heavily bandaged, Phineas is roaming about Cavendish 
in the rain with no coat and thin shoes. He is eating unwisely, refusing nursing advice, 
and ignoring doctor’s orders.  
 
Phineas says he wants to go home to his mother’s house in Lebanon, New Hampshire, 
twenty miles away. He intends to walk. According to the best medical theories of his day, 
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Dr. Harlow diagnoses an imbalance of bodily “humors.” This theory, dating back to the 
ancient Greeks, declares that health is maintained by a balance of four liquids, or humors, 
in the body—blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile. To bring them into balance, Dr. 
Harlow prescribes two powerful drugs—an “emetic” to make Phineas throw up and a 
“purgative,” a powerful laxative, to evacuate his bowels. Phineas is knocked flat by the 
medicines and spends the next two weeks in bed, where Dr. Harlow keeps him on a 
“low,” or bland, diet. His humors may or may not be in balance, but Phineas is resting 
quietly at last. 
 
Ten weeks after the accident, Dr. Harlow declares Phineas fully recovered from his 
wounds. He puts Phineas in a closed carriage and sends him home to his mother in New 
Hampshire. Phineas is very weak, but he can walk short distances. He can count, feed and 
dress himself, and sing. He can speak clearly and make sense of what he hears. Yet there 
is something odd about the “recovered” Phineas.  
 
Just before he leaves Cavendish, Dr. Harlow gives Phineas a little test. The doctor offers 
Phineas $1,000 for the pocketful of pebbles that Phineas has collected walking along the 
Black River near town. Dr. Harlow knows that Phineas can add and subtract, yet Phineas 
angrily refuses the deal. Dr. Harlow tells himself that a man who was so badly hurt is 
going to need time to regain his full powers. 
 
As soon as Phineas leaves for home, Dr. Harlow writes a short report for a leading 
medical journal. Most doctors ignore the article. The few who read it don’t believe it. 
How could a man survive such an injury, let alone make a “complete recovery”? But one 
Boston doctor, Henry J. Bigelow, is intrigued. He writes to Harlow for information and 
urges him to back up his case by collecting formal statements from eyewitnesses.  
 
In the spring, Phineas goes back to Cavendish, carrying his tamping iron. He never goes 
anywhere without it these days. Phineas has come for a final examination by Dr. Harlow 
and to reclaim his old job on the railroad. His left eye looks intact, but the vision has 
gradually faded away. Phineas has a huge scar on his forehead and a small scar under his 
cheekbone, but otherwise he is physically healed. Yet Dr. Harlow has private doubts 
about Phineas’ mental state. Phineas is just not his old self. 
 
His old employers on the railroad quickly come to the same conclusion. The new Phineas 
is unreliable and, at times, downright nasty. He insults old workmates and friends. He 
spouts vulgar language in the presence of women. He changes his mind and his orders 
from minute to minute. The railroad contractors let him go. Dr. Harlow, who is keeping 
confidential notes on Phineas, sadly writes, “His contractors, who regarded him as the 
most efficient and capable foreman in their employ previous to his injury, considered the 
change in his mind so marked that they could not give him his place again. 
 
Phineas’ old friends also wash their hands of him. Dr. Harlow writes: “He is fitful, 
irreverent, indulging at times in the grossest profanity (which was not previously his 
custom), manifesting but little deference for his fellows, impatient of restraint or advice 
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when it conflicts with his desires.” Phineas comes up with all sorts of new plans, the 
doctor writes, but they are no sooner announced than he drops them.  
 
Phineas is like a small child who says he is running away from home after lunch and then 
comes up with a new idea over his sandwich. Dr. Harlow writes, “A child in his 
intellectual capacities and manifestations, he has the animal passions of a strong man.” A 
doctor is bound by his oath not to reveal the details of a patient’s condition without 
permission, so Dr. Harlow will keep his observations to himself for twenty years. 
 
Meantime, Dr. Harlow receives another letter from Dr. Bigelow at Harvard, who thanks 
him for collecting the eyewitness statements about the accident, and asks: Would Mr. 
Gage consider coming to Boston at Dr. Bigelow’s expense so his case could be presented 
at the medical school and before the Boston Society of Medical Improvement? 
 
In the winter of 1850, Phineas goes to Boston so the doctors there can see for themselves, 
tamping iron in hand. A prize specimen, Phineas is examined, measured, and discussed. 
He agrees to sit for a plaster “life” mask. Dr. Bigelow puts straws up Phineas’ nose so he 
can breathe while the doctor pours liquid plaster over his face. From it, Dr. Bigelow casts 
a three-dimensional version of Phineas’ face. The enormous scar on his forehead is clear. 
The casting clearly shows scars where the iron went in and came out. Yet there are 
doctors who think that Phineas is a humbug, a fake from the back woods of Vermont. 
 
The plaster head remains in Boston, but Phineas and his tamping iron soon slip out of 
town. He travels from city to city through New England and ends up at P.T. Barnum’s 
American Museum on Broadway in New York City, the story goes. In Barnum’s time, 
people pay to see “living giants,” “bearded ladies,” and calves born with two heads. 
People have always gawked at strange and unusual things.  
 
Barnum’s special genius is “improving” the unusual. Hype and humbug make Barnum’s 
museum a roaring success. He pulls in the crowds with half-fakes like the “Woolly 
Horse,” a strange, long-haired horse that Barnum declares is a newly discovered species, 
being part deer, buffalo, elephant, camel, and sheep. At least the Woolly Horse is a real 
horse. Barnum’s “mermaid” is a total fake, a counterfeit fossil pasted together from bones 
withered skins, and who knows what else. Barnum shows his “mermaid” alongside real 
exotic animals like orangutans and grizzly bears. 
 
Barnum floods the exterior with the brightest lights in all of New York. Inside, the 
lighting is deliberately dim. The noise is deafening, with actors, jugglers, and the glass 
blowers working the crowd. 
 
Barnum’s museum billed Phineas as “The Only Living Man With a Hole in His Head.” 
The poster and one-sheets depicted a husky young man smiling broadly in spite of a huge 
iron bar which stuck out of his head. Of course, the iron bar no longer protruded from 
Gage’s head but he had it with him, and another skull, also perforated. During his 
sideshow performances, he would shove the long iron through the holes in his extra skull 
to demonstrate just how he was injured. All the details were to be found in a pamphlet he 
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sold, and by paying ten cents extra, skeptics could part Gage’s hair and see his brain, 
what there was left of it, pulsating beneath the new, thin covering. 
 
 
